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ABSTRACT 
This thesis deploys works of literature, political theory and intellectual history to reach an 
understanding of both the specific form and the content taken by the American political 
novel. This understanding is informed by an over-arching analysis of liberalism as the 
dominant ideology within the US pohfical tradition and the pressure-moral and political- 
exerted on this ideology by successive counter-ideologies at various historical junctures. 
The alleged 'anti-political' basis of many post World War 11 theories of American literature is 
initially explored along with the relative absence of American literature in studies of the 
political novel. Works by the 'New Americanist' literary critics as well as an important recent 
study of American political fiction by John Whalen-Bridge are also subjected to critical 
scrutiny. 
In the central chapters, tiovels by Gore Vidal, Russell Banks, Lionel Trilling and Philip Roth 
foreground the critique of liberalism put forward by republicanism, Transcendentahsm, 
Marxism and neo-conservatism at their respective historical moments of ascent. The aim here, 
primarily, is to treat novelists seriously as political thbikers; much of the analysis is, 
accordingly, inter-disciplinary in approach drawing from artists, philosophers and theorists 
such as Herman Melville, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Hannah Arendt, John Dewey and numerous 
contemporary commentators and historians as well as the novelists listed above. 
Melville's Moby Dick is ultimately invoked as a formal template for the American political 
novel with a theory of 'republican' fiction then being presented that is compared and 
contrasted with the 'democratic' mode Mikhail Bakhtin associated with Dostoevsky. The 
American political novel, finally, it is argued, is always informed by the complexities of the 
American political tradition itself: a form of immanent liberal critique pre-occupied with the 
health of the polity and guided by a 'republican' persuasion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Liberalism and the Problem of Tradition in American Literature 
I should say more than I mean if I asserted that a nation's literature 
I. s always subordinated to its; social state and political constitution. 
I know, that, apartfrom these, there are other causes that give literature 
certain characteristics, but those do seem the most important to me. 
There are always numerous connections between the social 
and the political condition of a people and the inspiration of its writers. 
He who knows the one is never completely ignorant of the other. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vol. 1), 1835 
Tocqueville's early recognition of an intimacy between literary and socio-political traditions 
emerges alongside his view that in a democracy'each generation is a new people". This leads 
him to suggest that the literature produced by democracies such as the United States may 
well be characterised by a certain immaturity, manifest in 'facile forms of beauty, self- 
explanatory and immediately enjoyable! Unhampered by the weight of a literary tradition 
and its accompanying 'anxiety of influence', writers in a democracy need merely respond to 
readers who 'above all 
... 
like things unexpected and new. ' The style cultivated amongst such 
authors will thus 'often be strange, incorrect, overburdened, and loose, and almost always 
strong and bold. " 
This particular sense of American 'exceptionalism' was pursued further by twentieth- 
century cultural critics of the United States beginning with D. H. Lawrence who, in Studies in 
Classic Ainerican Literature (1923), identified and championed a distinctive 'new voice' in a 
nascent literary heritage hitherto dismissed as a mere accumulation of 'children's tales'. 2Yet 
the fiction produced by Cooper, Melville, Twain and others, as Lawrence attests, is far more 
complex than this characterisation permits. Such ostensibly 'childish' themes of generational 
re-birth, renewal, re-invention and, most potently and problematicafly, American "innocence' 
are explored in these narratives as a form of democratic and cultural 'rebelfion against the old 
parenthood of Europe. '3 The great cultural progenitor of this in the aesthetic and 
' Alems de Tocqueville, Democrac 
'v 
in America, 473-74. 
2 D. It Lawrence, Snidics in ClassicAmerican Literanire, 7. 
3 Ibid., 10. 
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philosophical realm is, of course, Ralph Waldo Emerson -a figure who will be explored in 
chapter two. 
This 'anti-tradition' tradition, so to speak, was most powerfuUy delineated in the 
works of a group of literary and cultural critics published in the years following World War 
Il. Indeed, seminal studies such as Henry Nash Smith's Virgin Land (1950), R. W. B. Lewis's The 
American Adam (1955) and Leo Marx's The Machine in the Garden (1964) played a formative role 
in the institutionalisation of American Studies that attended and reinforced the United States' 
rise to political, economic and cultural eminence during this time. The mythopoeic quality of 
this criticism served to illuminate the influence of Emersonian individualism with reference 
to a wide range of tropes; these included, most prominently, the frontier or 'West' (Smith); 
the 'Adamic' figure (Lewis); and the pastoral (Marx). One important shared characteristic of 
this critical milieu was a concern with the presence of 'innocence'- lost and/ or regained 
- 
as 
a recurring theme in the American literary tradition. 
Foremost amongst the consequences of this particular thematic, it was alleged, was a 
reluctance to engage with society in the fashion familiar from the tradition of the nineteenth- 
century European novel. Rebelling against this particular understanding of the novel, 
American fiction instead associated society with corruption, compromise and loss of 
'innocence". American authors chose to 'purify' the form by showcasing characters whose 
central subjectivity-defining relationship was with nature as opposed to 'culture' in the more 
rarefied sense (or nineteenth-century bourgeois conceptions of 'society). 'Adamic' figures 
from Natty Bumppo to Huck Finn are thus portrayed as in retreat from society in some 
profound way and, as a consequence, still defined and energised by a pristine and frequently 
pastoral vision of American innocence. 
This downgrading of social relations, it has been argued, explains a certain lacuna of 
the political in American fiction. American commentators on the political novel as a genre 
have outlined this problem with implicit acknovviedgements of the obstacles presented by the 
US literary tradition. 'If a 19th century American novelist chose a political theme, Irving 
Howe noted in Politics aml Me Novel (1957), 'he generalh, did so in order to expose the evils of 
corruption in government (America's substitute, as someone has said, for ideology) or to 
bemoan the vulgarities of public life that were driving sensitive men into retreat. '4 Robert 
Boyers, in a preface to his study of the genre a few decade later, Atrocihj a? zd Atmiesla (1985), 
extends the charge of such 'exceptionalism' as a hindrance to political fiction to a new post- 
war generation of American novelists: 'To discuss the relevant [post-NN-ar American] 
novels 
... 
would require an extended focus on the peculiar "Americanness" of these works and 
direct us to matters largely unrelated to the themes of this book! 
This idea of a disjunction between politics and literature, or what Boyers more 
precisely describes in terms of the cultural slippage in the US between 'political intelligence' 
and "advanced literary thinking' was ostensibly addressed by a group of 'New Americanist' 
critics in the 1980s. Historicist in focus, scholars such as Donald Pease, Myra Jehlen and 
Sacvan Berkovitch advanced not only a wide-ranging critique of the literary "mythology' 
practised by critics such as Lewis and Smith but also launched a broader assault on the 
intellectual culture of the Cold War. The central organizing concept in their critical arsenal 
was that of 'ideology', that is, in this instance, the prevailing systems of ideas out of which 
American myth can only ever be generated. 
Their position hinged on a rejection of the myth critics' notion of America as 
'exceptional', as essentially a nation untainted by political ideologies. This was also the 
conclusion drawn by influential 'consensus historians' of the 1950s such as Richard 
Hofstadter and Daniel Boorstin whose promotion of 'liberalism' as the key to understanding 
such American 'exceptionalism' provides one important context for the discussion to foHow 
in chapter one. This idea, it was argued, was merely a symptom of rhetorical excess on the 
part of a liberal culture, society and polity threatened by the increasingly global reach of 
Soviet communist ideology. The popular mid-century 'end of ideology' thesis, therefore, 
articu lated by social commentator Daniel Bell (and legitimated in the work of the 'consensus' 
school) served only to further obscure liberalism's own status as the pre-dominant ideology in 
the United States. In other words, it was a liberal 'end of ideology' ideology. As we shall also 
' hN Ing Howe, Politics and the Novel, 16 1. 
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see in the fol-lowing chapter, a later 'post-consensus' school of American intellectual 
historians publishing in the late 1960s and 1970s did much of the spade work for the New 
Americanists, of the 1980s in their exposure of liberalism as 'ideology' or one competing 
group of ideas amongst others at various historical points. 
Perhaps the pivotal text in the shift from 'myth' to 'New Americanist' 
understandings of the American literary tradition was the Sacvan Bercovitch and Myra Jehlen 
edited collection Ideology and Classic American Literature (1986). Here, several of the older 
generation of critics such as Henry Nash Smith and Leo Marx, in a section entitled 
/ reassessments, addressed those who had come to associate their earlier works with the 
'pervasive ideological distortion' that largely determined the intellectual climate of the cold 
war. 5 This, it was contended, originated from a similar ideological strategy that prompted a 
contemporaneous 'consensus' historiography to view the concept of 'ideology" itself as 
quintessentially un-American. 
Elsewhere in the volume, Donald Pease builds on such criticism to critique forty 
years of 'Cold War' readings of Moby Dick, beginning with that put forward by F. O. 
Matthiesson in Americaii Rmaissatice (1941). Matthiesson's reading, Pease argues, largely set 
the tone for the post-war reception of Melville's novel that ultimately led to its canonical 
status. It did so, nonetheless, by reductively equating Ahab with a reckless totalitarian will 
and Ishmael with 'the principle of America's freedom who hands us over to our heritage". 6 
This, however, Pease argues, represents an ideological distortion of a complex text, a text that 
also crucially 'reveal[s] the way Ishmael's obsession depends on Ahab's compulsion'-an 
obsession, for Pease, analogous to the formidable 'totahzing logic' of cold war liberalism. US 
liberalism, in yet another cultural context, proves to be the ideology that dare not speak its 
name. Melville here then, in Pease's 'post-Cold War' reading, is taking aim not only at 
'totalitarian' ideology but also at the type of ideological strategies evident in post-war 
Henrý Nash Smith. 'Symbol and Idea in Virg 
, 
ýn Land' in /dcolo, ýn,, anti Classic American Literature, 28. 
Donald F Pease, 'MCIville and Cultural Persuasion' in Ideology anti Classic 
.4 merican Literature, 412. 
u 
liberalism. In doing so, Pease concludes, he is 'asking us if we can survive the free world 
Ishmael has handed downto US. '7 
This and other interventions by the New Americanist critics would appear to have 
belatedly introduced a political dimension to our understanding of the American literary 
tradition. However, as John Whalen-Bridge has made clear in a timely response to %, ý, hat has 
become, by now, a New Americanist orthodoxy, this critical-theoretical development has 
curiously failed to upgrade the status of the political novel. 'The "political novel" per se, he 
writes in Political Fictioiz aizd the Anzerican Self (1998), 'is not a factor in contemporary criticism 
though politics is supposedly more important than ever before. We no longer discuss the 
political novel though there is a great deal of discussion about politics "in" and the politics 
"Of". '8 What we have instead is a notion of the literary text as contaminated by ideology with 
literary theory or political criticism as the only feasible de-contarninant. The ur-text of the 
New Americanists and the New Historicist literary critics more generally, in this respect, is 
Fredric Jameson's The Political Uticotiscioits (1981) which famously announces that all 
interpretation- if it is to free itself from the 'reification and privatisation of contemporary 
life'- must begin 'with the recognition that there is nothing that is not social and historical 
- 
indeed that everything is "in the last analysis" political'. 9 If we follow Jameson's observation, 
of course, it no longer makes any sense to speak of a 'political novel' as every novel, indeed 
every act of interpretation, qualifies 'in the last analysis' as political. 
Whalen-Bridge indirectly takes issue with Jameson's thesis and its influence, 
believing it to have helped to reduce literary criticism and theory to 'a mode of discourse that 
offers psychic self-defense in a world of ideological oppression. "O The therapeutic tendencies 
of this discourse might even be related to the pre-occupation with 'purity' Whalen-Bridge 
skilfully uncovers in both earlier 'Adamic' mythology critics atid their New Americanist 
antagonists. It is in this respect, he argues persuasively, that the 1990s might be said to have 
witnessed the emergence of some 'new American Adams'. Here, incidentally, 
. 
ve find an 
7 Ibid., 415. 
Whalen-Bndgc, Political Fiction and the Anierican Sctf 29. 
9 Jameson, Ae Political Unconscious, 20. 
"' Whalen-Bridge, Political Fiction and the. 
-Iincrican Self. 29. 
f 
academic disciplinary instantiation- that of American Studies-of a generational conflict 
over the meaning of the liberal tradition that will feature heavily in other contexts over the 
remaining chapters. Whalen-Bridge supports his view by noting how Pease, in a special issue 
of bowidanj 2 devoted to the New Americanist phenomenon, feels an urgent need to re- 
establish a form of 'virgin land' in order to differentiate 
-that is, over-differentiate-New 
Americanist criticism from the 'Old Americanist' counter-revolutionary criticism of Frederick 
Crews. 
Crews criticizes the younger generation of critics for not respecting the 
disciplinary boundaries that have given the study of American literature 
its meaning. According to Pease, Crews has not merely criticized the New 
Americanists, he has rejected them as followers in the path of American 
Studies. Pease embraces the claim that American Studies is a bastard 
discipline (and he exaggerates Crews's "rejection" to do this) because the 
illegitimacy of the newer discipline is, paradoxically, the ground of its 
legitimacy 
-as counter-hegemonic formation. 
New Americanism 
-Call it Ishmael! To transcend the mob, to 
light out for the territory, or to mahitain some connection to innocence 
- 
These are the marks of the American Adam 
-as described by Lewis. " 
This self-dramatising act of institutional and generational rebellion-what Whalen- 
Bridge describes in terms of a 'self purification [that] provides a way to see oneself in 
opposition to the national sins (slavery, imperialism) [and] a depoliticised academy'- may or 
may not make for political criticism. It has, however, by dominating the study of literature in 
the modern American academy, done little to raise the profile of the political novel or address 
the question of what it might mean to treat writers of fiction as serious political thinkers. Like 
Whalen-Bridge, my own view is that the New Americanist criticism is symptomatic of the 
critical tradition it seeks to displace. Again, like Whalen-Bridge and contra Jameson, my 
concern here is with cxplicitly political fiction. Rather than operating on the premise, as 
Jameson suggests, that all fiction is 'in the last analysis' political, I wish to draw attention to 
the importance of the Althusserian qualification by asking what might be political bi the first 
I. IM? Ict'. As opposed then, to the perennial focus of contemporary critics on the politics of 
11 [bid., II. 
0 
representation (in which every fictional text inevitably has a stake) my concern here might be I 
said to be with those fictions that explicitly seek to represe? zt politics. 
If fiterary critics have been inclined to bracket the avAward question of the pofitical 
novel in a tradition supposedly characterised by myth and an anti-political predilection 
towards themes of innocence, nature and the pastoral then critics "'ith a background in 
political philosophy have been far less so. Scholars such as Maureen Whitebrook, Catherine 
H. Zuckert and Ethan Canin have sought to engage with certain American works of fiction in 
order to illuminate some of the finer detafl of an overarching liberal political tradition. Indeed 
Zuckerf s study Natural Right and the Political Inzagination (1990), which examines only 
'canonical' writers such as Cooper, Twain and Faulkner, effectively repudiates the notion that 
a Lockean liberal tradition rooted in 'natural law' disqualifies meaningful artistic exploration 
of politics and society. The final claim posited in this work is instructive for my purposes 
here: 
Taken as a whole these fictional depictions of a man's withdrawal 
from civil society to live in the state of nature have served to reiterate 
the major elements of the social contract theory underlying the U. S. 
Constitution, in the face of European philosophical criticism. The 
novels have not taken the truth of the'self-evident' propositions of 
the Declaration for granted, however. On the contrary, by leading their 
readers to raise questions about the adequacy of the philosophic found- 
ations of the American regime, these novelists have reminded us of the 
need repeatedly to reconsider the nature of the'truths' themselves as well 
as their practical meaning in ever-changing historical circumstances. 12 
The implicit point made here is that even the 'canonical' authors championed by the 
I myth' critics confronted the American liberal tradition by probIe? YiatisI'? zgas well as affirming 
its Lockean origins in a theory of 'nature' and 'self-evident truths'. My argument is an 
extension of this undertaking in so far as I focus on a number of post-war American novels 
that I believe significantly extend this form of novelistic political-philosophical inquiry. The 
airn is not solely to continue an effort to bridge the gap between literature and political 
thought in a particular context, useful as this may be, but also to bring to bear an intellectual- 
,, Zucketi, Natural Right and the Imerican Imagination, 247-48. 
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historical approach capable of discerning why some novels might offer us a greater degree of 
political understanding than others. My aim will be to focus on the liberal political tradition 
in the US in various 'historical circumstances' as it finds expression in a number of post-war 
historical novels. Although not all of these works can be said to be 'historical' in the strict 
generic sense (several have a 'contemporary' narrator) they none the less take %, ery specific 
historical periods and episodes for their central subject matter. 
To speak of 'liberalism' or a 'liberal tradition' in this way, of course, is to generate 
understandable concerns with conceptual clarity and definitional boundaries. My intention is 
primarily to show what was meant by liberalism and how it confronted and re-constituted 
itself in the face of competing ideological pressures in the chapters that follow. The novel 
itself will constitute the primary source for what is essentially a history of political ideas in 
America; political novelists will also be shown as identifiable as such in their often 
sophisticated negotiations of themes and ideas more commonly discussed in political 
philosophy and intellectual history. The study, however, is divided into nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century contexts for liberalism as a fairly clear distinction, it seems to me, can be 
drawn between the two. 
Part One is concerned with the nineteenth century context of 'classical liberalism' 
which has its philosophical roots in the work of Adam Smith and, most importantly, John 
Locke. Its precepts include a commitment to representative government; hostility to 
aristocratic privilege; some conception of government as a contract between those who 
govern and those who are governed; a belief in individualism premised on those 'natural 
rights' guaranteed by an immoveable law of 'nature' and, perhaps most centrally, a faith in 
the workings of a modern capitalist economy (itself governed by the laws of nature that 
operate the market's 'price mechanism-a process Adam Smith referred to as akin to an 
'invisible hand'). Nowhere did these ideas hold greater sway than in the United States whose 
'natural state' Locke himself identified as providing the archetypal site of such natural law. 
Not%vithstanding this influence the chapters in Part One seek to show how novels such as 
Gore Vidal's Biirr and Russell Banks's Cloildsplitter not only represent certain historical 
PART ONE 
THE NINETEENTH 
-CENTURY CONTEXT 
12 
1 
Elusive Republicanism: Thomas Jefferson and the Foundations of 
American Politics in Gore Vidal's Burr 
Sons have genemlly followed in thefootsteps of theirfathers 
Martin Van Buren, Inqmnj into the Origins and Cozirse 
of Political Parties in the United States 
I set down as caluniny evenj tale calculated to disturb our harniony. 
Aaron Burr in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 12th Feb., 1801 
The Republican Synthesis 
In the immediate post-World War 11 period the political tradition of the United States was 
explained in terms of the triumph of liberalism and, in particular, the liberal political philosophy 
of John Locke. America's self-image, it was claimed, was rooted more or less exclusively in 
Lockean 'natural rights' Such rights were part of a contract freely entered into by citizens, the 
consent of the governed premised on institutionalised recognition of the private individual's 
entitlements to life, liberty and property. For its proponents the liberal, pragmatic disdain for 
ideology which grew out of such a 'privatised' notion of rights constituted the 'genius' of 
American politics; less sanguine critics, meanwhile, had to be content with pointing out how this 
atavistic individualism at least explained the diminished appeal of socialist doctrines in the 
United States. '
1 or the foniler N lew see Boorstin, The Genius qf. 4merican Politics. for the latter see Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An 
Interpretation qfAmerwan Political Thought since the Revolution 
. 
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This consensus, however, began to crack in the late 1960s with the appearance of two 
seminal works. Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological Oh'gitis of tIx A? Yierican Revolution (1967) and his 
former pupil Gordon Wood's The Creation of Hie Anzerican Republic (1969) were the first important 
expressions in what ultimately came to be regarded as'a declaration of independence from older 
scholarship in American political history. 12 Instead of emphasising the extent to which the fight 
for independence and founding of an American republic was a beginizing which ushered in new 
organising principles for government, Bailyn and Wood each stressed the ways in which events 
were interpreted via a body of thought originating in the English parliamentary crises of the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Although Bailyn's study was concerned only with the 
impact of this hitherto submerged ideology on the American revolution, Wood pursued the link 
through to the constitutional convention of 1787. It was during this critical period between 1776 
and 1787, Wood claimed, that republican ideology began to dissipate as the constitution makers 
confronted their own crises of authority in the turbulent political climate of the 1780s. Thus, he 
concluded, the signing of the Constitution signalled the eclipse of classical republicanism as a 
major component of American political thought, the volatile historical moment forcing the 
delegates to embrace a more jaundiced view of human nature and consequently to place greater 
emphasis on those 'negative' liberties associated with property rights. This shift finally brought 
about what Wood describes as 'the end of classical politics' in the United States. In 
historiographical terms it prompted what, a few years after Wood's work appeared, would be 
labelled the'republican synthesis'. 
By the end of the 1970s however the influence of classical politics in the US was actually 
being extended into the early nineteenth century. Focusing on the early national period, Lance 
Baiinfiig and Drew R. McCoy detected the persistence of republican ideology amongst both 
Federalists aini Republicans during the first party quarrel and beyond. The main way in which 
2 Appleby, 'Republicanism and Ideology' in Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination, 279. 
ýThe most concise surN ey of the new thinking "as Shalhope's 'Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding 
of Republicanism in American I listoriography'. 49-80. 
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this ideology found expression in the early decades of the new republic, they asserted, was in the 
hypersensitivity of Americans to those 'corrupted' aspects of government they had previously 
associated with the British parliament prior to the War of Independence. 4 The Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 in England had established the principle of a polity headed by a Protestant 
monarch but premised on the notion of 'mixed' goverrunent. Power was divided between social 
groups of the one (the crown), the few (the lords) and the many (the commons). This abridgement 
of monarchical power combined with what was anticipated as a conclusive affirmation of 
parliament's sovereignty re-aligned the English political system with a pre-modem tradition of 
republican thought. The new mixed constitution consisting of a tripartite social order with the 
King as first magistrate was regarded by many as republican in spirit and was admired by 
Montesquieu in particular, Whose Considerations Sur Les Causes De La Grandeur Des Romains et De 
Leur Decadence (1734) and L'Esprit des Lois (1748) were highly regarded by many of the delegates 
who attended the Constitutional Convention in 1787.5 
Such accounts of the contitiuity of republican thought in a widened. Anglo-American 
context were bolstered further by the even broader historical sweep of J. G. A. Pocock's The 
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975). 
Pocock's work traced the meaning of a number of concepts as they appeared at various 
republican historical junctures. Most prominent amongst these was the notion of "virtue' which, 
first politicised in Aristotelian civic humanism, was further cultivated in the writings of 
Machiavelli during the Renaissance, revived once more by the English commonwealth men and 
James Harrington in the seventeenth century before finally re-appearing in early Enlightenment 
Europe and revolutionary America. By giving the 'republican synthesis' such a comprehensive 
historical grounding, Pocock illuminated more dramatically the problems inherent in the 
American Republic's confrontation with modernity and its emerging capitalist economy. In this 
4 See Banning, The Jqffersonian Persuasion and McCoy, The Elusive Republic. 
John Adams's Dýfence of the Constitution of Government pf the United States ofAmerica, the first volume of which reached the 
delegates at Philadelphia in 1787. in particular, is greatly indebted to the 'aristocratic republicanism' of Montesquieu. Although 
Adams' work was admired by several delegates it was criticised by James Madison who was troubled by the proximity of its 
principles to those of England's constitutional monarchy. 
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way he was able to elaborate on an earlier assertion 
-resting on his 'classical republican' reading 
of early American political thought- that the revolt of the colonies might be perceived 'less as 
the first political act of revolutionary enlightenment than the last great act of the Renaissance. ", 
Pocock's more determined attempt to relegate the influence of Lockean thought in the early 
modern period as well as his explicit dependence on a Kuhnian 'paradigmatic' framework, 
furthermore, appeared to up the stakes of the debate. Some historians now began to talk of a 
i republican paradigm' rather than 'synthesis'. 7 
Central to the political and civic notion of virtue which Pocock places at the heart of his 
study is 
-in contrast to the Lockean emphasis on negative liberty and the autonomy of the private 
sphere-the elevation of the public sphere and the importance of preserving its capacity to 
generate the positive sense of liberty associated with participation in civic affairs. The health of the 
public sphere-which eighteenth-century republican thinkers measured in terms of 'public 
happiness 18 
- 
iSpremised on the willingness of citizens to demonstrate 'virtue' by subordinating 
private interests to a higher notion of the public good. Only a virtuous citizenry 
-whose virtue 
and autonomy are assured by their status as property liolders and associated freedom from the 
economy 
-could be sufficiently 'disinterested' in political matters to maintain the moral rectitude 
of the republic. Pocock claims it is with the appearance in early eighteen th-centu. ry England of an 
oligarchy dedicated to financial reforms which promote a modern capitalist economy, that a 
countervailing republican discourse of opposition began to engage with modernity. 
This opposition disdained the economy's 'corrupting' impingement on the body politic as 
long-standing principles of commerce became distorted by a parasitic 'mercantilism'. Such 
developments were attributed to the financial revolution that led to the new and unsavoury 
phenomena of paper money, 'stockjobbers' (investors in the stock exchange) and public debt. The 
opposition in Fngland took the form of the 'country' critics of the 'court' Walpole administration 
who saw themselves as attempting to defend the ideals of civic virtue and 'disinterested' public 
6 J. G. A. Pocock, 'Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century', 120. 
7 Sce Rodgm- 'Republican 1 sin: the Career of a Concept'. 
s For an important excavation of this 'lost' concept of enlightenment political thought see Arendt, On Revolution, 126-135. 
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service in the face of a relentless 'commercialisation' of such values. The English oppositionists, as 
their American heirs would sixty years later, spanned the political spectrum of the day to include 
Tories such as Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, and the more radical 'old Whigs' such as 
Trenchard and Gordon, the authors of Cato's Letters. 9 For Pocock these critics were invoking the 
Machiavellian cry of ridurre ai pn'imph (return to first principles), the response of those loyal to 
the founding values of the city-state republics whenever those values were perceived to be 
threatened by 'corruption'. This informs Pocock's central organising concept which understands 
this republican discourse as a response to the temporal pressures exacted on all polities founded 
on the ideal of civic virtue. Republics are thus to be defined by their contingency. 'The 
Machiavellian moment', he writes, 
is a name for the moment in conceptualised time in which 
the republic was seen as confronting its own temporal 
finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically 
stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially 
destructive of all systems of secular stabflity. In the language 
which had been developed for the purpose, this was spoken 
of as the confrontation of 'virtue' with 'fortune' or 'corruption'. " 
The call to first principles re-appears in the American colonies, most notably in Tom 
Paine's exhortations to the New World to regenerate the Old by restoring that republican virtue 
which had been 'eaten out' of the English constitution by crown corruption. In his attack on the 
English MP Sir William Meredith in probably the most widely read pamphlet of the revolution 
Coiin? zo? i Setise (1776), Paine takes up the theme. He writes of the difficulties of arriving at 'a 
proper name for the government of England, complaining that although Meredith calls England 
a republic, 
in its present state it is unworthy of the name, because the corrupt 
influence of the crown, by having all the places at its disposal, 
hath so effectually swallowed up the power, and eaten out the 
virtue of the house of commons (the republican part in the constitution) 
that the government of England is nearly as monarchical as that 
9'rhe influence of Cafo *s Letters in particular has been accepted by most histofians of the revolutionary period although whether this 
autornaticallý endorses the 'republican synthesis' has been disputed. For an alternative reading of Trenchard and Gordon stressing 
their Lockean roots see I-larnowy, 'Cato *s Letwrs. John Iocke and the Republican Paradigm'. 
10 Pocock. Tht, Ifachiavellian %fonwrit, N iii. 
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of France or Spain 
... 
it is the republican and not the monarchical 
part of the constitution of England which Englishmen glory in. " 
Paine blames the timidity of the wealthy classes in the face of the monarchical usurpation 
of parliament on the unprecedented stake they now possess in the financial system controlled by 
that. corrupted body. The massive expansion in commerce thus undermines the 'virtue' of the 
House of Commons. 'With the increase of commerce', Paine laments, 'England hath lost its 
12 
spirit'. In The Machiavellian Moment Pocock claims that by the eighteenth century 'commerce' 
had replaced 'fortuna' (fortune' or 'the circumstantial insecurity of political life") in republican 
perceptions of "corruption. Invoking Montesquieu's observation in L'Esprit de Lois he writes: 
'Commerce, which makes men cultured, entails luxury, which makes [man] corrupt' . 14 It -is this 
stress on the extent to which commercial expansion was seen to undermine- rather than 
establish 
-the values of the republic that the principal critics of the republican synthesis were 
most keen to take issue with. It is to the arguments presented by the most notable of these 
adherents to a Lockean-liberal. interpretation that I will now turn. 
The Liberal Critique 
Since being self-confessedly awe-struck by the breadth and gravity of J. G. A. Pocock's work as a 
young graduate student, Joyce Appleby has produced a series of essays which rigorously 
interrogate its more ambitious claims. 15An intended effect of this has been something of a 
restoration of Lockean texts to their central position within the canon of American political 
thought. Appleby, however, does not wish Locke's writings to re-assurne an earlier unassailable 
status as the reservoir from which all political thinking in the United States has invariably drawn; 
She wishes, rather, only to re-iterate, in the light of the new historiography, the Lockean premises 
II Paine, Rights ofMan. Common Sense and other Political Writings, 19. 
12 [bid., 42. 
13 77te Machiavellian Moment, 38. For Pocock, as opposed to 'fortuna', commerce 'represented a principle more universal 
, 
and of 
another order, than that of the finite polis', 493. 
14 Quoted in 77te Machiavellian Moment, 492. 
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she remains convinced informed the main body of political thought in the revolutionary and early 
national periods. 
Acknowledging the new thinking and re-appraisals generated by what she re-describes 
as the 'republican hypothesis' Appleby commends, in particular, the way in vchich the 
methodology of its proponents has served to expose liberalism as one conipeting ideology amongst 
others. Treating liberalism as a 'cultural artefact' allows scholars 'to recognise in [the] self interest 
[of liberalism] as conceptual a notion as classical republicanism's civic virtue'. In a statement 
reminiscent of Louis Hartz she concludes: 'Like fish unaware of water we American writers have 
moved about in a world of invisible liberal assumptions. She goes on to make clear that her 
intention is not to refute the revisionist work of Pocock et al in order to 'return to the status quo 
aWc revislonisni. " The way such work disentangles republicanism from the political discourse of 
the era, rather, makes it easier for the historian to identify and trace the emergence of the new 
Lockean ideas that ultimately displaced it. 
Still, for Appleby the influence of republicanism in eighteenth-century England and 
America has undoubtedly been exaggerated. In gazing backwards so as to link the American 
republic to the past, she contends, Pocock et al fail to discern the tiovelhj of many of its underlying 
principles. The significance of the American republic lay in its niodernity and the significance of 
this modernity for political thought lay in the increasing pre-eminence of the liberal world view. 
At the heart of this world view was an acceptance of the 'revolutionary' fact of 'the replacement 
of the economy for the polity as the fundamental social system-'17 Classical republicanism, 
Appleby claims, did not have the social grammar necessary to negotiate this shift from honzo 
politlCus to lio? iio ecopio? Wcus in Anglo-American societies. A new grammar had to be invented for a 
trading system that had not only moved beyond the confines 
of political boundaries but had created wealth essential to the 
conduct of politics 
... 
However appealing civic humanism was to 
1-5 Applcbý. Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination, 136. 
16 Ibid., 289. 
17 Ibid., 288. 
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English gentlemen involved in public issues, it did not help persons 
who sought to understand the private transactions that that were 
determining the shape and direction of the Anglo-American economy. 18 
The idea of liberty, then, began to be re-cast in economic as opposed to political terms. 
Consequently the role of government was perceived on the basis of its capacity to facilitate access 
to this economic realm of freedom as opposed to its wfllingness to protect and promote any 
understanding of the political sphere, classical or otherwise. Appleby relates this oversight to 
these historians' perpetuation of an 'agrarian myth' in early American history, an idea familiar 
from the work of Richard Hofstadter in the 1940s. 19 This ideal, described as that of 'the self- 
sufficient yeoman dwelling in a rural arcadia of unspoiled virtue, honest toil and rude plenty', 
conveniently reinforces the republican synthesis in its overtones of English 'country' 
republicanism. Appleby, by contrast, contends that the reality behind this myth was of an 
economic order within which the rewards of large-scale conitnercial farn-fing- far from being the 
object of 'virtuous' republican suspicion-were enthusiastically seized upon as 'a material base 
for a new social vision. "O This vision was of a democratic republic premised on a forward-looking, 
non-hierarchical social organism made up of individuals committed to a market economy. Such 
commitments were seen to erase Old World social distinctions. Moreover, the abundance of land 
and natural resources to the west seemed to make this possible on an unprecedented scale. 
Crucial within this debate is the figure of Thomas Jefferson whose historical and 
philosophical legacy both sides were eager to appropriate. Accordingly it is to the politics of 
Jefferson-both in theory and practice-as well as its contested legacy that this study of 
republicanism and Gore Vidal's novel Burr will now turn. The relation between land, economy 
and the polity is at the heart of the exchanges prompted by the new republican synthesis in early 
American historiography. It is vvithin this triad that I will now attempt to situate Burr. 
Republicanisni has rightly been characterised by Drew McCoy as something of an 'elusive' 
18 Ibid., 3 1. 
1, See liofstadter, TheAge of Rc(ornifirom Bryan to FD. R, 23-24. 
Applcbý, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination, 258. 
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ideology. Examining this elusiveness within Vidal's Burr, however, allows us to negotiate some of 
the tensions that have made Jefferson's brand perhaps the most elusive of all. 
Why Jefferson? Why Burr? 
Two recently puýlished works, pursuing more openly a phenomenon evident to some degree in 
nearly all earlier studies, have stressed the ambiguity of the jeffersonian legacy, one going so far 
as to characterise Jefferson himself as an 'American sphinx. '21 Any scholar who has devoted 
serious time to absorbing both Jefferson's political thought and the historical record of his 
political career is invariably struck by the complex interface between the two. The inscrutability 
of Jefferson's political psyche appears somewhat at odds with the popular perception of the 
founding father. Within the political culture of the United States, Jefferson is widely perceived as 
the embodiment of an unambiguous, robust sense of liberty most Americans have come to hold 
as an article of faith. For this reason he is an unavoidable reference point for the intellectual 
historian of the early national period. Since Merrill D. Peterson initially charted the vicissitudes of 
his posthumous reputation in the early 1960s, Jefferson has increasingly come to be viewed as a 
crucial figure within race and gender studies. This has served to foreground Jefferson's private 
life-in particular his ownership of slaves and alleged affair with a slave servant-or what, in 
contemporary political parlance, might be called the "character' issue. 22 For the traditional 
intellectual historian the question of character sits uncomfortably alongside schemas which- 
however subtle and receptive to the nuance of social change 
-nonetheless tend to assign to ideas 
a status independent of the subjects who draw on their tenets. To talk about the character of 
21 See Aqflersonian Legacies, Onuf (ed. ) and Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jeffersons. 
22 See Peterson, The Jiffiýrson Image in the American Mind. For a more recent overview of Jefferson scholarship see Onuf, 'The 
Scholars' Jefferson'. The turn towards Jefferson's private life began in earnest with the publication of Fawn Brodie's Thomas 
Jefferson: An Intimate History although historians had begun to seriously interrogate Jefferson's record on slavery since the mid 
1960s. More recently Joseph Ellis's American Sphinx explicitly focuses on Jefferson's 'character'. Douglas L Wilson also discusses 
the character question within the context of a defence of Jefferson's record on slavery in 'Thomas Jefferson and the Character Issue,. 
Important amongst the more recent studies of slavery and Jefferson's alleged relationship with his slave-servant Sally Hemings (with 
whom he is alleged to have fathered as many as four children) are, respectively, Finkelman 'Jefferson and Slavery. "Treason Against 
the Hopes of the World"' in Onuf (ed. ) Jeffersonian Legacies, 181-221 and Gordon-Reed, Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: An 
American Controversv 
21 
Jeffersonian. thought is one thing; to talk about the character of Jefferson himself quite another. 
The problems of such an approach are amplified in those rare instances where figures whose 
thought has exerted long-term influence have also held public office and, hence, exercised power 
in a much less oblique fashion. Bearing these two dimensions in mind, Thomas Jefferson may 
represent a republican take on Plato's dream of the philosopher-king: the phi losopher-citizc? i. The 
question that haunts Jefferson scholarship, consequently, is to what degree the theory can be said 
to have informed the practice. Was Jefferson, in other words, a Jeffersonian? If we follow Pocock 
and understand Jeffersonian politics as essentially republican, we might be prompted to ask how 
'republican' was Jefferson's classical republic? Conversely, if we follow Appleby and interpret 
jeffersonian democracy as an early militant species of liberalism, we might ask how 'liberal' was 
Jefferson's modern democracy? 
Gore Vidal's novel Biirr (1973) asks precisely these questions, albeit in a much less 
abstract fashion. This is not to say, however, that it fails to represent the complexlhj of Jefferson. 
Indeed, in some ways, I shall be arguing, the intricate narrative structure of Bitrr conveys a sense 
of the difficulties in reconciling Jefferson with the ideologies of his day which has frequently been 
absent in historical discourse. Although the novel focuses on the life of his contemporary Aaron 
Burr, it is as much about the founding fathers, and Jefferson in particular, as it is Burr. 
A hero of the War of Independence, Burr was one of the founders of the political machine 
that became Tammany Hall and, by 1800, had become a powerful enough figure in the 
Republican party to tie with Jefferson in that year's Presidential election. There are, in Burr's 
career like Jefferson's, almost too many fascinating, not to say complicated, episodes to recount 
here but to most Americans, if they have heard of him at all, Burr's name is ignominious for two 
reasons. The first of these is connected with Alexander Hamilton, whom Burr, whilst still 
Jefferson's vice-president, killed in the most famous duel of the era. The second is the 'Burr 
conspiracy', that is, the allegations of Burr's involvement between 1805 and 1807 in an attempt to 
invade Me\ico, detach the western states from the Union and establish an empire in the newly 
OCCUpied territories with himself at its head. Burr was put on trial where, despite Jefferson's 
11) 
highly irregular attempt to exert executive branch influence by condemning the accused in 
advance, he was acquitted of any crime or misdemeanour by a grand jury. Nonetheless Burr was 
forced into exde for three years; and, consequently, the image of a North American Bonaparte 
determined to break up the union remains a potent and enduring one. It is certainly not 
altogether undeserved, although several historians have quite rightly insisted that Burr is a more 
complex figure than is generally understood. 13 It must also be said that Vidal is perhaps a little too 
smitten by his central character at various points, losing his authorial grip on Burr's voice, letting 
opinions slip through that sounds closer to one of Vidal's own wry political observations. It is not, 
however, the a7uthor's intention primarily to resurrect the soiled reputation of an unfairly 
maligned historical figure; it is rather to iniagine how a cynical, political animal like Burr n-dght 
have reflected on the first few decades of the American republic. A tarnished Richard Nixon 
remained absorbing in his anger at the deification of John F. Kennedy, a man he believed, not 
without reason, to be as ruthless and corrupt as Nixon himself was perceived to be. So perhaps, 
Vidal thought, Burr might be made to shed light on the dark side of Jefferson. Both Nixon and 
Burr, after all, were to remark that they had elections 'stolen' from them by an opponent who was 
subsequently deified (although here, for once, Richard Nixon's accusation seems to have 
significantly more foundation). In aflowing Burr to 'speak for himself' Vidal deploys an 
exclusively hteraiýl resource: the unreliable narrator, a distorting prism through which we might 
view the historical Personage of Thomas Jefferson. Numerous characters remark upon Burr's 
penchant for fabrication throughout the novel in the same way that the text faithfully re-enacts, 
the accusations of deception and duplicity the founding fathers once hurled at each other. The 
truth, to Burr, is dull, prosaic, something towards which, like Jefferson's 'self-evident' truthsof 
1776 enshrined later in the Constitution, he remains 'equivocal': 
'On with the trial of the century! ' Burr held up a large volume. 'This is a 
prC-cis of my trial. The actual record runs to some eleven hundred pages. 
23 Vot a more sý nipathetic treatment of Burr which stresses the values he might be said to have shared with his contemporaries, see 
Damels. Ordt'al qfArnbition: Jýfterson. Hamilton. Burr. 
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If you are ever morbidly disposed, read it. But for the moment, I shall 
condense the issues, in a way entirely favourable to me! '24 
Time and Narrative in Burr 
Burr's resentment of Jefferson would not, in itself be of much interest if it were not for the fact 
that the novel situates his robust criticisms in the radically different context of the 1830s. The 
relation between time and narrative in Burr is crucial to an understanding of the ways in which 
the novel explores the broader themes I am concerned with. The acute sense of historical tra? isition 
the novel conveys is skilfully achieved via several narrative devices. The overarching narrative is 
set against the backdrop of Andrew Jackson's presidency (1828-1836). More specifica-Hy it depicts 
the events leading to the succession of Jackson's vice-president, Martin Van Buren, in 1836, the 
first head of state we are reminded 
-lest we overlook the symbolism of the novel's architecture - 
to be born in the post-colonial era. 
The tale is narrated by Charles Schuyler, a young New York journalist who has been 
assigned the task of procuring politically sensitive information from Aaron Burr, now seventy 
two years old. By the 1830s, we are informed, the perception of Burr's place in the early history of 
the republic has become clouded by a widespread and powerful image of him as a traitor to the 
Union. Combined with this is his notoriety as the slayer of a founding father, one, moreover, 
whose ideological stock had risen considerably in an age of unprecedented commercialism and 
increasing political centralisation 
. 
21 This latter fact is crucial. Between Schuyler's narrative and the 
narrative of Burr's political career, recalled via his own memoirs and conversations held with 
Schuyler, we are able to chart this very process. The United States, by the 1830s'is seen to have 
realised, in a fundamental way, the Hamiltonian vision of an expansionist republic supported by 
I 
those modern economic principles that aroused the suspicions of the old Republican opposition 
24 Vidal, Burr, 500. Hereafter references to the novel will be in the text. 
25 Because of their assault on the National Bank and commitment to economic de-centralisation the Jackson and Van Buren 
adin in i strat ions' record of political centrallsation in the form of bureaucracy and the 'spoils system' is often unacknowledged. 
Gordon Wood tocuses on these aspects of Jacksonian democracý in his The Radicalism of theAmerican Revolution, 298-305. 
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during the first Federalist administrations. Furthermore, Burr's commentary on the first 
Republican administrations from 1800 onwards clearly shows the extent to which, once these 
structures were in place, Jefferson could not dismantle the whole edifice of the 'treasuro- 
bankites'(Burr, 242). 26 Equally interesting, however, is the way in which this is in tension with 
certain democratic developments of the Jacksonian era that bear a trace of the jeffersonian 
tradition both in its Lockean and classical republican aspects. Most prominent amongst these is 
the Jacksonian attack on the National Bank, the appeal to states' rights and the anti-Nitist 
character of its rhetoric in general. 27 
The Jacksonian democrats perceived themselves to be at the vanguard of a de-centralising 
movement that would ultimately place power back into the hands of the people. But what type of 
power: econon-dc or political? And if the appeals were to Jefferson's principles, then which 
Jefferson 
-Appleby's liberal forward looking commercial farmer or Pocock's classical republican 
yeoman? To some extent the principles of Jacksonian democracy have been subject to the same 
types of confusion between the roles of the polity and the economy as those of Jeffersonian 
republicanism. it is quite clear, however, that Jackson's appeal to Jefferson was grounded chiefly 
in the idea of deniocratizing the econoniy by breaking up monopoly privilege. Its political features 
were basically a reflection of this particular jeffersonian impulse, albeit more nationalistic and 
mass-oriented in character in an expanding republic with a significantly extended franchise. It is 
crucial to bear in mind, then, Richard Hofstadter's point that although the age of Jackson is 
acknowledged as 'a phase in the expansion of democracy 
... 
it is too little appreciated that it was 
also a phase in the expansion of liberal capitalism. "8 
Vidal's narrative technique foregrounds this notion of political legacy as it manifests itself 
in a more recognisably tiiodern social context. What was the legacy the founding fathers wished to 
26 'Tbis cumbersome phrase', Burr explains in the novel, 'was of Jefferson's coinage'. 
27 Jackson himself wrote in 1835: '1 have long believed, that it was only by preserving the identity of the Republican party as 
embodied and characterized by the principles introduced by Mr Jefferson that the tights of the states and the people could be 
maintained as contemplated by the constitution. I have labored to reconstruct this great party and bring the popular power to bear with 
full influence upon the Govemment, by securing its permanent ascendancy'. Quoted in Peterson, 7he Jefferson Image in the 
American Mind, 72-73. 
28 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men H%o Made It, 55. 
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leave to their descendants and how might they have wished them to interpret it? And what was 
the interpretation of that legacy by those descendants in the nevv social world? Although the 
United States was still a pre-dominantly rural society in the 1830s, it was nonetheless a society in 
transformation. Schuyler's New York City, for instance, is beginning its march towards the 
twentieth century. Burr relays how Manhattan Island is about to be occupied by its first 
commercial buildings and new penny papers are appearing 'that make a fortune by each day 
giving the public some atrocious novelty'(Burr, 522). It is a city in political turmoil where masses 
congregate; abolitionists trigger riots; and anti-Catholic diatribes lambast a new wave of 'papist' 
immigrants as a threat to American civilisation. These were circumstance that could not possibly 
be foreseen by the Constitution makers for whom mass meetings were a cause for alarm; slavery 
an accepted, if somewhat troubling, component of the economy; and the Protestant faith a 
cornerstone of the American moral universe. By the 1830s new patterns were beginning to emerge 
and the sense of a gap between past and future they prompted explains the narrative complexity 
of Vidal's novel. 
Imagining Jefferson 
Some of these new patterns evident in Bitrr intersect, of course, with those traced by the 
intellectual historians of liberalism and republicanism discussed earlier. There is an important 
sense, however, in which Burr avoids some of the drawbacks inherent in the approaches of 
Appleby and Pocock; these, incidentally, are flaws that have, more recently, also been identified 
by several scholars associated with the 'republican synthesis. One of the weaknesses of the 
'republican synthesis' and the responses to it within early American historiography has been its 
inability to accept the extent to , ý'hich both republicanism and, more obviously, liberalism are ex 
postfiacto concepts. Despite having provided us with trenchant understandings of how Lockean 
and classical republican concepts entered the mainstream of American political thought, both 
sides in the dispute have tended to dichotornise these respective theories. The result is that the 
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nascent American republic is seen to be understood unequivocallýý by its founders as either a 
modern liberal polity or as a civic-humanist republic. In other words it is with an either/or as 
opposed to a both/and formulation that they approach the question. Most pertinently it 
downplays the flexibility or what some, including Vidal, might view as the expediency, of the 
founders' politics. 
The central problem is one of the selectlVihj of the historians in question. Decisions as to 
the appropriateness or irrelevance of material are based on the objectives of rigid interpretative 
schemas. These schemas are designed to establish a logical pattern which consolidates a thesis. 
The problem is particularly evident, for reasons I will explore, in those instances where the 
thought of Thomas Jefferson is under consideration. Both Appleby and Pocock seem to assume a 
certain consistency in the way in which liberal or classical republican ideas shaped Jefferson's 
confrontation with modernity; but what they fail to take account of is the fact that, although 
Jefferson was himself undoubtedly aware of such phenomena as an expanding economy, 
commercial isa tion, property rights, corruption and so forth, he was not aware in the same way as 
we are retrospectively. They may have been striking features of American public life to Jefferson 
but they were certainly not perceived in the context of the'rise of liberal capitalism' orthe end of 
classical politics' in the sense we (can only) now understand such developments. Before speaking 
of the Tockean' or 'Machiavellian' nature of Jefferson's encounter with modernity, then, Gordon 
Wood has written, we might recall that 
For early Americans there never was a stark dictionary of traditions, 
liberal or classical republican. None of the historical participants ever 
had any sense that they had to choose or were choosing between Locke 
and Machiavelli. The categories of 'liberalism' and 'classical republicanism' 
into which the participants in the past presumably must be fitted are the 
inventions of historians and as such are gross distortions of past reality. --9 
29 Wood, 'Hellfire Politics', 30. 
27 
In this sense recent historiography has constructed tv, ýo jeffersons out of a vvide range of 
ideas that have only subsequently acquired their own respective coherence. Gordon Wood's TIw 
CreatiOn of the American Repitblic was viewed initially as part of a republican synthesIS with an 
earlier liberal orthodoxy which perhaps explains his sensitivity to the hybridity of ideas in 
previous historical circumstances. We might go on to say that what-is required if we are to avoid 
the drawbacks of the approach Wood critiques, is an act of niiaginatim something akin to that 
which Vidal offers in Burr; that is, an attempt to re-create the way in which Jefferson conceived 
political problems without drawing on any 'stark dictionary of traditions. 
Filtered through Burr's narration 
-whose self-serving and evasive dimensions are made 
explicit in the novel-Jefferson is no longer the strict adherent to a cohesive body of political 
thought. Burr notes, rather, how 'each swift response' of jefferson's, be it as ambassador to France 
or as president, '[is] rich with ambiguities' (Burr, 431). The reader is presented, via the character 
of Burr, with a radical re-reading of Jefferson's character and thought as it responds to a number 
of unfolding political crises and predicaments. Jefferson's posthumous glory is inexplicable to the 
elderly Burr who, as the presiding authority in the Senate, witnessed Jefferson's attempt to 
'subvert the Constitution and shatter the Supreme Court' during the trial of Justice Samuel Chase 
in 1805. 'Judge Chase was acquitted', Burr writes in his memoirs, 'for the very good reason that 
there was no true case against him' (Btirr, 404-5). Burr regards Jefferson's purchase of the 
Louisiana territories, thereby doubling the size of the United States in one fell swoop, as similarly 
unconstitutional. Furthermore, compounding this apparent deviation from strict 'constructionist' 
republican constitutional principles was the fact that 
Jefferson made it plain that he was in no hurry to extend to the 50,000 
souls he had just bought any of those freedoms he had once insisted 
must be enjoyed by all mankind, or at least by the white inhabitants of 
the eastern American sea-board at the time of the Revolution. (Biirr, 342-43) 
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This remark is foreshadowed in the novel by an earlier episode recalled in Buff's 
memoirs where Jefferson is recorded as speaking favourably of Montesquieu. The latter's 
principle, however, that true republican government was only able to exist on a small scale, is 
seen by Burr to prompt a drastic change of opinion in Jefferson after the Louisiana purchase. 
Perhaps because Burr's career itself, as Stanley Elldns and Eric McKittrick have claimed, is 
notable chiefly for the absence of any consistent adherence to a political philosophy, Vidal can 
portray him as alert to instances of this shortcoming in the views of his contemporaries. 30 In hard- 
headed observations like this he is certainly quick to detect in others instances of that imperial 
impulse associated with his own misadventures: 
Certainly this 'ideal' [republican] form of government is not practical for 
an empire of the sort Jefferson gave us when he illegally bought Louisiana 
.... 
To justify himself Jefferson turned on his old idol [Montesquieul and 
attacked him for (favourite and characteristic Jefferson word) "heresy'. 
(Burr, 215) 
Likewise Burr is alert to the irony of Jefferson's fiery republican suspicion of executive 
power throughout the first Federalist administrations in the light of developments during his 
own presidency. 'By the time Jefferson's Presidency ended', he writes, 'the Executive was more 
powerful than it had ever- been under those two 'monarchists', Washington and Adams' (Burr, 
268). Moreover, it is not only Burr who is shown to make such cynical assessments of Jefferson. 
Vidal is well aware of the frenzied, paranoid climate that characterised. politics in the US after 
independence, a process that accelerated as the French Revolution polarised Anglo-American 
political opinion. Defamation and slander disseminated via anonymously published pamphlets 
30 Speaking of the political culture of 1800, Elkins and McKitrick write: 'A trustworthy man was not even supposed to desire power, 
but when he was seen to reach for it, other men needed at the very least some idea of what he thought about its acceptable uses and 
limits. Aaron Burr was the only man of prominence in his time who disdained to provide, through either word or example, any such 
information or even misinformation. ' Elkins and McKitrick, 7he Age offederalism, 746. I'his seems to me the most persuasive 
explanation of why Burr is not seen to be a representative figure in the manner of his contemporaries. It does, however, overlook 
certain instances such as his widely admired speech on leaving the Senate (which is referred to in Vidal's novel) and his sponsorship 
of a bill in the New York state legislature in 1786 to abolish slavery in New York (which is not). The latter would hardly have 
endeared him to his fellow Republicans in the Virginia junto who controlled the party. Most were. of course, slave owners. Tbe 
rejection of Burr's bill by the state legislature is mentioned in Gronowicz. Race and Class Politics in New York City Before the Civil 
War, 2 1. 
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dominated the political discourse of the day. Accusations of 'monarchism' and 'Jacobinism' were 
flung wildly at the appropriate antagonist. Unlikely alliances were forged against mutual enemies 
and duelling increasingly became a means of resolving grievances originating in the pofitical 
sphere-" 
Such chaotic elements help to explain the episode depicted in the novel where Alexander 
Hamilton meets with his arch enemy Burr to persuade him to remain neutral in a Senate vote. We 
learn, first of all, that 'Hamilton and Jefferson spent a good deal of time reading each other's 
correspondence. ' Hamilton has discovered that Jefferson 'had wrote to advise a Mr Short to 
invest his money in the bank! In the very bank Jefferson is publicly accusing of being a menace to 
the republic!. With regard to his self-cultivated image as a peace-loving, frugal farmer suspicious 
of luxury, commerce and the unbridled accumulation of wealth, Hamilton claims Jefferson is 'as 
two faced as Janus. ' Jefferson's eagerness for a war in Europe, he adds, is based on the 
opportunity it allows him for personal enrichment via sales of hemp, cotton and flax. War is, 
Hamilton quotes Jefferson, 'helpful to domestic manufacture. ' Astutely Burr goes on to add: 'I 
have no idea if any of this were true. The important thing is that Hamilton believed it to be true' 
(Burr, 224). 
It is via such means that the novel acquaints the reader with how the tensions in 
Jefferson's commitment to republican principles were first received. These are the very tensions 
that persist in historiographical debates today but are perceived, with hindsight, within the 
context of an emerging liberal democracy underpinned by a capitalist economy. This, of course, 
was the economic vision first championed by Hamilton himself and facilitated by his financial 
policies as Washington's Treasury Secretary. The siege mentality of Jefferson and Hamilton 
becomes more comprehensible, however, if we 
- 
following Vidal 
- 
realise that this eventual path 
was far from clear to the protagonists themselves. Jefferson and Hamilton believed that at stake in 
31 John R. Howe has written of how political life during this period was 'gross and distorted, characterised by heated exaggeration 
and haunted by conspiratorial fkntasy', and of how 'individuals who had not so long ago cooperated closely in the struggle against 
England and even in the creation of a firmer continental government now found themselves mortal enemies, the basis of their earfier 
trust somehow worn away', in 'Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s', 150-5 1. For an intriguing examination 
of the politically motivated duel, see Freeman, 'Duelling as Politics: Re-interpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel'. 
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their quarrel was nothing less than the survival of the republic. Whether their respective 
philosophies were informed by Lockean or Machiavellian values iý-as neither here nor there: they 
embraced or espoused such values as and when the occasion demanded. As Lance Banning has 
written in an attempt to bring his fellow historians around to this fact: 'Logically, it may be 
inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal and classical. Historicafly, it was not. 132 
Burr, Genealogy and The Jeffersonian Legacy 
No era in American history perhaps illustrates Banning's distinction with greater clarity than the 
period in the early nineteenth century associated with the rise of Andrew Jackson. Indeed the re- 
naming of the party of Jefferson in 1828 (from the 'Democratic- Republican" to 'Democratic') can 
be seen as the Jacksonian pivot which makes visible the lineage connecting Jeffersonian 
republicanism with the modern day Democratic party. It also neatly demonstrates the importance 
attached by this time to associating Jefferson and his supposed heirs primarily with the concept of 
dmiocracy. It was, ironically, Jackson's opponent, John Quincy Adams, the son of Jefferson's old 
Federalist adversary and fierce critic of the French Revolution, John Adams, who invoked the 
republican mantra by running for re-election as a 'National Republican'. On a broader, though 
certainly not unrelated level, the Jackson era is con-Lmordy viewed as the high watermark in the 
United States' transition from a modest, agrarian repiiblic to an expansive, increasingly urban 
dettiocracy supported by a recognisably modern market economy. 33 
Jacksonian Democrats came to power in 1828 kvith Jefferson's funeral eulogies still 
ringing loudly in American ears. In many ways the election of that year re-enacted the bitterly 
partisan battle of 1800. The spectre of monopoly, in the form of a second National Bank, for 
instance, was once more the subject of ferocious political debates. Was the United States, the 
Jacksonians %N, ere asking as Jefferson had in 1800, to be governed by the many or the few, the 
32 Banning, 'Jeffersonian Ideolop ReN lsite& Liberal and Classical Ideas in the Ncýk American Republic', 12. 
13 I-Ills is the thesis of \\ ood's The Radicalism o(The 
. 
4merican R, volishon. 
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majority or the minority, the aristocracy or the people? 14What remained unaddressed was 
whether such appeals to the people's sovereign will undern-dned the republican order 
championed by the founding fathers. As Merrffl D. Peterson has written: 
According to the ideology the victory of 1828 was a restoration. But 
the popular democracy the Jacksonians championed clashed with the 
republican order they professed to cherish; the party's label in 1828, 
Democratic-Republican, suggested its ambivalent posture. The proof of 
Jacksoes orthodoxy was to be his adherence to the principles of Jefferson, 
as if these constituted a fixed and coherent code of government. 35 
S 
Public reaction to Jefferson's death in 1826 then, helped sweep the Democratic 
Republicans to victory in 1828, tributes to the sage of Monticello adding resonance to Jackson's 
professed conu-nitment to 'repeat [ Jefferson's ] revolution of 1800. '36 The reaction to the death of 
Aaron Burr ten years later was somewhat different. On Burr's death, it was said in one 
contemporary newspaper, 'deceAcy congratulated itself that a nuisance was removed, and good 
men were glad that God had seen fit to deliver society from the contandnating contact of a 
festering mass of moral putrefaction. '37 
Gore Vidal is only too aware of the ironies of this discrepancy of reputation by the 1830s. 
The plot of Burr turns on this very theme, subjecting what Vidal believes to be its 'fictive' 
elements to his very own form of 'fictive' scrutiny. Such is Aýron Burr's infamy at this historical 
juncture, the reader learns, that the establishment of any connection, particularly a political 
connection, past or present, with the disgraced former vice-president could seriously check the 
ambitions of any aspiring politician. With this effect in mind, Charles Schuyler's employer at the 
Evening Post, WiRiam Leggett, is intent on scuppering Vice-President Martin Van Burenýs chances 
of succeeding Jackson as President. This he hopes to achieve by revealing Van Buren as Burr's 
34 Daniel T. Rodgers traces the deployment of 'the people' as a term within American political discourse in Contested Truths: 
Keywords in American Politics Since Independence. 'By the 1840s', he writes of this transitional period, 'when the Democratic 
party's opponents, sensing the dangers and the possibilities in the slogan, tried to co-opt and nationalize it, talk of the people's 
sovereign will had risen to earsplitting volume', 83-84. 
35 Peterson, The Afferson Image in the American Mind, 28. 
36 [bid., 72. 
37 Quoted in Peterson, The Jqfferson Image in the American Mind, 144. 
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illegitimate son, conceived during his stay at a tavern run by the Van Buren family in 
Kinderhook, New York. To support his view, Leggett points to the physical resemblance between 
the two and the excessive interest Burr took in the young Van Buren who, at an earlier age than 
was common, found a position in the law firm of a Burr associate. Moreover, on his return from 
exile and still under indictment for the murder of Hamilton, Burr stayed with Van Buren, then a 
leader of the Albany regency, the controlling political 61ite of New York state. 
Leggett claims to be acting in the name of democracy, as a supporter of Jackson, whose 
reforms he believes will be reversed should Van Buren attain office. Unmasking Burr as Van 
Buren's biological father, however, he intends only as a preliminary strike which will help 
establish what he perceives to be a more pernicious connection: that of Van Buren as Burr's 
politiCal heir. 'Americans are a moral people', Leggett tells Schuyler, 'But even more damaging 
than his bastardy is his political connection with Burr, particularly in recent years. If we can prove 
dark plots, secret meetings, unholy combinations 
- 
then, by Heaven, Van Buren will not be 
chosen to succeed General Jackson' (Bitrr, 28). This exchange in the novel gives an early signal of 
the author's interest in playing with ideas of paternity and lineage, in this case by excavating a 
long-forgotten rumour, powerful at the time, but ultimately lost to history in its failure to ignite a 
full-blown political scandal. The figurative pull of such genealogical themes is a powerful one 
within American political culture. If it has been said of Jefferson thatparties do not take sides for 
or against him, but contend, like children, as to their legitimate descent', 38 then what, Vidal 
appears to be asking, might it mean if a whole generation of American politicians could be 
construed as, in some sense, the 'heirs' of Aaron Burr? 
Vidal, after all, is not merely interested in gossip for its own sake, although he no doubt 
takes a certain relish in deflating the more hagiographical accounts of the founding fathers' 
/ virtue'. He does not draw attention to the promiscuity and se\ual peccadilloes of historical 
personages primarily to e\pose any perceived sexual 'hypocrisy /. The coverage in Burr of 
Jefferson's and Hamilton's indiscretions is likewise unconcerned with the pre- or extra-marital 
18 Quoted in petc, -son, Ac JCffi, rýon Image in the American Ifind, 29. 
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nature of such transactions. The point Vidal wishes to extrapolate from the Burr-Van Buren 
rumour is at once figurative and political: who are the founding fathers and who are their 
legitimate descendants? Burr is at pains to stress how virtually every senior politician of the 1830s, 
including Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren and Henry Clay kvere, at the very least, tacit 
supporters of Burr during his Mexican misadventure, which was, in constitutional terms, the 
most serious episode of a career with no shortage of dark corners. William Leggett's attempts to 
discredit the vice-president by raising the specter of Burr are motivated by a refusal to 
acknowledge Van Buren as the legitimate heir to Andrew Jackson. Vidal, however, ironises 
Leggett's efforts in those sections of Burr's memoirs which recall Jackson's own fierce loyalty to 
Burr in his several hours of need. Here for instance is Burr's recollection of Jackson's response to 
the Hamilton duel: 
'Never read such a damn lot of nonsense as the press has been writing! 
All that hypocritical caterwauling for that Creole bastard who fought you 
of his own free will, just like a gentleman which he wasn't, if you'll forgive me, 
Colonel! 
... 
He was the worse man in this union, as you, Sir, are the best. 
(Bitrr, 416) 
Vidal here perfectly captures the voice of Jackson, the 'frontier aristocrat', who couches 
the gentlemanly code of the classical republican Mite in the robust language of the emerging 
democratic order. Both Jackson and Burr entered politics on the back of heroic military exploits, 
contemptuous of fence-sitting career politician, preferring to emphasise the importance of 
'courage', 'honor', and other martial virtues as opposed to those less exalted attributes, such as 
'discretion' and 'flexibility' more germane to political life. Furthermore, irony is piled upon irony, 
when Burr records how the great champion of the 'common man' was once himself the object of 
public derision in the aftermath of the Burr conspiracy trial: 
A few days later Jackson was nearly mobbed when he addressed 
an anti-Burr crowd 
.... 
But he held his ground and %vith many an oath 
34 
declared that I was the victim of political persecution 
... 
I fear 
-hard 
as it is to believe now 
-that the plebs actually laughed at their future idol Andrew Jackson. I at least blessed him for the friend he was. 
(Burr, 483-84) 
What, then, are we to make of such affiliations and their bearing on any understanding of 
the American political tradition? What does it mean when Vidal has Aaron Burr 
-a figure 
perceived as antithetical to that tradition--announce: 'it has been a rule with me to measure people 
by what they think of Andrew Jackson. Anyone who does not appreciate that frank and ardent 
spirit is an enemy to what is best in our American breed 
-by the Eternal! '? (Burr, 426). How did a 
man once perceived by Jefferson as a grave threat to the republic acquire support from Andrew 
Jackson, later promoted as Jefferson"s supposed political heir? Furthermore, how does Burr, 
marked in political terms as both the Caesar and Catiline of the early republic, come to admire the 
inheritor of the Jeffersonian political tradition? 39Has the imperialist, we might ask, come to 
embrace the republic or has the republic, without realising it, always secretly embraced the 
imperialist? These are intriguing questions which finally bring us back to the issues raised by 
Pocock and Appleby connected with the attitudes towards commerce and expansion, democracy 
and empire in the early republic. 
Elusive Republicanism 
In Burr, it might be said, we find a discernible slippage between rhetoric and reality, word and 
deed, theory and practice in the early republic: a gap prompted by the confrontation between 
republican discourse and the emerging capitalist economy. For Vidal this gap gave many of the 
I republican' pronouncements of the founding generation of American statesmen a contradictory 
flavour verging on hypocrisy: a flavour too often watered down by American historians. Aaron 
Burr was one of the few members of that generation who consistently refused to countenance the 
republican claims of the revolution. Burr's eventual fate, the novel implies, is tied to his contempt 
39 References to the Roman republic abound in Burr. The image of Burr as an American Cataline (the infamous Roman conspirator 
who plotted to have Cicero and other prominent noblemen killed) is at least implicit in Vidal's novel. The idea of Burr as a 'Cataline' 
figure is discussed in Nolan, Aaron Burr and the American Litermy Imagination, 157-16 1. 
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for such idealistic claims, his refusal to harness new economic impulses and developments to the 
spirit of 1776,1800,1828 or any other republican meridian. Jefferson and jacksoii, on the other 
hand, were always careful to acknowledge the cultural povver and importance of such demands 
which helped to re-assure Americans by connecting past to future. 
Vidal's Burr views his own career retrospectively as a premature attempt to embrace new 
realities which was doomed precisely because of its failure to provide a commensurate (and to 
him no doubt spurious) justificatory political discourse. Burr's inabflty to legitimate his actions 
within an acceptable republican rationale resulted in marginalisation and obloquy. By contrast, 
Jefferson and Jackson deftly circumvented this problem by extending the conceptual territory 
covered by the term. They knew that although 'liberalism- the philosophy best suited to the 
demands of a broadening capitalist economy- appealed to the heads of Americans, 
I 
'republicanism' still appealed to their hearts. It is the mYriad contradictions involved in this 
harmonising strategy, however, that makes the politics of these figures so difficult to 
compartmentalise. This has led some intellectual historians to speak of a jeffersonian or 
Jacksonian perstiasion, defined by Marvin Meyers as 'a half-formulated moral perspective 
involving emotional commitment', rather than any more coherent political ethos as such. 10 In this 
vein Vidal has a cynical Burr articulate the persuasiveness and sphinx-like qualities of Jefferson in 
the following passage: 
It is arnazing how beguilingly Deffersonj could present [his] contradictory 
vision. But then in all his words if not deeds Jefferson was so beautifully 
human, so eminently vague, so entirely dishonest but not in any meretricious 
way. Rather it was a passionate form of self-delusion that rendered Jefferson 
as president and as man (not to mention as writer of tangled sentences and 
lunatic metaphors) confusing even to his admirers 
... 
when Jefferson saw that 
he could not create the Arcadian society he wanted, he settled with suspicious 
ease for the Hamiltonian order 
... 
he was the most successful empire-builder of 
our century succeeding where Bonaparte failed. But then Bonaparte was always 
candid %vhen it came to motive and Jefferson , %, as always dishonest. In the end, 
candour failed; dishonesty prevailed. I dare not preach a sermon on tliat text. (Burr, 218) 
40 Mevem, The Jackwitian Persuasion, 12. 
36 
Burr's infamy rests on his capacity for deception, Jefferson's fame on his capacity for seff- 
deception. Burr, incapable of 'preach[ing] a sermon on that text', like all true villains, revels in his 
self-awareness and his candour on such matters allows Vidal an ideal vehicle to pursue these 
psychological themes. The traditional historical study is always going to be stymied, to some 
extent, by an over-determined notion like persuasion which hinges on a sense of the subject's 
emotional commitment to a set of ideas. Such psychological factors invariably remain obscure to 
the probings of. the historian. To the novelist, by contrast, such intangibles are the very stuff of 
artistic representation. Even representations which wilfuHy work against the grain of such 'depth 
models' generally do so in order to endorse the idea of an emotionally withdrawn and 
psychologicafly "depthless' modern society. 
. 
Jefferson's self-deception was generated by the paradoxical co-existence of a republican 
philosophy which associated 'virtue' with participation in governnient and a laissez faire economy 
where it was transplanted into the social sphere and became associated with participation in 
societ, 
. 
41 Having never subscribed to any notion of virtue, in his public or private life, Aaron Burr j 
consequently remained untroubled by this paradox. With virtue banished from the public sphere 
the imperial adventurism and political opportimism of a later generation of Americans gives 
Burr's actions something of a premonitory gloss. 'Ahead of the times! That should be on his 
tombstone', exclaims one character in Vidal's novel, 'Aaron Burr always saw the future first. Yet 
never profited by it' (Burr, 440-41). Burr depicts the ageing 'embryo Caesar' garnblin& one last 
time, on America's deviation from its republican heritage. In attempting to buy land in Texas to 
be settled by German immigrants, Burr's prospective investment turns on the United States 
ultimately annexing the territory from Mexico. He dies, however, before the onset of Mexican 
War that would have made his investment good by extending US territories beyond Texas to the 
Pacific Coast. He does not live to applaud the first American imperial conquerors proper, one of 
41 For an elaboration of this 'privatization' or 'domestication' of virtue see Woodý The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 217- 
218. For discussions of how this development additionally served to 'feminize' virtue see Kerber Women of the Republic: Intellect 
and Ideologi, in Revolutionaiýv America and Diggins, The Lost Soul ofAmerican Politics. 
37 
whom, Zachary Taylor, will become President on his return, under a Whig party newly commited. 
to the democratic values championed by Jackson. 42 
Vidal's focus on this 'prophetic' dimension of Aaron Burr's career, his emphasis on the 
secret imperial impulse that lurks behind the faqade of agrarian republican innocence is a useful 
corrective to the triumphalist and elegaic notes QccasionaHy sounded in the debates surrounding 
the 'republican synthesis. Burr not only foregrounds some of the destructive effects and legacies 
of the unrestrained individualism celebrated by Appleby but also questions the tenability of 
reading 'republicanism' as a central guiding ethos in the early national, period. Yet the text also 
remains haunted by the idea of republicanism as the path not chosen, as a set of ideas to be 
invoked against the abuse of centralised power. Republicanism could speak to public feelings of 
hostility towards certain effects of the new econon-dc forces yet could only beat somethng of a 
retreat when given the mandate to tackle those forces in any comprehensive fashion. If classical 
republicanism dictated that only properhj holders could participate in civic affairs, it was largely 
because there had been no historical precedent of a society in which so many individuals were 
I 
property holders. Never before had commerce, in the form of trade and land acquisition 
opportunities, held out so great a material promise to so many. 
In this sense republicanism was, in the United States 
- 
much as socialism and its 
jacobinist/Chartist antecedents were in Europe 
-the primary discourse of political opposition to 
capitalism. If republicanism presented capitalism with its greatest political critique, then socialism 
can be seen to have subsequently provided a later industrialised capitalism with the missing 
econontic dimension. Neither, however, were able to accomplish both these objects. In the same 
way that Marxism has no conception of the political beyond the economic realm of Necessity, 
republicanism has no conception of economics beyond the political realm of Freedon-L 
Republicanism then, stands to the economy as Marxism does to the polity: at a considerable 
distance. This is what gives republicanism its elusive quality. Capable of galvanising considerable 
42 ft is worth recalling here that the Mexican war was opposed by the young Abraham Lincoln amongst others and was also the 
catalyst fbr Henry David Thoreau's On the Duýv t? f Civil Disobedience. 
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oppositionist forces, when allowed to govern, republicanism fails to achieve its professed ends. 
Political adjustments and compromises are always to be made in the face of unavoidable 
economic demands just as the political implications of radical economic agendas have thwarted 
governments elected on socialist manifestos. 
Thus we see in Burr republicanism invoked pre-dominantly by those not in power as a 
means of restraining those in power. Indeed a key feature of republican 'virtue' turns on a certain 
suspicion of power-wielding per se, most pronounced in the potent myth of George Washington 
as an Amerian Cincinnatus, the reluctant Roman officeholder who returned to the plough after 
his military victories. As Burr caustically notes, however, evidence of such self-abnegation in the 
early republic is slim. When Jefferson claims he has no desire to hold office, Burr writes in his 
memoirs: A will not record the farniliar speech. Washington, Jefferson and Madison gave it in one 
form or another at regular intervals throughout their political (and they had no other) lives. ' 
Again Jefferson is depicted making the appropriate republican noises before taking a more 
pragmatic approach to the political matters in hand. 'The retirement speech done with', Burr 
writes, 'we both continued as if he had not made it' (Bitrr, 276). 
In an afterword Vidal feels obliged to explicitly distance Burr's view of the early republic 
from his own. 'All in all', he admits, 'I think rather more highly of Jefferson than Burr does; on the 
other hand, Burr's passion for Jackson is not shared by me' (Biirr, 576). This betrays, perhaps, 
Vidal's sympathy for Jefferson who, unlike Jackson, understood virtue in still broadly classical 
terms and, however much in self-deception, sought to keep the United States' republican robe 
unsoiled by imperial and capitalist enterprise. There was, after all, none of the US nillitanj 
imperialism during Jefferson's period in office which Vidal believes has ultimately led in the 
twentieth centurv to a tax-devouring mil itary- industrial leviathan and global American 'empire' 
premised on economic power. Jefferson seems to forsee this latter development in Burr when, 
after his purchase of Louisiana, he remarks: 'I do think that we are the first empire in history to 
buy its territory rather than to conquer it' (Bitrr, 430). 
2 
'Our Divine Equality': Russell Banks's Cloudsplitter and the 
Redemptive Liberalism of the Lincoln Republic 
Was John Brown simply an episode, or was he an eternal truth? 
And if a truth how speaks that tnith today? 
W. E. B. Du Bois, John Brown 
One cannot think of the long, long story of black bondage and 
the war that ended it without a shiver of awe. It i's the one 
chapter in American life that brings us back to biblical history. 
Alfred Kazin, God aizd the American Writer 
It is not an era of repose. We have used up our inhen'tedfreedoin. 
Henry David Thoreau, 'Slavery in Massachusetts' 
Transcendental Politics 
hi August 1837 Ralph Waldo Emerson delivered his famous oration 'The American Scholar', 
exhorting the young men of the Harvard Phi Beta Kappa society to free themselves from the 
dead hand of the past and, more specificallN,, 'the sacredness which attaches itself to the act of 
creation'. ' This 'intellectual declaration of independence', as Oliver Wendell Holmes was later 
to describe it, has often been viewed as a response to the prevailing European criticisms of 
early American culture and society as shallow and rootless, impoverished by the absence of 
tradition. Emerson's confident call for the young nation to seize the possibilities conferred by 
geography rather than history, his affirmation of nature as the most important index to 
national character, is rightly seen as a benchmark in the development of American thought. 
' Ernemon, S, lcoted Lvsays. 88. 
40 
Yet there is another context for 'The American Scholar' that is best understood with 
reference to internal and political rather than transatlantic and socio-cultural antagonisms. By 
the 1830s, as we have seen in the previous chapter, American political life o, 'as a very obvious 
arena within which a sacred 'act of creation' had, in fact, established an indigenous tradition. 
Political ideas in Jacksonian America could be neither advanced nor opposed without first 
being positioned in relation to a revered heritage. When Emerson states to his contemporaries 
then, that such a time'like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do %-,, ith it', he 
might be regarded as demanding something more ambiguous and, perhaps, subversive than 
the rejection of European social and cultural values. 2 'If there is any period one would desire 
to be born in', he asks, 
is it not the age of Revolution; when the old and the new stand 
side by side and admit of being compared; when the energies of 
all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the historic 
glories of the old can be conipensated [my emphasis] by the rich 
possibilities of the new era? 3 
It is fairly obvious that by invoking the idea of 'historic glories' proper to an 'age of 
Revolution' Emerson is here conjuring up images of the founders of the American republic. 
More interesting, however, is the way such ideas are transmitted to a fresh generation whose 
understanding of individual rights, civic virtue and modern forms of republican government 
are being fashioned from the rather different moral and political imperatives of 1837. 
Eýrnerson's suggestion here that the deeds of the founders require compensation is thus 
revealing. To compensate is to acknowledge a wrongdoing. In a period and regional context 
marked most conspicuously by the emergence of abolitionism as a political force, talk of a 
wrongdoing with respect to the Revolution can only refer to one thing: slaverý,. 
Indeed the broad contours of Transcendentalist philosophy advanced by Emerson in 
this earIN, address are delineated not only in terms of 'the new importance given to the single 
person' but also by 'an aitalogous [my emphasis] political movement' that remains unnamed 
Ibid.. 101. 
Ibid, 
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but hardly difficult to identify. 4Aided by the discovery of previously unpublished material, 
recent scholarship has facilitated a clearer picture of Emerson's commitment to anti-slavery 
politics during this period. Earlier critics' portrayals of a conservative who embraced the 
cause only tardily and with some reluctance in the polarised atmosphere of the 1850s are now 
seen as, at best, partial accounts. Consequently, any notion that Transcendentalism's pre- 
occupation with the sovereignty of the individual somehow precluded meaningful political 
commitment has also been questioned. 5 
Five months after Emerson had advanced the ideal of 'The American Scholar' to the 
Brahmins of New England, Abraham Lincoln, a month short of his twenty-ninth birthday, 
gave an address before the Young Men's Lyceum in Springfield, Illinois. Lincoln's remarks on 
'The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions' can be read fruitfully alongside those of 
Emerson. On the surface at least, Lincoln would appear at odds here with Emerson's future- 
oriented sentiments, 'The Perpetuation... " being a plea for moderation, respect for the 
Constitution and the rule of law in the wake of recent lynchings in the South. Added urgency 
is given by an event somewhat closer to home: the murder in Alton, Illinois of the anti- 
slavery newspaper editor Elijah P. Lovejoy by an anti-abolitionist mob in the previous 
November. What is striking, however, is the language and tone in which the young frontier 
politician chooses to couch this plea: 
Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, 
to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap 
- 
let it be taught in 
schools, in seminaries, and in colleges 
... 
let it be preached from 
the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts 
of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion of the 
nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the 
grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and 
conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars. 6 
4 Ibid., 103. 
Gougeon. Virtue's Hero and Teichgraeber, Sublime 77toughts and Penny Wisdom contain more radical readings of Emerson's 
politics that stress the strength and consistency of his opposition to slavery. 
Lincoln, 'On the Perpetuation of our Political Institutions: Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of SpringfieK Illinois, 
January 27,1838' in Uncoln on Democracy, 19-20. 
42 
It is not merely in the explicitness of the call for a 'political rehgion' that one finds 
here a conflation of the religious and the secular. The lecture as a whole takes something of 
the Puritan jeremiad form critics have identified in several of Lincoln's Civil War speeches, 
most notably the Second Inaugural Address. 70ne finds here a vocabulary of the sacred 
that 
- 
whilst playing an important role in the ideological shape of the American Revolution 
- 
had largely disappeared from national political discourse by the turn of the century. Beyond, 
however, the calls here for ceaseless 'sacrifice' in the name of secular values articulated via 
. 
such a vocabulary ('pulpits', " altars) lies an ambiguous and, some have suggested, almost 
prophetic message that has fascinated and perplexed Lincoln scholars for a number of years. 
This heavily coded message follows the theme pursued by Emerson a year earlier in 'The 
American Scholar, namely, the desire of the present to establish sovereignty over the past. 
One passage of the Lyceum speech, in this respect, is worth quoting at length: 
It is to deny what the history of the world tells us is true, to suppose 
that men of ambition and talents will not continue to spring up 
amongst us. And, when they do, they will as naturally seek 
the gratification of their ruling passion, as others have so done 
before them. The question then, is, can that gratification be 
found in supporting and maintaining an edifice that has been 
erected by others? Most certainly it cannot. Many great and good 
men sufficiently qualified for any task they should undertake, may 
ever be found, whose ambition would aspire to nothing beyond a seat 
in Congress, a gubernatorial or a presidential chair; but such beloiig 
itot to thefatitily of the hoti, or the tribe of the eagle. What! Think you 
these places would satisfy an Alexander, a Caesar or a Napoleon? 
Never! Towering genius disdains a beaten path. It scorils to tread 
in the footsteps of atiy predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts 
and burns for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, whether 
at the expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen. 8 
Such rhetoric can be read in a number of Nvays. Again, it might be suggested that Lincoln is 
here merely calling for republican vigilance in the face of would-be dictators with no respect 
for the 'edifice' erected bv the founding fathers. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
Jacksonian America was awash with such opinion, Aaron Burr figuring, by that time, as an 
I American Bonaparte', and, of course, Andrew Jackson himself (as an 'Imperial' President) 
Sce, flor instance. White. Lincoln 'It Grt-,, W-vt SIve, h and 'Lincoln's Sermon on the Mount: The Second Inaugurar. in Miller et 
al (Lds. ) Rclýgion and the Inicrican Civil Wim 208-225 1 
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being the major demon within the Whig political culture that shaped the mind of the young 
Lincoln. But, as Edmund Wilson was to note, there are also other conclusions that might be 
drawn. 
Wilson famously claimed in Patriotic Gore that in the earl), Lyceum lecture Lincoln, in 
actual fact, 'has projected himself into the role against which he is warning. 9 Although later 
critics have gone on to pursue the implicit psycho-analytic meanings of such 'projection'. 10 
the point to retain here is the less speculative one that Wilson's Lincoln chapter closed on, 
that is, that Lincoln is 'describing this figure with a fire that seemed to derive as much from 
admiration as apprehension. "' John Burt has substantiated this particular claim in recent 
years by outlining a more profound romantic-religious context for the demonology of the 
Address to the Young Man's Lyceum: 
... 
what Lincoln describes here is not just the tyrant familiar from the civic 
republican literature of the previous century to which we have been 
introduced by Bailyn, Pocock and Appleby, or even the Machiavellian 
man of virtd, but the demonic hero familiar to us from the Romantic 
reading of Milton. At least it is clear that the figure Lincoln describes 
resembles Melville's Ahab far more than he resembles Sir Robert Walpole, 
and Lincoln's own feelings resemble far more that mixture of fascination 
and repulsion which Melville felt for Ahab than the far simpler disgust 
the revolutionary generation felt for King George or Lincoln's own Whig 
allies felt for King Andrew. 12 
Burt here usefully takes us beyond the period's routine party political invocations and 
towards some of the themes I wish to explore in this chapter on liberalism in the ante-bellum 
period. What vve might identify here, in both Emerson's 'The American Scholar' and 
Liticoln's Lyceum lecture, I would like to suggest, are two points on a spectrum of 
'transcendental' politics that would ultimately redefine the meaning of American liberalism 
bv the time of the Civil War. At one end of this spectrum, I "rill be positing, is the militant 
abolitionist John Brown. 
8 Lincoln, / incoln on Ocniocrac 
* 
v. 2 1. 
9 Wilson, Palriolic Golv. 108. 
'() Sec. for mmance. Forgle. Patricitic in the Hoiac Divided Ind Strozier. Lincoln 's Owst for Union. 
Wilson, Palriolic (lort'. 129. 
12 Buri. 'Lincoln's Addre., s to the Young Nlan', ý Lýceum... ', 304-5 
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What connects figures such as Brown, Emerson and Lincoln is a near-spiritual belief 
in the Declaration of Independence as enshrining a transcendent principle removed from 
historical contingency: the principle that all men are created equal. Emerson praised the 
Declaration, in this sense, for its'blazing ubiquities' and, as we shall see, the document held a 
significance for Brown akin to scripture. Lincoln's desire to protect the Declaration from both 
the philosophical and the interpretive assaults of his political opponents became a defining 
feature of his rise to prominence in the 1850s. 'All honor to Jefferson', he wrote to a group of 
Boston Republicans in 1859, 
- 
to the man who, in the concrete pressure of a struggle for national 
independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and 
capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract 
truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm it there, 
that to-day, and in all coming days, it shall be a rebuke and stumbling- 
block to the very harbingers of re-appearing tyranny and oppression. 13 
This, however, as historian Garr), Wills claims, is a questionable account of Jefferson's 
intentions in 1776. For Wills, Jefferson 'was not like Lincoln, a nineteenth-century romantic 
living in the full glow of transcendentalism 
... 
He was an eighteenth-century empiricist, 
opposed to generalizations and concentrating on particulars'. The Declaration, Wills asserts 
emphatically, was no'spiritual covenant'. 14 
This is probably accurate in the strictly historical sense but, as has been noted in the 
previous chapter, Jefferson lived for a long time during a period of rapid socio-economic 
change and his politics evolved accordingly. Indeed, in the final years of his life Jefferson 
himself quite self-consciously sought to anchor the Declaration to a civil religion that might 
help sustain the new nation. In doing so he wished to stress what Pauline Maier has 
described as its 'redemptive force'. 15 Jefferson saw the re-publication of the Declaration 
during the 1820s as salutary in this respect, encouraging a further 'pledge of adhesion to its 
principles and of a sacred determination to maintain and perpetuate... [its] 
... 
holy purpose'. 16 
Lincoln, Lincoln oil OemocracV, I 
Wills, InventingAincrica, xui-\in 
15 Maler, American Scrij)IIII-C. AfAing the Declaration qf bidept ýndtwce, 186. 
Quoted In \11ner, 180. 
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Such evidence of 'romanticism' or, at the very least, a prominent spiritual dimension 
to Jefferson's thought is not, however, confined to this single sphere. 'it is impressive and 
significant beyond words', Harry Jaffa has ch-timed, 'that Jefferson, who was such a confirmed 
detractor of revealed theology, and whose works are filled with contempt for it 
... 
could not 
but express himself in the most solemn language of that theology when he contemplated the 
institution of Negro slavery'. 17 It iSunsurprising too, we might add, that such an observation 
should appear in the context of a study of the Lincoln-Douglas debates. It was here, after all, 
in the tenacious set of arguments advanced by Lincoln during the Illinois senatorial campaign 
of 1858, that the tensions between the 'empirical' and 'romantic' Jefferson were finally 
resolved. 
The Lincoln 
-Douglas Debates 
The Senate election battle between Abraham Lincoln, standing for a still young Republican 
party, and the incumbent Democrat Stephen A. Douglas in the summer and autumn of 1858, 
' represents a pivotal moment in American history. Not only did the publicity the campaign 
attracted bring Lincoln to national prominence, but the debates themselves exposed, in 
graphic fashion, the ideological gulf that would first divide the Democratic Party and 
ultimately the whole country resulting in civil war. 
Douglas was committed to the idea of a large republic premised on territorial 
expansion as the nation's 'manifest destiny'. Such a project, he believed, along Madisonian 
lines, would help curb the 'factionalism' engendered by contentious issues such as slavery. 
For Douglas the concept of 'popular sovereignty- allowing local populations to decide these 
issues for themselves 
- 
if implemented in the new territories such as Kansas-Nebraska, 
promised to resolve the crisis of slavery in the West. 
Lincoln, by contrast, had already, in the 1840s, denounced such 'ixnperial' enterprises 
in his criticism of the Mexican War. Above all, however, he objected to slavery on moral 
" Jaffa, Crisis qf the House Divided, 243. Jaffa is presumably thinking here of, amongst other statements, Jefferson's striking 
admission with regard to American slavery: I tremble for my country when I recall that God is just'. 
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grounds-an objection voiced in a less and less guarded fashion as the campaign 
progressed-and feared the opportunities western expansion might afford to extend its 
influence. Equally important to Lincoln and the Republican Party more generally %vas the 
threat posed by the fixed and 'dependent' status of the slave to the ideolop, of 'free labor'. 
The presence of a permanently enslaved labour force in the territories would, it was argued, 
increase the power of slaveholding interests in Washington and undermine the social 
mobility which energised mid-nineteenth century American capitalism. 18 
Whilst accepting the fact that the Constitution effectively protected slavery where it 
already existed, Lincoln firmly believed that the founders viewed the institution as morally 
unacceptable and therefore ensured that no provision was made for its extension. But 
although the Constitution undoubtedly remained ambiguous on the question as a whole, 
Lincoln saw only 'eternal antagonism' between slavery and the 'perfectionist' credo 
underwriting the Declaration of Independence. Interestingly, in explaining this relationship 
during the course of his first reply to Douglas in the campaign, the Declaration is once more 
elevated to the status of scripture: 
The Savior, I suppose, did not expect that any human creature 
could be perfect as the Father in heaven; but He said, "As your 
Father iii heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect. " He set that up as 
a standard, and he who did most towards reaching that standard, 
attained the highest degree of moral perfection. So I say in relation 
to the principle that all men are created equal, let it be as nearly 
reached as we can. If we cannot give freedom to every creature, 
let us do nothing that will impose slavery on any other creature. 19 
For Douglas, the Declaration had to be viewed, first and foremost, as a struggle to 
establish the rights of certain ýiie? i (NA, hite, middle-class property owners) at a specific 
historical juncture rather than the rights of 'man' in the abstract. The issue then, in 1776 
-as 
during the ante-bellum period for Douglas 
- 
was one of self-determination premised on the 
rights, of a pre-emsting political community. In one e\change Douglas seenis to taunt Lincoln 
t- or his iia*fve, pseu do- religious understanding of the Declaration, reminding his audience that 
"' See Foner, Fret, Soil. Fret, I abor. 
19 Lincoln, bncoln on A-mocracv. 117. 
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'no one of [the signers] emancipated his slaves, much less put them on an equality with 
himself, before asking his adversary whether 'e%, ery man who signed the Declaration of 
Independence declared the Ne o his equal, and then was hypocrite enough to continue to gr I 
hold him as a slave, in violation of what he believed to be divine lavý, -? '211 
Douglas's chief strategy hinged, however, on a wide range of legal arguments 
symptomatic of what critic David Zarefsky has described as the 'cons titu tionalization of 
political discourse' which characterised this period. 21 Indeed, the drama of the debates as well 
as many other sectional crises preceding the war arose from the battle for supremacy between 
law, as laid out in the U. S. Constitution (of which Douglas can be seen as representative) and 
spirit, or the spirit of that law as embodied in the Declaration of Independence (which might 
be associated with Lincoln and the 'transcendent' turn referred to above). 
Several scholars working in different disciplines have identified this bifurcation in 
American political thought. For the political scientist J. David Greenstone, this opposition 
constitutes a 'liberal polarity', emerging in the 1830s, between 'reform liberals 
... 
concerned 
primarily with the development of the faculties of individuals' and 'humanist 
liberals 
... 
concerned primarily with the satisfaction of preferences of individuals'; for the 
intellectual historian John Patrick Diggins, religion holds the key to the period as Calvinism 
once more becomes 'the conscience of liberalism', opposing a Machiavellian republicanism 
that would bracket moral questions from the public realm; for the political philosopher 
Michael Sandel it is, on the contrary, a repubhcan politics that 'cannot be neutral toward the 
values and ends its citizens espouse' and, rather, a prevailing 'minimalist liberalism' accused 
of the moral abdications evident in American'public philosophy'. 2-' 
Each of these thinkers utilises the Lincoln-Douglas debates to support their argument 
and seeks to elaborate what they perceive as the essentially moral foundations of Lincoln's 
political thought. Greenstone and Diggins stress the positive effects of the impact of 
Calvinism on Lincoln's thought, in particular, his belief in American as a new Israel and the 
Imm Angle (ed. ), Created Equal: Ac ConipIcIc Lincoln 
-Dougla-v Debates, 294 
David ZarefskN, Lincoln. Douglav anti Slaver. v. 140, 
22 Greenslone. Me Lincoln Penwasion, 6. Diggins. The Low Soul qlAmerican Politics, 7 
.- 
Sandel, Dernocracl-'s Discontent, 6. 
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/covenantal status' of Americans 'as a special people with an "ancient faith", a status that 
imposed solemn responsibilities on them. "23 
Sandel, however, is careful to detach this tradition of what we might, fol. lowing Lsaiah 
Berlin, describe as 'Positive fiberty-24 from any explicitly religious bearings. Yet even here 
there is a stray reference that can be seen, perhaps, to somewhat belie this intention. In the 
broader defence of republicanism undertaken in the conclusion of Democracy's Discontent, it is 
with reference to the 'soul', that is, a theological rather than political- philosophical term, that 
Sandel acknowledges the dangers to liberty posed by the republican emphasis on shaping a 
common conception of the 'good'. The cultivation of virtue among a large and disparate 
population, he admits, threatens to expose, 'the coercive face of soulcraft. 25 
It is within this intellectual struggle over the right to assert a place for the 
transcendent principle within American liberalism 
-crystalhsed during the Lincoln-Douglas 
debates 
- 
that the figure of the militant abolitionist John Brown should be understood. 
Russell Banks's novel Cloudsplitter- a fictional account of the life of Brown and his family 
- 
traces this 'transcendental turn' in American liberalism. Moreover, in its structure and choice 
of narrator it presents a context for this process that brings Brown and, to a great extent the 
Civil War period itself, into sharper intellectual-historical focus. 
Cloudsplitter, Religion and ante-bellum America 
Cloudsplitter is narrated by John Brown's third son Owen, who also acted as his principal 
lieutenant in the Kansas Wars of the 1850s. Owen Brown imparts his recollections to 
Katherine Mayo, a research assistant to Oswald Garrison Villard, the historian and editor of 
The Nation, whose major biography of John Brown appeared in 1910. The elderly Owen is 
now, by the turn of the century, we learn, an isolato, an internal exile, spiritually bereft and 
struggling to tend sheep in the Californian wilderness. As we shall see, it is primarily the 
2-'Greenstone, 7he Lincoln Persuasion, 282. 
24 Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Uberty' in Four EssaYs on Libern% 118-72. 
2-' Democrac), s Discontent, 319. The 'lost soul' invoked in thý title of Diggins's 1984 work also advances the idea of a 
fundamentally positive relationship between religion and the American political tradition. Indeed, as Diggins' latest work makes 
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critical distance afforded via this choice of narrator that allows the text to map the reshaping 
of the American political tradition in the years leading up to the Civil War. 
Owen Brown's initial hostility to the Villard project soon gives way to a sense that 
this will be a final opportunity to correct the accumulation of myth and fancy that has 
gathered around his father's image. More significantly for my purposes here, however, is 
Owen's admission that this last act of testimony brings to a close a long and tortuous process 
of moral and spiritual reckoning on his own part. Since the infamous Brown raid on Harper's 
Ferry in 1859, which resulted in the death of several brothers as well as the execution of his 
father, Owen claims jto] have been dead these forty years 
... 
I am more the ghost of Owen 
Brown than I am the man himself'. 26The visit of Katherine Mayo, however, now holds out 
the prospect of a form of closure to this "after-life. 'It was as if, he acknowledges, 
Your visit had sounded a final knell that drove me into a purgatory 
which I had been longing for all these years but had neither the 
courage nor the wisdom to seek on my own. As if, now that I am 
here, there is no going forward or back, no possible ascent to heaven 
or descent to hell, until I have told my story. (CS, 9-10) 
Banks here seeks to place his novel squarely in a tradition of 'witness' literature that 
runs from the Book of Job in the Old Testament to Coleridge's 'Rime of the Ancient Mariner' 
and Melville's Moby Dick. 27 Such works depict figures conditioned by "exile' of some 
description whose faith in authority, secular or religious, is rendered vulnerable in the face of 
the traumatic experience recorded. The resonance of Molýj Dick is especially notable. The 
major source of authority for the young Owen is, of course, John Brown himself, who 
functions as Ahab to his Ishmael. Like Melville's creation, John Brown is in the grip of 
'monomania', obsessed by a single idea and willing to sacrifice himself and all around him in 
its pursuit. Brown's all-consuming idea, however, is to destroy the 'white whale' of slavery. 
The theme of 'whiteness', moreover 
-itself the object of increasing critical scrutiny in recent 
clear, Lincoln is a crucial figure in this respect and is at the centre of the vision of American political life Diggins seeks to affirm. 
See Diggins, On Hallowed Ground. 
26 Banks, Cloudsplitter, 9. Hereafter references will be to CS and will be in the text. 
27 The epigraph to Cloudsplitter from Job 1: 16 is also cited by Melville in the epilogue to Moby Dick A line ftom Coleridge's 
poem, it is worth noting, serves as the epigraph to one of the twentieth century's most notable examples of this genre, Primo 
Levi's 77je Drowned and the Saved: 'and till my ghastly tale is told/ this heart within me bums'. 
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years-is as important in Banks's novel as the beguiling chapter, 'The Whiteness of the 
Whale', is in Melville's. 
Brown's 'monomania" is what we would noNN, understand in terms of 'religious 
fundamentalism". Calvinism here provides the frame-work within which the notions of 'sin' 
and 'slavery' fuse-if sin, within this theological schema, is a form of 'enslavement' then 
slavery itself must be regarded as a sin. Thus, for Brown, the American state of the 1850s, in 
its sanctioning and extension of slavery into the new territories, is nothing less than the Great 
Satan. 'No, for Father', Owen Brown attests, 'quite literally, we Americans, white as much as 
black, Northern as much as Southern, anti-slave as much as pro-, we were, all of us, presently 
living under the rule of Satan'. Yet Banks makes clear that there are also a number of crucial 
secular questions at stake here. Owen continues: 
It was an inarguable truth to Father that man's essential task while on 
this earth was to bring both his personal and his civic life into total 
accord with the will and overarching law of God. And since a republic 
is a type of state that by definition is governed by laws created and 
enforced by its citizens, whenever in a republic those laws do not conform 
to the laws of God, because those laws can be changed by men, theV niiist 
be changed by men. And not to change them placed the mortal soul of every 
one of its citizens in jeopardy. Not to struggle constantly to overthrow the 
system of slavery was to abandon. our Republic, was to surrender our civic 
freedoms and responsibilities, was to give our mortal souls over to the rule 
of Satan. We were obliged to oppose slavery, then, not merely to preserve 
and perfect the Republic, although that alone was a worthy enough task, 
but to defeat Satan. It was our holy, our peculiarly American, obligation. 
(CS, 254-55) 
Here Banks seeks to restore a sense of the immense triangular tension between 
morality, politics and religious conviction during this era. This is what is described by 
Melville, in the famousKnights and Squires' chapters in Moby Dick in republican terms as an 
'august dignity. 
-j"'lilchl ... which is not the dignity of kings and robes, but that abounding 
dignity that has no robed investiture! Yet this 'dignity' is deeply informed by a Protestant 
Christian absolutism that shares little with the comparatively tepid paganism of the classical 
Roman and Athenian republics- 'Thou shalt see it shining in the arm that wields a pick or 
. 
7,1 
drives a spike; that democratic dignity which, on all hands, radiates without end from God; 
Himself! The great God absolute! The centre and circumference of all democracy! His 
omnipresence, our divine equality! '28 
The second Great Awakening and an increasingly vocal abolitionist movement in 
the North, combined with the emergence of an explicitly pro-slavery ideology in the South 
were the pre-conditions of Kansas-Nebraska, Harpers Ferry and, ultimately, fratricidal war. 
For the Brown family, "like some ancient Hebrew tribe of wanderers and sufferers, burdened 
by the death of women and children and by... endless obligations to our father's restless, yet 
implacable, God' (CS, 32), the inter-relationship between the personal pain and political 
conflict forged by religious faith long pre-dated the Civil War itself. The tendency of others 
to posit some pre-lapsarian idyll, effectivelv obscuring such tensions, is addressed at the very 
beginning of the novel: 
The truth is, for us, the so-called Civil War was merely aftermath. Or, rather, 
it was part of a continuum. just another protracted battle. Ours was very 
much a minority view, however. It still is. But from the day it began, to 
Northerner and Southerner alike, the Civil War was a concussive trauma 
that erased all memory of what life had been like before it. On both sides 
white Americans woke to war and forgot all the preceding nightmare, which 
had wakened them in the first place. Or they made it a pastoral dream. 
(CS, 8) 
John Brown and Jefferson 
The politics of the pastoral, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was an important source 
of conflict in the emergence of liberalism as the dominant ideology in early nineteenth- 
century America. Yet the meaning of Jefferson's conception of agrarian democracy premised, 
as It was, on the right to hold slaves, was even more grievously contested in the years prior to 
the Civil War. Mis, of course, is also evident in the depiction of 1830s New York in Vidal's 
purr. 
29 Njcj, ýijje. Atob. 1, Dj, -ý. 104ý 
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Banks makes clear in Cloudsplitter, however, that Brown's hostility to slaver-y 
- 
hke 
Abraham Lincoln's-did not lead him to disavow a jeffersonian understanding of American 
democracy. This is most conspicuous in an episode ", here Owen and his father journey to 
Europe on business. The trip is motivated by the elder Brown's failure to sell %%, ool to the 
'greedy' and "conspiring' merchants of New England. English cloth manufacturers, by 
contrast, John Brown believes, will be impressed by the comparative quality of American 
wool and hence pay a better price. When asked by his son to explain the superiority of the 
American product, Brown offers a scathing, republican critique of British society which is 
pitched somewhere between Jeffersons understanding of the independent yeoman and the 
notion of 'free labor' championed by Lincoln: 
'We've seen the shoddy goods they try to foist off on us poor colonials, 
pitching it to us at prices way above our own. Owen that stuff's grown 
by peasaws! ' he pronounced. The Irish and Scottish peasants were poor 
and demoralised, lie explained. They were practically serfs, a conquered 
abject population impoverished for generations by a feudal overlordship. 
They were farmers who couldn't even own the land they worked or the 
animals they raised, and thus they had no more pride in the products of 
their labor than did the slaves in the American South. 
(CS, 338) 
Owen Brown is less persuaded by. his father's unfavourable 'comparison between the 
products of slave labor and free, quite as if all the cotton being produced in the South by slave 
labor were not of sufficient quality to control the world market in cotton and make the 
slaveowners richer than Croesus and their senators and congressmen powerful out of all 
proportion to their numbers' (CS, 338). In his recognition of the formidable political and 
economic might Nvielded by the 'slaveocracy' Owen Brown here, as he frequently does 
elsewhere in the novel, offers some pointed criticism of his father's judgement. 
The author uses the Browns' trip to register their deeply ambivalent attitude towards 
the United States polity. Farly on, E. ngland is praised as a country where 'no man could 
legally buy and sel] anothee and &us 'for that reason alone% despAe Ming an 'antique 
nionarcliv, not a modern republic', is acknowledged as 'a freer country than ours'. More 
pointedINY perhaps, at a personal level, England is perceived as a refuge from conscience wiffi 
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the trip, at one point, described as 'a vacation from the obligation to be constantIN conscious 
of our national shame' (CS, 364). We can see from this that slavery for the Browns (as , vith 
Jefferson), is also to be abhorred as much for the psychological effects it imposes on 
slaveholders and those whose citizenship would seemingly confer a degree of complicity. 
We also find strong intimations in these passages of Lincoln's regret that slavery undermines 
the influence in the world of the 'republican example' upheld by the United States. 29 It jS, 
however, when the Browns pass through mid-Victorian Manchester that some of the virtues 
of American society first identified by Jefferson come into full focus. They can view, for 
example, 'the shocking sight at dusk of the sooty mills 
... 
and the blackened hovels of the 
thousands of laborers whose lives were given over to the mills', with much the same sense of 
(in Owen Brown's words) 'luxurious detachment' evident in Jefferson's tone in Notes on the 
State of Virginia when describing the horrors of nascent industrialisation in Europe. 30 
This 'detachment' is the privilege that the young Jefferson at least wished to bestow 
on America, a privilege that would free the young republic from the 'crimes' and 
depredations of modern industrial capitalism: 
The crimes evidenced by these monstrous, huge, prison-like factories 
were English crimes not American; and the greed that drove the mighty 
engines of the mills and the owners' callous disregard for the lives 
devoured in their service were English greed and callousness not 
American; and the raggedy, exhausted, vacant-eyed men and women 
and pathetic small children whom we saw wending their way along 
the narrow streets to their teeming tenements were English, Scottish 
and Irish workers 
- 
not a one of them American. 
(CS, 366) 
We have already seen, however, that as the nineteenth century advanced, the Jeffersonian 
context for the pastoral became increasingly untenable. For Northerners such as the Browns 
this vision was adhered to only in an attenuated form, as a reflex reaction against 
inclustrialisation, urbanisation and modernity more generally. Its popularity amongst pro- 
SldVeIN ideologues (many of %vhorn saw 'paternalistic' slavery in the South as preferable to 
F, uropean 'x%-age slaverv') also rendered the vision problematic. In intellectual terms then, 
Sec 'Speevh on Kan, ýas-Ncbra, ýKa %,: t. Nx)ria, Illinois. l6th October IS54' in bný oln on 65-78. 
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there was a vacuum within which a new understanding of the pastoral might emerge. It was 
one filled, in large part, by the transcendentalist thinkers of lNew England whose substitution 
of Nature for God and anti-slavery politics played a crucial role in the intellectual and 
political life of the ante-bellum period. 
The Significance of Emerson 
The meaning of Cloudplitter in the context of the American political tradition that I am 
interested in here rests primarily on the effects engendered by the use of Owen Brown as the 
novel's narrator. The self he presents at the beginning of the text is, in several respects, a 
divided one. This is most explicit, of course, in his attitude to his father; but because of John 
Brown's anti-slavery politics and willingness to deploy violence, any Oedipal drama must 
unfold in the public as well as the private sphere. The complex inter-relation between public 
and private selves, the idea of an internal and external "house divided', is neatly encapsulated 
in the following passage: 
Ah Father, how you shame me one minute and anger me the next. How 
your practical wisdom, which at times borders on a love of violence for 
its own sake, challenges my intermittent pacifism, which borders on 
cowardice. Your voice stops me cold and then divides me. One day and 
in one context, I am a warrior for Christ. The next day, in a different 
context, I am one of His meekest lambs. If only in the beginning, when 
I was a child, I had been able, like so many of my white countrymen, to 
believe that the fight to end slavery was izot my fight, that it was merely 
one more item in the long list of human failings and society's evils that we 
must endure, then I surely would have become a happy, undivided man. 
(CS, 324) 
I'his admission occurs during Owen and John Brown's stay with Samuel Gridley 
Howe and his family prior to embarking on their journey to Europe. It is here, in Boston, 
amidst the currents of tra nscenclenta list thought and anti-slavery agitation that Owen Brown 
undergoes what he himself describes as a 'transformation' in character. 'I realized', he notes, 
"' Sce the AI anu factures' J1.1picr fmin Noics on the Swic9f Virginia (1 787 ) repninted in JelfciNon. The Lýfe.. 
, 
258-60. 
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I had become, in an important sense, a ne%N, man. No more the disgruntled, 
sulky boy who follows his Old Man around and waited for orders that he 
could resent. No more the pouting, conflicted ape. This new fellow, i'--ho had 
been a reluctant follower, was now an enthusiast, was a proper lieutenant, 
was a fellow believer! He might fail here and there 
-fail to act, fail to 
believe 
- 
but he would no longer question his aspirations or his commitment. 
(CS, 360) 
The process begins as soon as father and son arrive in the city after the Howes have taken 
them to the Charles Street Meeting House to hear Ralph Waldo Emerson speak on the topic of 
heroism. The speech that Owen hears Emerson give on 'Heroism' (later collected in the first 
series of essays published in 1841) provides the epiphanic moment in his narrative. It does so 
by closing the sense of division previously referred to, that is, by presenting a template for a 
self no longer "conflicted". Owen-who identifies with Emerson's inability to find spiritual 
solace in institutionalised religion-can now, paradoxically, re-connect with his father, for 
whom such 'godlessness' is anathema. 
-, rhe spellbinding quality of Emerson's oratory style and physical presence is 
beautifully captured early on. There is no theatricality in the performance. 'Instead', we learn, 
'he spoke simply, directly, in a way that made you feel that he was speaking to you alone and 
to no one else in the hall. His bright eyes were the colour of bluebells and did not fix on any 
single person but fixed on the space just above one's own head, as if he were contemplating 
one's thoughts as they rose in the air' (CS, 311). 
What Emerson offers to his audience is 'a freshened way of looking at things' loaded 
with provocative insight. The talk begins with an early example of this in the analogy he 
dravv's between English culture's obsession with class, in the form of 'gentility', and American 
pre-occupations with skin colour. Moreover, in examining thehero' figure, 0,, %, en Brown also 
identifies a crucial subte\t in Imerson's 'hints and subtle asides', which suggests 'that our 
present national crisis over slavery was the necessary field for such a person' (CS, 312). As 
with tile passages from 'The American Scholar' e\amIned at the beginning of this chapter, 
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references to slavery are once more carefully encoded in generalities. The allusions, however, 
do not escape Emerson's impressionable young listener: 
Mr Emerson wanted a 'tart cathartic virtue', he said, that could contend 
with the violations of the laws of nature committed by our predecessors 
and contemporaries. And here he lapsed into language 
-or should I say 
he rose to language 
-that, although not once uttering the word itself, 
excoriated slavery horribly and with great originality. It is a lock-jaw, he 
said, that bends a man's head back to his heels. It is a hydrophobia that 
makes him bark at his wife and babes, an insanity that makes him eat grass. 
(CS, 312) 
Emerson then goes on to outline the characteristics he associates with the hero such 
as a 'military attitude of the soul' and a certain form of 'pride' that comes with representing 
'the extreme of individual nature. Furthermore, he adds, 'the hero advances to his own 
music' and there exists 'somewhat that is not philosophical in heroism. 'These words', Owen 
reflects, 'struck fire with me, for, of course, they described my father perfectly'. Emerson goes 
on to persuade Owen even further of the relevance of his ideas to the situation and 
Wcltaýiscliaiuuig of the Brown family. 'Times of heroism, he explains, 'are generally times of 
terror'. As was the case in Lincoln's Address to the Young Man's Lyceum, the death of Elijah 
Lovejoy is recognised by Emerson in this speech as a sign that such times may well have 
arrived. 
John Brown, however, is, initially at least, less impressed by what he has heard. He 
departs from the hall before the applause for the lecture has abated and, when *oined bN, his 
son, complains loudly of the 'clouds, fogs, mists of words' that barely conceal the "godless' 
character of Emerson's thought. 'What', he concludes, 'does lie know of terror? Ralph Waldo 
Emerson has neither the %vit nor the soul to know terror. And he surely has no Christian belief 
in him! That's ývhat oitglit to be terrifying him, the state of his own naked soul' (CS, 314). Yet 
this outburst does not prompt, as one might expect, an angry defence of the Ne%-, - England 
philosopher from his son: 
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I followed silently, pondering the meaning and import of his fulmination, 
even as I nurtured an odd thought which had come to me towards the end 
of Mr Emerson's peroration 
-that Father resembled no man so much as 
the Concord poet himself. The Old Man was a rough-cut, Puritan version 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson, it seemed to me that first night in Boston and 
many years afterward, and even unto the present time, when it matters 
probably not at all. But it was that night of some personal significance to me. 
(CS, 314-15) 
The final sentence here is another indication that this episode is not to be taken lightly in the 
context of the narrator's moral and intellectual development. After remarking on a peculiar 
physical resemblance, their '. old-fashioned, hawk-nosed Yankee faces', that might lead one to 
believe they were brothers, such physical detail is then linked with their force of personality. 
Both men share the same 'pale deep-set eyes', we are told, 'that looked out at the world with 
such an unblinking gaze as to force you to avert your own gaze at once or give yourself over 
to the man's will'. Finally, the comparison is extended into the metaphysical sphere: 
And just as easily and selflessly as Father believed in his God, Mr 
Emerson believed in the power and everlasting truth of what he 
called Nature. For both men, God, or Nature, was beginning, cause 
and end, and man was merely an agent for, beginning, cause and end. 
(CS, 315) 
The episode ends, however, with something approaching concession from John 
Brown on the matter of Emerson. Sensing a change of mood after walking for some time in 
silence, Owen notes that his father may indeed have been moved by Emerson's words. 
'Perhaps', it is suggested, 'he had been stung by their similarity to his o, wn thoughts and 
beliefs and had never before heard them so handsomely expressed, and thus his anger had 
been directed not at Mr Emerson but at himself. When Brown eventually requests his son"s 
opinion on the lecture, Owen replies that he took the philosopher's words as 'high counsel 
and prophecy. 'Very interesting', comes the replv, 'High counsel and prophecy. Well, who 
knoNvs? God speaks to us in unexpected ways. Even in the words of philosophers' (CS, 316). 
I'his kind of ambiguity is also evident in the position of Owen himself who is able to 
recognise the shortcornings as well as the qualities of both men. If Brown 'could not see 
58 
himself in Mr Emerson's portrait' then equally Emerson 'was probably incapable of seeing 
my father as the very hero he was caffing for. ' More generally, however, by using a narrator 
able to reconcile the credos of both Emerson and Brown in this way, Banks allows us to trace 
the relation of the events depicted in the novel to the broader intellectual culture. What is 
significant here is the messianic note struck by both men in their public pronouncements 
during a period of crisis. Emerson is clearly calling in both 'The American Scholar' and 
'Heroism' for the emergence of a redemptive disposition, even a redemptive figure, to re- 
invigorate the young republic by taking up the fight against slavery; John Brown clearly sees 
himself in that role. 
Such actions, of course, as the Civil War itself proved, might involve the suspension 
of democratic norms and the temporary convenience of military dictatorship. Lincoln, in the 
Address to the Young Man's Lyceum, with this in mind no doubt, was more ambivalent but 
himself not a little smitten by the aura of such authoritarianism. This increasing willingness 
to redeem American liberalism with recourse to such steps, however, becomes even more 
apparent when the Browns visit the battlefield of Waterloo after their stay in England. 
Napoleon and Dictatorship 
Alongside Napoloeon, analogies abound in Banks's novel between John Brown and other 
historical examples of military dictatorship. Oliver Cromwell, as "Lord Protector' of a Puritan 
republic is a continual and, perhaps, obvious point of reference; but the acts and ideas of 
Brown's contemporaries in Italy 
- 
Mazzini and Garibaldi 
- 
also feature as sources of military 
strategy and political inspiration. 31 The journey to the scene of Napoleon's final defeat is 
though, we are led to believe, motivated only by the former, that is, by 
ýrown's 
own military 
plans and, in particular, his desire to learn from Napoleon's mistakes at Waterloo. It is not, he 
claims, connected with any admiration for the former Emperor of France on his part: 
" The parallels between these figures of the Risorgimento and Brown (andý for that matter, Lincoln and Emerson) are interesting. 
All embraced a republican vision of national union premised on the rejection of the twin ancien r6gime authoiities of monarchy 
and institutionalised religion. For Mazzini and Garibaldi, attempting to unify Italy, this authority came in the form of the 
Hapsburg dynasty and the Vatican respectively. 
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'Adnure him, Owen? I loathe him! However brilliant a military man 
he was, he was nevertheless an atheistic monster, an egotistical dictator 
of the first rank. When he was finally declared dead on his little island 
of St Helena, while all over the world people wept, I cheered. ' 
(CS, 380) 
Earlier, after acknowledging his father's penchant for 'passing, erratic distractions', 
Owen nonetheless notes that the 'interest in Napoleon and Waterloo 
... 
had lasted longer than 
it should have(CS, 378-79). Brown's fascination, we learn, is connected primarily vvith a 
famously bold but ultimately foolhardy military endeavour undertaken by the French 
Emperor which unfolded over a hundred day period. It is a sound understanding of this 
episode, he believes, that may well determine the outcome of his own plans to emancipate 
slaves in the South. 
It was those one hundred days, he explained. One hundred days 
- 
from Napoleon's unexpected departure with a half-dozen faithful 
lieutenants from the island of Elba, where he'd been exiled, to his 
arrival here at Waterloo three months later with a quarter-million 
armed men at his command. 
(CS, 381) 
This is clearly viewed as a template for Brown's own raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859, which 
was meant to instigate slave insurrection in the South and ultimately mobilize an army of 
freed slaves to trigger complete emancipation. But the connection between Brown and 
Napoleon operates on many more levels than that of mere military strategy. Observing his 
father pace the site of Waterloo, seeing him 'track and translate a series of elaborate, invisible 
runes', searching for clues the past might offer to unlock the future, Owen once more reflects 
on the increased grip his father's 'visions' have come to exert on his ov,, ii imagination: 
I believed in his visions, that they had occurred, and that theN, were 
of the truth 
- 
the truth of warfare, the truth of religion. 
.. 
He was a man 
who saw things that I knew must be there but could not see myself, 
and because I loved him and trusted him, and because of the power 
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of his language and the consistency of his behavior, rriý, belief had 
swiftly become as powerful and controlling, as much a determinant 
of my mind and actions, as Father's belief was of his. In this refracted 
way 
-though I remained until the end his follower and continued to 
live with no clear plan of my own and no belief in God 
-I became during those days for the first time a man of action and a man of 
religion. The difference between us, between me and my father, is that 
I would inspire no one to follow me, either into battle or toNvards God, 
whereas he had me, and soon would have a dozen more, and finally 
whole legions and then half a nation, following him. 
(CS, 384) 
The notion of "refraction' invoked here reminds one of the qualities Emerson 
associates with the 'representative man'; that is, the way in which the image of an historical 
era is 'refracted' through that of its most imposing personalities. Here, Emerson was 
famously drawing on Thomas Carlyle's theory of history as best understood via the words 
and deeds of 'great men'. Bonaparte himself, of course, was one of the character portraits in 
Emerson's Representative Metz (1850). For Emerson, Napoleon was the personification of 
democracy and the bourgeois revolutions that had engulfed the modern world: 
[Napoleon] desires to keep open every avenue to the competition of 
all, and to multiply avenues: the class of business men in America, 
in England, in France and throughout Europe; the class of industry 
and skill. Napoleon is its representative. The instinct of active, brave, 
able men, throughout the middle class every where, has pointed out 
Napoleon as the incarnate Democrat. He had their virtues and their 
vices; above all, he had their spirit or aim. That tendency is material, 
pointing at a sensual success and employing the richest and most 
various means to that end; conversant with mechanical powers, highly 
intellectual, 
-v%, idely and accurately learned and skilful, but subordinating 
all intellectual and spiritual forces into means to a material success. 32 
'rhe distinctive point in the piece more generally, however, is the conflicting 
sentiments %-., ith NN hich Emerson views Napoleon. It is the same ambivalent perception of the 
leader-dictator figure evident in Banks's portraval of John Brown and Lincoln's Lyceum 
speech (for whom Napoleon, we might recall, stands as one such 'representative' of the 'tribe 
ot - the eagle'). This is perhaps tvciuse, aside from his image as a dictator, Napoleon can also 
12 Emenion. 'Napokon. Or, the N11in t4the World' in Selected Lssays, 31S 
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be seen as a redemptive figure, a saviour of the French republic, fighting to defend 
republicanism from the hostile forces of monarchy and aristocracy which included Britain, 
Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Moreover, the image of Napoleon as liberator, as 
the guarantor of national autonomy and democracy, was popular amongst subjugated 
populations such as those in Poland previously subject to the rule of the Russian Empire. 
Two recent studies of Abraham Lincoln explicitly identify such qualities in Lincoln's 
own leadership during the Civil War. 33 It is in this context too, that the connection between 
Napoleon and John Brown hinted at throughout Cloiidsplitter becomes apparent. Brown, of 
course, as Benjamin Quarles's work has made clear, has consistently been viewed in this less 
complicated light by African-Americans. 34More specifically perhaps, in terms of character, 
F-merson's portrait of Napoleon conjures up several more striking similarities. 
Bonaparte was the idol of common men because he had in 
transcendent degree the qualities and powers of common 
men. There is a certain satisfaction in coming down to the 
lowest ground in politics, for we get rid of cant and 
hypocrisy. Bonaparte wrought, in common with that great 
class he represented, for power and wealth, 
-but Bonaparte, 
specially, without any scruple as to the means. 35 
One wouldn't wish though, to overstate the analogy. After all, in his efforts to align himself 
with the middle class in his business dealings Brown was undoubtedly a failure; Lincoln, as a 
successful politician in an era of immense political polarization, was undoubtedly forced to 
cast a Machiavellian eye on issues from time to time. Yet on the level of personality, the 
contempt for 'cant' and 'hypocrisy' as well as the absence of scruple in relation to questions of 
I means' certainly fit the John Brown profile. Lincoln too, as we have seen, was well versed in 
exposing the former as features of the arguments of Douglas and other apologists for slavery; 
likewise, his ruthless prosecution of the civil N, %, ar %N, as admired-as we shall see in the next 
chapter 
- 
by Leon Trotsky 
- 
SL-c Vcw Birth of'Freedom and Guelzo. 4braham Lincoln: Reileemcr Prevident. 
Sv Quarles. Allies for Five(Jom: Black, ý antlJohn Brown and Quarles (ed. ) Blacks on John Brown. 
Finerson. solectci 340. 
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Emerson's understanding of Bonaparte's life also mirrors the rationale Owen Brown 
provides for his father's deeds in Cloudsplitter. 'Horrible anecdotes', Emerson claims, 'may no 
doubt be collected from his history, of the price at which he bought his successes; but he must 
not therefore be set down as cruel, but only as one who knew no impediment to his NN-ill. '36 
The same argument might be made about Lincoln's determination to prosecute the war 
against the southern states in the face of significant internal opposition, particularly after the 
substantial initial military defeats endured by the Union army. 
The bearing of Emerson's assessment of Napoleon and the broader concerns of this 
chapter, however, only come fully into view if we examine their relation to the intellectual 
context of Romanticism from which they emerge. It is Napoleon's appeal to the emotions of 
men, for instance 
- 
to what Emerson describes in terms of 'sense', 'spirit' and a 'universal 
sympathy' in the following passage 
- 
that set him apart as a Romantic figure: 
... 
there is something in the grand talent which enlists a universal 
sympathy. For in the prevalence of sense and spirit of stupidity 
and malversation; all reasonable men have an interest; and as 
intellectual beings we feel the air purified by the electric shock, 
when material force is overthrown by intellectual energies. As 
soon as we are removed out of the reach of local and accidental 
partialities, Man feels that Napoleon fights for him; these are 
honest victories; this strong steam-engine does our work. Whatever 
appeals to the imagination, by transcending the ordinary limits 
of human ability, wonderfully encourages and liberatesUS. 37 
It is this visionary ability to remain 'out of the reach of local and accidental 
partialities' that also ensures Emerson, Brown and, indeed, Abraham Lincoln occupy 
important positions in the intellectual history of American liberalism. The single most 
important 'partialities' N%, hich they each ultimately challenged by the 1850s, were those 
wrought by an ideology of what historian James Oakes has termed 'slaveholding 
liberalism'., '18 It is primarilv in this capac, tY that the), 'transcend[ed] the ordinary limits' of this 
Ibid., 343-44. 
Ibid., 35 1 
st-c oýjkcs. Slavo: vand Frectiom and The Ruling Ract. 
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earlier form of liberalism, and-albeit via the bloodv birth of civil war-effectively brought 
the United States fully into the modern ývorlcl. 
From Romanticism to Modernity 
The key text in this respect is the Declaration of Independence, the primacy of vvhich emerges 
clearly in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Emerson's doctrine of 'self-reliance' and the thought 
of John Brown as articulated in the pages of Cloudsplitter. As we have seen earlier, Lincoln 
used the 1858 debates with Douglas to imbue the Declaration with the status of religious 
covenant. The biblical injunction to 'perfect' oneself as an individual was, in this context, 
invoked as a model for rejuvenating the Declaration's principle 'that all men are created 
equal". Although, for Lincoln, slavery as an institution clearly stymied this aim, the struggle 
to prevent its extension was a crucial phase in the quest towards the perfection of that 
principle. 'Let it be', he claimed, given such obstacles, 'as nearly reached as it can'. 
If Lincoln transplanted this 'perfectionist' credo to the political sphere, then 
Emerson did so, in far more sustained and controversial fashion, to the philosophical sphere. 
Indeed, more than any other American thinker, Emerson, in early pieces such as 'Self- 
Reliance' (1841), 'The Transcendentalist' (1842) and his famous 'Address Before the Divinity 
School' (1838), was responsible for the secularisation of such New Testament values in the 
intellectual history of the United States. The political implications of Emerson's radical move, 
however, are more ambiguous. 
'To believe your own thought' it is announced at the beginning of 'Self Reliance', 'to 
believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, -that is genius. '39 
Here we find an individualism articulated against the grain of Jacksonian, majoritarian 
democracy. Emerson's can be seen as a reaction to the stifling social conformitv hinted at by 
his contemporary Focqueville, in the first volume of De? iiocracy bi A?? ierica (18355), as a cultural 
repercussion of democratic social conclitions. 'While the majority is in doubt', Tocqueville 
wrote in this respect of America, 'one talks; but when it has irrevocably pronounced, 
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everyone is silent, and friends and enemies alike seem to make for its bandivagon'. 40 On the 
subject of slavery, of course, by the 1850s the majority had pronounced, to the effect that it zius 
tolerable, albeit under prescribed conditions for a proportion of that majority. 
The conflict at its sharpest point then, by this time, was bet-vveen a national, 
democratic-liberal political culture, underwritten by majoritarian precepts and an 
increasingly strident intellectual culture in the North premised on a 'perfectionist' ethos and 
minority rights. The latter also drew on a residual puritan emphasis on the importance of 
acting 
- 
in the face of whatever degree of hostility 
- 
according to individual 'conscience'. 
Perhaps the most famous statement of this position was detailed by Emerson's fellow 
transcendentalist (and even more vocal advocate of John Brown) Henry David Thoreau. 'Any 
man more right than his neighbor', wrote Thoreau famously in 'On the Duty of Civil 
Disobedience' (1849), 'constitutes a majority of one already'. 410oudsplitter reflects this climate 
of ideas at a number of points, perhaps most memorably in its depictions of John Brown's 
evangelical efforts to persuade his followers in Kansas of the righteousness of their cause. 
'The largest majority', he [John Brown] explained, 'is often only 
an organized mob whose noise can no more change the false into 
the true than it can change black into white or night into day. 
And a minority, conscious of its rights, if those rights are based 
on moral principles, will sooner or later become a just majority. 
What we are building here is nothing less than a free common- 
wealth promised us by our Declaration of Independence and 
prophesied and ordained by God in the Bible. 
(CS, 642) 
As well as an expression of the 'majority of one' vve once again find here an original religious 
ideal-rooted in the Puritan desire to construct a new commonwealth, a 'New England', 
according to the dictates of conscience- fused with one of the founding documents of secular 
America. What brings these elements together most fully is a shared rejection of the 
materialist thought that was such a feature of American liberalism by mid-century. Such 
materialism was perhaps most evident in the formalism and constitution-oriented basis of 
political discourse referred to above; but it was also present in the culture at large, notablv so 
"' Ibid., 175, 
4" TocqucNi lie, I)cniocraci- in ýI incrica, 254. 
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in the sociological arguments put forward by pro-slavery thinkers such as George Fitzhugh 
and John C. Calhoun. 42 
The important point in this context is that the materialist basis of this dominant strain 
of liberalism disavowed the possibility of radical social change premised on 'metaphysical' 
abstractions such as those evident in the Declaration of Independence. If N, ý, e were to look to 
political philosophy for an explanation, this, it might well be said, was why the Civil War was 
fought. It also, interestingly, explains some of the motivation of those later American 
/pragmatist' thinkers who sought to reconcfle the idealist and materialist philosophical 
traditions in the post-war era. This is a theme I will pursue further in the next chapter. 
Russell Banks, however, brilliantly deploys Owen Brown as a means of both 
illuminating this tension and illustrating how various idealist currents-from both secular 
and religious realms and cutting across class as well as generational lines-came to share a 
new vision of the American polity. Although, as we have seen, Owen dimly perceives some 
connection between the ideas of the two men earlier, in his father's ultimately ambiguous 
response to the Emerson lecture, by the end of the novel he has become fully aware of this 
process: 
Father's God-fearing, typological vision of the events that 
surrounded us then was not so different from mine. My vision 
may have been secular and his Biblical, but neither was 
materialistic. They were both, perhaps, versions of Mr 
Emerson's grand, over-arching, transcendental vision, 
just not so clearly or poetically expressed. 
(CS, 678) 
Indeed, Cloudsplitter re-contextualises the events it depicts by foregrounding their 
relationship to both the intellectual culture of Romanticism and the more recognisably 
modern pre-occupations that superseded it. This is achieved via the novel's formal narrative 
StrUCtUre as vvell as its theniatic concerns. Owen Brown, the isolato, tells his tale from out 
West, a twentieth-centurv Ishmael imprisoned in his own consciousness, without the solace 
of community pro\, ided bv the Pi, quoil. In many ways he is also, having 'lighted out for the 
" Thorciu. lValden and 'on the Outv Dis,, )ht, di, nct'', 230. 
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territory', after the Harpers Ferry debacle, living a kind of warped epilogue to 77te Adventures 
of Huckleberry Finn. This idea is given additional force by the provocative ruminations on the 
question of race present in the novel and, in particular, an extraordinary episode that 
concludes with Owen murdering Lyman Epps, a close black companion and underground 
railroad activist. 
Lyman is clearly designated as Jim to Owen's Huck in these sections, their friendship 
complicated by homoerotic as well as racial tensions 
-elements that also clearly allude to 
Leslie Fiedler's famous thesis in Love and Death in the Ainerican Novel (1960) for which, of 
course, Huckelberry Finn provides a notable primary source. More importantly perhaps, the 
complex dynamics of what Owen eventually admits to himself as a 'manly love finding itself 
lockod inside a racialist's guilt' (CS, 519), as well as its ultimate fate, are designed to 
foreshadow the trajectory of American race relations from the Reconstruction period to the 
twentieth century. It is episodes such as this, amongst others, that ultimately imbue 
Cloudsplitter with such immense contemporary relevance. 
A similar level of dramatic force is located in an even greater secret Owen has carried 
out west with him. The murder of Lyman Epps is, in significant part, his response to an 
accusation made by Epps during an argument that '[Owen] ain't half the man [his] father is. ' 
Epps's recognition of the disparity between the father's altruism and the son's ambivalence 
on the question of race forces Owen to acknowledge himself and his fellow countrymen as 
modern Americans in their 'faffen' status. This is the 'faH' prompted by the persistence of 
slavery, a fall that defines American modernity and ultimately ensures that its modem liberal 
polity is cursed by the issue of race. 
One of the achievement's of Banks's novel is that it once more foregrounds the anti- 
racist basis of John Brown's opposition to slavery. This was first noted by W. E. B. Du Bois but 
later eclipsed by the accounts of more hostile biographers. 43 Given the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of abolitionists remained deeply sceptical about the possibility of 
42 Richard Hofstadter famously described Calhoun as the 'Marx of the Master Class' for his critique of industrial capitalism and 
ability to justify slavery in similarly materialist, social-scientific terms. See Hofstadter, Ae American Political Tradition, 67-9 1. 
4-' See W. E. B. DuBois, John Brown. Robcrt Penn Warren's John Brown: The Making qfa Mart)w was the first of many works to 
subsequently obscure this aspect of Brown. influencing a generation of Southern historians such as C. Vann Woodward. 
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social equality for black Americans, John Brov, 
-n's position was indeed remarkable. 
Moreover Banks does not ground this in the pieties of contemporary multiculturalism but 
rather grounds it in Brown's patriotism, duty and his sense of anger that America has strayed 
so far from its professed ideals: 
If the country had been made of one race of people, if everyone had 
been white 
.... 
he would not have looked eastward across the Atlantic 
and loved African Negroes 
... 
or black-skinned people anywhere. No, 
he loved Aiiierican blacks, and he loved them, I believe, because of their 
relation to the dominant race of American whites. He saw our nation as 
divided unfairly between light-colored people and dark 
... 
Something 
deep within his soul, regardless of his own skin color, something at 
the very bottom of his own sense of who he was, of %N'ho he was 
especially in relation to the dominant, lighter race, went out to the 
souls of American Negroes, so that he v%'as able to ally himself with 
them in their struggle against slavery and American racialism. 
(CS, 416) 
Yet this struggle to redeem the nation is one that Owen Brown, by the end of his life, 
comes to see in terms of failure. His own betrayal of his Father thus operates as a metaphor 
for the failed project of Reconstruction and the segregationist turn in late nineteenth-century 
race relations. This emblematic quality of Owen's life is made particularly graphic when, 
alone in his shack, he permits himself the thought that he might once, in another America, 
have married Lyman's widow Susan Epps. Raising Lyman's son in the pastoral bliss of an 
Adirondack wilderness, they could, he fantasises, have been 'one small family free of all the 
cruel symbolism of race and the ancient curse of slavery, a white man and a Negro woman 
and child lield dear by a family and community that see them and deal with them solely as 
family and friends and fellow citizens. These we might describe as the 'unencumbered 
selves' of liberal tlieoi-\, and Romantic thought, untainted by social structures and 
unburdened bv history-themes that I will return to in subsequent chapters. The image 
Owen Brown presents here, however, is soon rendered a 'fantasv, delusion, dream 
... 
a white 
man's chimera', lasting, lie laments, only until 'Father comes forward 
... 
and places his heavy 
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hands on my shoulders... as if he has settled a yoke upon mv shoulders and wishes me to 
kneel under its weight' (CS, 696). 
By this point Owen resembles no-one so much as Hamlet, haunted by the spectre of a 
crime against his Father and the corrupted relic of a state that comes in its wake. Indeed, like 
Shakespeare's creation, Owen's 'modernity' manifests itself in 'purgatorial' terms 
characterised by mental instability, suicidal tendencies and the absence of belief. 44 Indeed, as 
he himself comes to accept, his final testament to Miss Mayo is motivated by nothing so much 
as the desire to "become a ghost 
... 
so as to replace in purgatory the long-suffering ghosts this 
confession has been designed expressly to release' (CS, 688). 
As is the case with Gore Vidal's Btirr the issue here is that of the sons' 'heresy' with 
regard to the ideals underlying the founding of the republic. This is what makes the relation 
between Banks's novel and the politics of patrimony evident in the pronouncements of 
Elmerson, Lincoln and Douglas such an intimate one. Indeed, Banks himself recognises this at 
crucial moments in the text situating claims such as those in the following passage from the 
closing pages of the novel, within the religious framework so crucial to any understanding of 
John Brown and the Civil War. After his father's gang had departed for Harpers Ferry, Owen 
recollects spreading out some papers, a 'mass of incrimination', before the stove, ready to 
follow an order to destroy them, 
... 
it was like listening to a thousand low, choked confessions all at once, 
as if the voices, mingling and merging with one another, were the sad, 
accumulated results of a long, unforgiving Inquisition into the heresy 
and betrayal of their Puritan fathers by an entire generation of sons. I 
burned none of it. My heretical refusal to play Isaac to my father's 
Abraham seemed not mine alone: it felt emblematic to me -as if all Age 
of Heroisrn had acceded to an Age of Cowardice. As if, in the context of 
those last days at Harpers Ferry and the one great moral issue of our 
time, I had become a man of another time: a man of the future I suppose, 
a modern nian. (CS, 740) 
Owen Brown's 'modernity', then, is articulated in terms of a republican 'fall' from a 
prior state of grace. Cloudsplitter is, in this respect, a republican fable of irreversible 'decline 
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and fall'. Falling is, in fact, a persistent motif in Owen Brown's memoir. His arm is 
permanently damaged in a childhood fall; he slumps to the floor of a Negro church in Boston, 
overwhelmed by an early spiritual experience; he slips from a tree, an observation point for 
the Harpers Ferry raid; and finally, he falls in his isolated cabin, alone, in the act of 
considering this very motif, 'a sympathetic act no doubt' (CS, 754), just before his confession 
is complete. 
Owen's refusal to die in the cause or carry out the task he has been charged with of 
destroying a mass of incriminating papers, also becomes symbolic in this way. Instead of 
continuing to confront a corrupt polity in the manner of his father, he heads for the 
anonymity of the West. This, Owen later perceives, was in an effort to 'become new 
... 
an 
American without history and with no story to tefl', an idea he believed in 'then and for many 
years to come' (CS, 757). Yet by the end of the novel he is disabused of this notion. Contrary 
to popular mythology, Banks clearly suggests, the West is, rather, a land of the fallen. The 
liberalism of mid nineteenth-century America was too often enraptured by this pastoral 
vision promising, as it seemed, a retreat from politics, history and the res publica. It was, as 
Banks's masterpiece makes clear, a fallen liberalism, stained by the sin of slavery, and 
redeemed only by the singular visions of those such as Brown, Emerson and Lincoln who saw 
it as such. 
" See Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatoq, for a fkscinating and erudite analysis of the strange bearing of the Catholic conccpt of 
-purgatory' on Shakesperare's play and early Protestant. Elizabethan England more generally. 
PART TWO 
THE TWENTIENTH- CENTURY CONTEXT 
71 
3 
Ideas in Modulation: Marxism and Liberal Revaluation 
in Lionel Trilling's The Middle of the journey 
A feeble logic, whose finger beckons its to the dark spectacle of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union, affirins the bankruptcy of Bolshevism, followed 
tnj that of Marxism, followed by that of Socialism 
... 
Have you forgotten 
the other bankruptcies? What was Chn'stianihj doing in the various 
catastrophes of society? What became of Liberalism? Mat has 
Conservatism produced, bi either its enlightened or reactionaryfornt? 
If we are indeed honestly to weigh out the bankruptcies of ideology, 
we shall have a long task ahead of its 
... 
And nothing isfinished yet. 
Victor Serge, 1947 
He can neither bclicoc nor bc comfortable in Ins disbelief, and lie 
I. s too lionest and courageous not to tnj to do one or the other. 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, writing of Hermann Melville 
Politically New York City 
... 
became the most interesting part of the 
Soviet Union. For it became the one part of that country in which 
the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky could be openly expressed. 
Lionel Abel 
Progressives and Reactionaries 
There are many historical-contextual factors to be borne in mind when distinguishing between 
the respective political agendas advanced by the Old and New Left. Arguably the most important 
of these is the absence from the latter's historical experience of a politically and intellectually 
transforniative econornic crisis equivalent in magnitude to the crash of October 1929. 'The 
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historical context of the Old Leff, as John Patrick Diggins has remarked, 'was the abundance of 
poverty; that of the New Left, the poverty of abundance. " 
Indeed, it would be difficult for the intellectual historian to overstate the ultimate impact 
of the Depression on political thinking and policy-making in the United States. As unemployment 
figures spiralled upward and industrial relations became increasingly fractious during the first 
half of the 1930s it became clear that government co4ld no longer look on indifferently as 
unrestrained capitalism appeared t6 de-stabilise American society as never before. Some 
concessionary form of statism was required as inoculation if Americans were not to develop the 
fuU-blown disease as it was perceived by many in Fascism andCOMMUrliSM. 2 
The extent to which the Depression had influenced opinion across the political spectrum 
was clearly evident by the time of the 1944 presidential election. The desire to avoid any sin-dlar 
experience resulted in an unprecedented bi-partisan conunitment to full-employment. Broadly 
Keynesian policies which promoted stimulation of the economy via deficit spending were, 
furthermore, advocated as the chief means 
-of attaining this objective. This 'New Deal Order' 
I 
would more or less prevail until the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the subsequent return 
to laissez-faire ideologically framed as a repudiation of the 'big government' liberalism of the 
post-war period. In broader theoretical terms the consensus prompted by the Keynesian 
revolution, according to Michael Sandel, also initiated a major shift in US political philosophy as a 
'political economy of citizenship gave way to [a] political economy of growth and deliberative 
justice. 113 - 
Yet such an understanding of the relation between polity and economy would have been 
anathema to either main candidate in the first presidential campaign of the Depression. Franklin 
I Diggins,, The Rise and Fall qf the American Left, 232. 
2 Although this piece will focus on the ideological tensions between leftist credos and liberalism, it is important to point out that 
homegrown right-wing populist movements with fascist undercurrents, spearheaded by demagogues such as Huey Long and Father 
,s Coughlan, represented another important dynamic in the political climate of the Roosevelt em. See Upsett and Raab, 7he Politic of 
Unreason, 167-203 and Brinkley, Voices qf Protest for treatments of this phenomenon. It is also worth noting that the New Deal itself 
was seen by the CPUSA before 1935 as 'social fascism'-a dubious epithet premised on the idea that such new forms of 'big 
government', in their authoritarianism and rearguard efforts to prop up capitalist economies, were indistinguishable from the fiLscist 
state. 
3 Sandel, Democra4zvs Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosopky, 262. 
73 
D. Roosevelt came to power in 1932, much as Bill Clinton did sixty years later, armed with the 
conventional, time-honoured panacea: a promise to balance the federal budget. When John 
Maynard Keynes visited the White House in 1934 his ideas merely mystified a President 
committed only to the institutional reform and bureaucratic regulation of economic activity. Such 
measures were, as most historians have agreed, carefully designed to leave the underlying 
structure and central premises of American capitalism securely intact. The large-scale federal 
spending initiatives central to Keynesian economic theory, by contrast, appeared to go against all 
of its laissez-faire instincts. 4 
So how did American liberalism reconcile the manipulation of aggregate demand with 
the imperatives of free enterprise, the claims of the collective made urgent by the Depression and 
a traditional emphasis on individualism? How did it manage to subvert many of its own 
underlying Lockean principles and still remain a 'liberalism', still remain 'American', in any 
meaningful sense? I do not wish to respond to these particular questions directly in this chapter 
but feel they are crucial to bear in mind as a broader intellectual context for the remarks that 
follow. The New Deal undoubtedly helped foster a climate within which the complex attachment 
of a large section of the 1930s left-liberal intellectual community to Stalin's Soviet Union was 
made possible. It will be my aim here to use Lionel Trilling's novel The Middle of the journey (1947) 
1 
to explore this attachment and the complications it engendered for left-liberal political thought. 
Submerged beneath the common man rhetoric of this period was what Trilling described 
in a later introduction to the novel as a 'clandestine negation of the political life" -a negation that 
events in the USSR, by the end of the decade, would make visible to an increasing number of 
CPUSA and People's Front members.. T/w Middle of the Journey is well positioned historically to 
shed light on this development. By composing and publishing his novel in the years immediately 
following World War 11, Trilling was able to articulate a liberal anti-Communist position, which 
was alert to the realities of Stalinism but not yet constrained by the cultural climate produced by 
4 lbid, 259-60. 
5 Trilling, The Middle qf the Journey, xx. Hereafter references will be to TMOTJ and will be in the text. 
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McCarthyism in full swing. In the period after the novel's publication, it became clear that 
Trilling had based the character of Gifford Maxim on Whittaker Chambers. One unfortunate 
effect of this association has been to reduce the novel to the status of a Cold War curiosity, 
interesting only for its representation of one of the period's more colourful figures. 
The affiliation between certain liberals and the Soviet Union took a number of forms and 
was accompanied by a complex array of rationalisations. It lasted, however, for the best part of a 
decade. Indeed, the not insubstantial degree of liberal sympathy for communism in general only 
began to fully unravel in the wake of the 1936-7 Moscow Trials and, with less rancour, the 1939 
Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. This process, after the hiatus provided by wartime alliance, 
would finally climax, with even greater attendant trauma, amidst the maelstrom of McCarthyist 
innuendo and recrimination in the 1950s. 
The attraction to the Soviet Union can be divided into two phases, the first of which 
began in the early 1930s largely as a result of domestic economic developments which prompted 
a major shift in attitudes amongst left-liberals. The new Roosevelt administration's decision to 
restore diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1933 can be seen as the culmination of this phase. It 
was initially triggered, however, by liberal intellectuals associated with such journals as the 
Nation and the New Republic who, frustrated by American governmental inertia in the face of 
economic collapse, had begun following a social experiment many of them had previously 
written off. In 1930 the first intimations of mass unemployment in the United States stood in stark 
contrast to reports which stressed the rapid growth of the Soviet economy in the period foHowing 
the commencement of the first Five-Year Plan. As Frank A. Warren has written: 
the Five-Year Plan did not generate excitement until 1930 
-two 
years after it had begun. What happened to cause this excitement 
was 1929 and the depression, the real impetus in turning liberals 
east towards Russia 
.... 
It was the confrontation of the Five-Year Plan 
6 The pair had met at Columbia University in the 1920s where, as a young communist, Chambers had been involved, at one point, in 
an 'underground assignment' for the Party. By the late forties Chambers, repudiating the radicalism of his youth, had become a born- 
again Christian and was working for Time magazine. He came to public prominence as the chief witness in the high profile espionage 
trial of Alger Hiss, a prominent establishment left-liberal, accused of passing secrets to the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Trifling's 1975 
introduction provideas a portrait of Chambers and an account of his bearing on the novel. 
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with the depression that served as the catalyst. ' 
, 
What impressed some American observers of the USSR most profoundly was the spirit of 
experimentalism evident. in the construction of a plaimed economy. 8 Planning, of course, had been 
one of the don-dnant concepts in the thought of an earlier Progressive movement whose ideas still 
permeated liberal thinking. 9 More abstractly, planning also appealed to a specific strand of 
American idealism which-alongside a commitment to individual rights and freedom froni 
goverrument- stressed- equally the duties and responsibilities of those who govern to the 
governed. It was out of this admiration for planning in the early thirties 
-which many centrist 
thinkers could quite readily reconcile with a re-structured capitalist economy-that the USSR 
quickly became a touchstone for self-questioning American liberals. This process, as Richard PeUs 
has noted, was equally facilitated by Russian propaganda itself which 
... 
often emphasized achievements that sounded typically American. Both 
countries valued the material rewards of mass production, both respected 
the machine and its power to transform life, both celebrated industrialism 
and technology, both worshipped bigness as a sign of quality and progress, 
both preached the virtues of efficiency and physical growth. 10 
Neither did the imperatives of Soviet communism-after Stalin's 'pragmatic' turn from 
internationalism to 'socialism in one country'- appear to be especiaBy at odds with those of a 
pragmatic philosophical tradition which valorised scientific method. Many commentators thus 
soon became adept at 'translat[ing] their praise for the Soviet Union into peculiarly American 0 
terms. ' These were ultimately those that enabled Soviet communism under Stalin to be perceived 
as 'an unfinished test where final judgement could be suspended until all the results were in. ' 
7 Warren, Liberals and Communists, 65. 
8 Some examples of treatises which testify to the importance of planning as an organising principle in the economic sphere during this 
period are Charles A. Beard's 'The Rationality of Planned Economy' and 'A Five Year Plan for America' from America Faces the 
Future ( 1932), Stuart Chase's Government in Business (1935), George Soule's The Planned Societv (1932). For a discussion of 
attitudes to the Five Year Plan in the US during the early 1930s see Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment 1917-1933. 
9 See Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents, 24-27 for an appraisal of the link between the earlier Progressive and later New Deal 
emphasis on planning. 
10 Pells. Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years, 64. 
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Such scientific pragmatism, importantly, 'eliminated the need to evaluate or criticize the more 
unpleasant aspects of the dictatorship. "' Indeed, by 1935 even Walter Duranty, the Moscow 
correspondent of the New York Times, could write on collectivisation and socialisation in the 
following terms: 
Their cost in blood and tears and other terms of human suffering has 
been prodigious, but I am not prepared to say it is unjustified. In a 
world where there is so much waste and muddle it may perhaps be true 
that any plan, however rigid, is better than no plan at all and that any 
altruistic end, however remote, may justify any means however cruel. 12 
The warming of such pron-dnent representatives of American liberalism to the Soviet 
Union generated a number of interesting consequences. Most significant amongst these, perhaps, 
was the novel form assumed by a pre-existing bifurcation in American political life between 
'progressives' and 'reactionaries'. This distinction had its origins in the era of an earlier Roosevelt 
presidency when the term 'progressive' had little, if any, connection with communism or 
socialism. 13However, whilst the interest of liberal intellectuals in Soviet planning had established 
some of the theoretical ground for a new 'progressive' political alliance, the Communist Party of 
the United States (CPUSA)) following the Comintern line dictated by Moscow, had remained 
hostile to any organisational. links with democratic political groups. 
This altered quite dramatically in 1935 when events in Europe caused the USSR to re- 
evaluate its relations with the Western democracies. With the advent of Gem-ian re-militarisation, 
fascism was now perceived as the chief threat to both Western liberal democracy and 
communism. In response Moscow retreated from its earlier isolationism, authorising the 
establishment of a People's Front in the United States, along with a Popular Front in Europe, to be 
made up of communist and non-communist organisations and individuals sharing anti-fascist 
11 Ibid. 
12 Quoted in Warren, Liberals and Communists. 72. 
13 For a study which compares the 'progressive' impulse in the two respective Roosevelt eras see Hofstadter, The Age ofReform. 
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goals. The establishment of the People's Front inaugurated a second phase in the relation between 
communists and 'fellow travelling' liberals. In the years that followed, this alliance would never 
be free from division and wrangling given the broad spectrum of disparate, often contradictory 
opinion it sought to house. In the US, nonetheless, the widely deployed term 'progressive' used to 
describe those associated with the People's Front gathered in this opinion to an extent that 
minimised internecine friction. It did so primarily through its invocation of an ever-improving 
future which appealed to an Enlightenment-rooted faith in reason and progress prominent in 
both the liberal and Marxist traditions. 
For American liberals, culturally programmed to look forward, it had no doubt proved 
disheartening to be presented with the spectacle of the Soviet Union apparently leading the race 
to a future they had long taken as their own providential endowment. As a result, by 1935, 
receptivity and openness to the USSR 
-as the only means of rejuvenating a seemingly moribund 
US political tradition 
-moved from being a touchstone to a cornerstone of 'progressive' liberal 
thought. If the first phase of the liberal attraction to the USSR can be viewed in terms of a drift to 
the left amongst centrists, then. this second phase should be seen more as the effect of the 
CPUSA's move to the centre under the new Comintern policy. Indeed, so complete was this move 
that by 1936 CPUSA Presidential candidate Earl Browder could proclaim that 'Communism is 
Twentieth-Century Americanism. Moreover, his party, by embracing the flag and invoking 
figures such as Lincoln and Jefferson, was re-positioning itself within a less threatening political 
tradition. The small groupings of dissident Marxists who, only a couple of years earlier, had been 
criticising the authoritarianism and inflexibility of the CPUSA, were astonished by this reversal. 
'If they saw the party as too uncompromising in 1934, Judy Kutulas remarks in her excellent 
intellectual history of anti-Stalinism and the People's Front, 'it seemed too accommodationist in 
1936.114 
Within the American Left, however, the progressives linked to the People's Front wielded 
significantly more cultural and institutional power than either the CPUSA or the various 
14 Kutulas, The Long War, 88. 
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renegade Marxist groups opposed to it. Indeed, by the mid-thirties, as Kutulas stresses, such 
progressives were the left-liberal establishment. For this reason dissident Marxists such as Philip 
Rahv considered them 'the real mainstay of Stalinism', giving Stalin's regime an unprecedented 
degree of legitimacy within the US establishment. 15 Moreover, this cultural power helped dictate 
the terms of what it meant to be 'progressive' as the designation increasingly became premised on 
how one felt about the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union. The term 'reactionary' 
which awaited those who disagreed was, like the term 'progressive' itself, drawn from an earlier 
division in American political life. If this first generation of progressives, however, were focused 
only on the fate and future of the republic, the one that spcceeded was concerned, more 
ominously, with the fate and future of mankind. As American progressives increasingly began to 
look to the international scene, such enlarged ideas of 'fate' and 'future' became inextricably 
bound up with the survival of Stalin's Russia. 
The Moscow Trials and the Dewey Commission 
The 'fatalistic' pre-disposition was at its most conspicuous in the response of CPUSA members 
and liberal 'fellow travellers' to the Moscow Trials which began in August 1936. In the first of 
these show-trials several of the October Revolution's most prominent figures were charged with 
plotting the assassination of Stalin and other top Soviet leaders in alliance with Hitler's Gestapo. 
Each defendant signed confessions to this effect before pleading for the death penalty. 
Furthermore all the accused named Leon Trotsky, former leader of the Red Army and one of the 
Bolsheviks' most respected intellectuals, as the instigator of the plot, competing with each other to 
denounce him. 16 
The polarising effect of these events on left-liberal political opinion in the United States 
was intense. W-hilst causing soiiie to renounce or retreat from earlier politicaj positions and 
1-5 Rahv quoted in Kutulas, The Long War, 125. 
16 For a comprehensive study of the Moscow tfials see Conquest, The Great Purge Trials. 
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allegiances, the trials hardened the conviction of many more who saw the USSR as defending 
itself from subversion and providing the chief bulwark against the forces of Fascist reaction in 
Europe. The Soviet Union had to be backed at all costs, many claimed, including liberal 
sympathisers uneasy with its methods. To withdraw support on the basis of such internal 
political matters risked jeopardising the precarious balance of ideological power in Europe and 
beyond. 
Leon Trotsky, an exile since 1929, had been the most vocal Marxist critic of Stalin's 
regime, protesting the emergence of a new Party oligarchy and the abandorurnent of the Leninist 
legacy under his leadership. 17This critique culminated with the publication of Trotsky's The 
Revolution Betrayed in 1936. As Stalin's most outspoken and intellectually formidable opponent, 
Trotsky became, in the US as elsewhere, an inescapable presence for intellectuals across the left- 
liberal spectrum during the latter half of the 1930s. Moreover, Trotsky's abiding interest in the 
relation between politics and aesthetics 
-which prompted his repudiation of Stalinist philistinism 
and advocacy. of cultural modernism 
-also made him an equally appealing figure to many artists, 
writers and critics such as those associated with Partisan Review. " Because of his status as the 
most ideologically feared critic of Stalin during the crucial period of the Moscow trials Trotsky 
soon came to dictate the terms of an emergent anti-Stalinist Marxism. 
Trotsky was scornful of charges brought against him largely on the basis of forced 
confession. Initially he demanded that a formal case be made for his extradition-a process that 
would have forced the Soviet authorities to present firm evidence of his involvement in any 
conspiracy 
- 
but this failed to materialise. The Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky was set 
up by mostly New York based intellectuals (many of whom were contributors to Partisan Review) 
with the backing of Norman Thomas's Socialist Party. This broader party political support had 
been acquired via pressure brought to bear by James P. Cannon's Workers' Party who, under 
17 See Deustscher, The Prophet Outcast: TrotSA3,1929-1940. 
Is For a discussion of Trotsky's sometimes clandestinely exerted influence on left-wing American politics in the 1930s see M. S. 
Venkataraman, 'Leon Trotsky's Adventure in American Radical Politics'. For Trotsky's important intellectual affimity with the 
influential cultural critics and artists associated with Partisan Review see Hitchens, 'The New York Intellectuals and the Prophet 
Outcast' in For The Sake QfArgument. 199-207 and Wald's The New York Intellectuals. 
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Trotsky's advice, had earlier formulated a policy of 'entryism' vis a vis the Socialist Party. 
Designed primarily as a means of securing a forum from which Trotsky could respond to the 
charges made against him, the cornmittee was also acutely conscious of the opportunity it might 
provide as an outlet for Trotsky's political views in general. 19 
John Dewey, the most highly regarded liberal intellectual in the US, after discussion with 
his former pupil and Trotsky Committee member Sydney Hook, agreed to head a commission of 
inquiry. 21 The Dewey Commission of Inquiry into the Charges against Leon Trotsky took place in 
Coyoacan, Mexico over eight days in April 1937. Despite several attempts to discredit the process 
in advance, " the commission's hearings eventually took place largely as a result of a powerful 
intimation amongst those involved of their historical and intellectual significance. James T. Farrell 
captured the shared sense of high drama and historical gravitas amongst the Commission's 
organisers when he wrote: 'It is a spectacle to see, a spectacle rare in history. Imagine Robespierre 
or Cromwell under such circumstances. Well, this is more, because neither Cromwell nor 
Robespierre had the intellectual breadth that Trotsky has. '22 
After assessing the evidence offered by the Soviet authorities and witnessing, by all 
accounts, a remarkable defence testimony from the defendant himself, the Commission 
announced that Trotsky was innocent of all charges. The importance of this verdict lies in the fact 
that, initially at least, it was by no means perfectly clear that Trotsky was innocent. Fabrication on 
the scale alleged by Trotsky and his defenders was unimaginable, not only to CPUSA and 'fellow 
travelling' backers of the Soviet Union, but also, crucially, to liberals with deep reservations about 
Marxism such as John Dewey. Dewey had always refused to justify or equivocate on the 
suspension of political freedoms under both Lenin and Stalin whilst the Soviet system 'matured'. 
19 See Wald, The New York Intellectuals, 128-132. 
20 "is was only after some deliberation. Writing after Dewey's death Hook testified to the physical and intellectual courage of 
Dewey, who was then 78 years old, in eventually agreeing to embark upon such an undertaking. 'Scarcely anyone knows the variety 
and intensity of pressure he had to withstand', Hook claimed, 'not least of all from members of his immediate family, some of whom 
feared he might be killed in the excitable political milieu of Mexico City 
... 
The simple truth is that Dewey made up his mind 
irrevocably [to go] only after he became aware of the efforts and far-flung strategems of the Communist Party to prevent him from 
going. ' Quoted in Wald, 132. 
21 'Me most famous of these was the 'Open Letter to American Liberals' signed by CPUSA members and 'fellow travellers' which 
included such luminaries as Malcolm Cowley, Henry Roth, Theodore Dreiser, Dorothy Parker and Nathanael West. See Wald, 132. 
22 Quoted in Wald, 132. 
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He had, nonetheless, no reason to believe that this contempt for the political could extend to the 
levels suggested by those on the left who rejected the verdicts of the Moscow Trials. For this 
reason Dewey had, in fact, left for Mexico believing Trotsky to be guilty. 
Like many others then, Dewey initially believed that no court of law anywhere, 
communist or otherwise, was capable of presiding over deception on such an immense scale. It 
was only when such certainties began to crumble in the face of accumulating evidence that the 
implications of liberal commitment to the 'progressive" forces embodied in the USSR. began to 
appear more grave. Liberals with communist sympathies maintained a somewhat pragmatic 
position of 'agnosticism' on the trials claiming, with some justification, that the truth was difficult 
to ascertain under such historically unprecedented circumstances. The pragmatism of others, 
however, took a more troubIing form. 
The CPUSA, following the Comintern line, saw the trials as 'necessary', an unavoidable 
process which would keep the revolution on course by cleansing the Party of 'reactionary' and 
'subversive' elements. Many of their fellow-travelling liberals did not dissent significantly from 
this position. To liberals with a greater degree of moral and political investment in the Soviet 
Union, Stalin's high-level purge was also 'necessary" if 'regrettable'. It was to be understood as an 
unfortýinate phase within an otherwise progressive series of developments, a phase that could not 
be explained with reference to the political culture of the US which emphasised civil liberties and 
the rights of the individual. The trials' credibility, furthermore, many such progressives; argued, 
should not hinge on normative legal criteria which demanded evidence of Trotsky's 'guilt' or 
'innocence'. Such factors had to be subordinated to more urgent political imperatives. 
This position implicitly affirmed Stalin as the practical and pragmatic leader intent on 
making History 
- 
much in the way that some early nineteenth-century radicals had viewed 
Napoleon. Trotsky's criticisms seemed, by contrast, to undermine anti-fascist solidarity, with 
Trotsky himself appearing to American progressives as jan] ineffectual intellectual trapped by 
his theoretical dogma. '23The preservation of the People's Front against fascism, then, justified the 
23 Waffen, Liberals and Communists, 188. 
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means deployed to silence those who disturbed its harmony. This was ultimately the liberal input 
into a reading of the trials as the inevitable triumph of the 'objective' Law of History over the 
merely 'subjective" fantasies of the theorist. Maurice Merleau-Ponty was later to characterise the 
trials as 'a drama of subjective honesty and objective treason. '24 
The Means and the Ends 
The central irony of this apologia for Stalinism is that it did not diverge significantly from 
Trotskyist orthodoxy which held to the view that the ends justifies the means with similar vigour. 
Trotsky's quarrel with Stalin, however, did not turn on the morality of this strategy per se. It 
centred, rather, on the fact that Stalinism did not bring about the end it purported to. As opposed 
to the liberation of mankind by means of the advancement of class struggle, Trotsky argued that 
Stalin espoused Marxist-Leninist philosophy whilst, in actuality, re-imposing oligarchy through a 
new form of 'state' capitalism. Thus, it might be said, Trotsky did not recoil so much in moral 
horror from Stalinist nzeans but in political horror from Stalinist ends. He himself had not hesitated 
in deploying severe means to subjugate the Kronstadt rebels during the civil war because he 
believed that such rebellion would ultimately lead to counter-revolution. Accordingly, many anti- 
Communist liberals as well as Soviet-supportingprogressives" believed that the democratic good 
faith of liberals such as Dewey 
- 
who were prepared to give Trotsky"s grievances a hearing 
- 
was 
being abused by a revolutionary whose theoretical writings held such sentiment in open 
contempt. 
For Trotsky the most important achievement of the hearings in Mexico had been their 
exposure of the motivation behind Stalin's purges: the consolidation of his own power by means 
of a ruthless state bureaucratic apparatus. This, in turn, had allowed Trotsky as defendant to 
present himself as the persecuted hero and legitimate heir of a Marxist-Leninist tradition which 
stood in opposition to such developments. In short, the commission had been notable primarily, 
24 Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, 44. 
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for Trotsky, in allowing the consideration of these competing ideologies. To this extent Trotsky's 
view coincided with those of the trial's critics who equally perceived the hearings in terms of an 
'ideological struggle"; they differed only in so far as that Trotsky believed the hearings to have 
afforded the crucial historical occasion for a balanced consideration of such matters. John Dewey, 
on the other hand, subscribed to neither of these positions. For him the conunission's work was 
'one of evidence and objective fact, not of weighing theories against each other. '25Accordingly, 
Trotsky's guilt or innocence had to be established without reference to the inexorable law of 
human history advanced by both the 'progressives" atid Trotsky himself. It was from within this 
divergence of opinion that Trotsky and Dewey were to debate the relationship between means 
and ends in the pages of The New International in the summer of 1938. 
Dewey and Trotsky had parted company with a keen sense of their political differences 
but also, as I have explained, a new mutual respect for each other's nioral ilitegrihj. 26 In many ways 
the rapprochement between Dewey and Trotsky is just as puzzling as that which occurred between 
the pro-Stalin CPUSA and 'fellow travelling" liberals. Dewey was later to describe the events in 
Mexico as 'the most interesting single intellectual experience of my whole life. 127 Trotsky himself 
claimed that the Dewey Commission hearings had given his 'faith in the clear, bright future of 
mankind 
... 
[an] indestructible temper, praising Dewey as 'a man of unshakeabIe moral authority' 
and the 'personification of genuine American idealism. '28 This convergence is all the more 
surprising when considered in the light of their philosophical exchange only a year later. 
Trotsky's piece 'Their Morals and Ours' was prompted by the widespread criticism of 
Marxist doctrines as 'amoral' in their adherence to the 'Jesuitical' maxim of "the ends justifies the 
means. ' The former Bolshevik leader responded by requesting that such critics outline the basis 
of 
- 
rather than merely assert 
- 
their own moral positions. Close examination of the bourgeois 
25 Quoted in Spitzer, 'John Dewey, the 'Trial' of Leon Trotsky and the Search for Historical Truth', 29. 
26 Albert Glotzer, the reporter for the commission, recalled one occasion when 'a great laughter broke out in one comer of the large 
room where Dewey and Trotsky were conversing. They were surrounded by several people listening to their conversations. I asked 
Frankel what happened in the comer. He smiled, "Dewey said to Trotsky, 'if all Communists were like you I would be a Communist. ' 
And Trotsky replied 'if all liberals were like you, I would be a liberal"'. See Glotzer, Trotsky: Memoir and Critique, 27 1. 
27 Quoted in Wald, 13 1. 
28 Quoted in Diggins. p. 181-82. 
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critic's moral precepts, Trotsky claims, reveals that morality is always socially constructed and 
hence never independent of the social relations Marxism foregrounds. Such supposedly 
transcendental "supraclass morality', Trotsky writes, 
inevitably leads to the acknowledgement of a special substance, of a 
'moral sense, 'conscience, some kind of absolute, which is nothing more 
than the cowardly philosophical pseudonym for God. Independent of 'ends' 
- 
that is, of society 
- 
morality, whether we deduce it from eternal truths or 
from the "nature of man', proves in the end to be a form of 'natural theology. '-9 
The rejection of the 'ends justifies the means' maxim also, Trotsky points out, fails to 
acknowledge its manifestations in Anglo-Saxon utilitarian philosophy. Likewise the 'pollution' of 
Stalinism is counterposed to the abstraction 'democracy', an ahistorical manoeuvre which fails to 
recognise that anti-Stalinists such asTrotsky 'in order to characterise Soviet bureaucracy 
.... 
have 
borrowed the terms of "Thorn-ddor"' and "Bonapartism" from the history of bourgeois 
democracy. ' This, he adds emphatically, is because "... dentocracy canze into the world not at all 
through the democratic road [italics in original]'. 10 Aware that he is writing for an urban, 
predominantly Northern US readership, Trotsky then skilfully re-iterates this position in a more 
pointed context: 
, 
Lincoln's significance lies in his not hesitating before the most severe 
means, once they were found to be necessary, in achieving a great 
historic aim posed by the development of a young nation. The question 
lies not even in which of the warring camps caused or itself suffered 
the gTeatest number of victims. History has different yardsticks for 
the cruelty of the Northerners and the cruelty of the Southerners. "
John Dewey's response to Trotsky's typically bold, if carefully pitched, argument was 
equally deft and can be seen as something of a blueprint for the combination of 'pragmatism' and 
social democratic values which have furnished much of the American philosophical response to 
-'9 Trotsky, 'Their Morals and Ours', The New International, June 1938. reprinted in Novack (ed. ), Their Morals and Ours, 16. 
30 [bid, 32. 
-11 lbid, 38. 
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Marxism in the post-war era. Dewey notes that the 'transcendental' morality criticised by Trotsky 
in 'Their Morals and Ours' is actually re-inscribed via Trotsky's dependence on the class struggle 
as 'the law of all laws. ' Far from means and ends being involved in a relationship of inter- 
dependence, therefore. grounding Trotskyite praxis, means (in the form of 'class struggle") are 
invoked without reference to alternatives or any view to their consequences. Hence, they soon 
assume, at best, a semi-detached relationship to the ends ("the liberation of mankind'), that is, if 
they do not overwhelm those ends completely. Dewey is here attempting to highlight the flawed 
'science" which underwrites th is central axiom of orthodox Marxism: 
Since the class struggle is regarded as the only means that will reach 
the end, and since the view that it is the only means is reached deductively 
and not by an inductive examination of the means-consequences in their 
interdependence, the means, the class struggle, does not need to be 
critically examined with regard to its actual objective consequences. 32 
Bearing in mind this failure of critical examination, Dewey adds later, 'it is conceivable 
that the course actually taken by the revolution in the USSR becomes more explicable when it is 
noted that means were deduced from a supposed scientific law instead of being searched for and 
adopted on the ground of their relation to the moral end of the liberation of mankind. '-33 Dewey's 
position, however, does not pre-suppose the rejection of a scientific approach to social theory in 
itself. It is rooted, rather, in a scientific methodology which refuses to derive ends from laws, 
natural or social, be they those promoted by Trotsky or the political forces of all descriptions who 
oppose him. 
I have focused on this specific cultural context and, more narrowly, Dewey and Trotsky 
as important intellectual figures within it, in order to facilitate my critical reading of Lionel 
Trilling's novel The Middle of Hie Joumey. Trilling's work is an attempt to re-construct in fiction the 
political and intellectual choices forced upon middle-class liberals and radicals in the aftermath of 
32 Dewey, 'Means and Ends', The Neis- International. August 1938; reprinted in Novack, 7heir Moraij and Ours, 7 1. 
31 [bid., 72. 
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the Moscow Trials. Perhaps because of its concern with moral, political and intellectual life, The 
Middle of the joumey has been either ignored or given cursory treatment in most surveys of post- 
war American literature. It is, nonetheless, a self-conscious attempt to depart from the fantasies of 
a pre-political state of nature which characterise the "classic' American novel or romance, an 
interesting effort to integrate politics and fiction in a manner more readily associated with the 
European novel. In spite of an, at times, over-elaborate plot and some schematic characterisation, 
The Middle of the Journey remains noteworthy for both the ambition and considerable degree of 
success with which it maps the political psyche of a generation. This thematic is more familiar in 
another strand of the European tradition represented by works such as Conrad's Under Western 
Eyes (1911) and Dostoevsky's TI-w Possessed (1871)- a novel, incidentally, that Trilling's central 
character begins but fails to finish reading. More specifically, The Middle of the Joumey delineates 
the origins of a retreat from Marxism amongst liberal intellectuals which continues to inform 
American political thought today. 
The Middle of the Journey: The Politics of Death and the Death of Politics 
Trilling's novel tells the story of John Laskell who, recovering from an illness which brings him 
close to death, visits, Nancy and Arthur Croom, two married friends who have recently moved to 
a Connecticut farmhouse. The author of a book entitled Theories of Housing, Laskell, we learn, is 
the kind of New Deal liberal who 'had committed himself to the most hopeful and progressive 
aspects of modern life, planning their image in public housing developments, defending them in 
long dull meetings of liberals and radicals' (TMOTI, 30). Laskell finds that his own liberal views, 
which appear to have undergone a crisis of re-orientation in the time since his illness, are now 
increasingly at odds with the 'progressive' politics espoused by the Crooms. The resulting 
confrontation forces Laskell to accept the need for some degree of political and philosophical 
revaluation. The process is both accelerated and complicated by the appearance of their mutual 
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friend, the former communist Gifford Maxim, who believes himself to be in physical danger after 
breaking with the party. 
At the heart of the matter, Laskell believes, is the very fact of his illness itself, mention of 
which the Crooms appear to scrupulously avoid. This engenders frustration on their visitor's part 
who comes to regard their reluctance to raise the issue as the sign of an over-investment in the 
'progressive' political vision. This commitment 
was expressed in their youth, their vigor, their unquestioning attachment to each 
other, the child they had and the child to come; but it did not stop there as Laskell 
knew 
-it went beyond, expressing itself in their passionate expectation of the 
future, an expectation that was at once glad and stern, in their troubled but clear 
sense of other people all over the world, suffering or soon to suffer. Life could not 
reach further, could not pitch itself higher, than it had in these young Americans. 
(TMOTI, 17) 
To discuss the past in any depth or to acknowledge the reality of death in the Crooms' presence, 
Laskell discovers, is to risk undermining their faith in this 'affirmative life'. It is, in some 
profound sense, he comes to believe, also to question the politics which anchori that faith. Such 
intimations finally find open expression when an exasperated Laskell turns to Nancy and says: 
'You talk about morbidity and living in the past-as if you thought that death was politically 
reactionary' (TMOTI, 1,16). 
At this point Laskell has not disclosed the news of Gifford Maxim's break with the party. 
Later, however, he realises that his decision to withhold this information is bound up with his 
feelings about his illness. After acknowledging an element of revenge for the Crooms' reluctance 
to discuss these feelings with him, we learn that 
more decisive than this was his determination that the only way he 
could tell the story of Maxim ivas to make it part of the story of his illness. 
Without the account of - what he had felt during those weeks in bed, 
the story of Ma\im would lack the particular force it had in his mind. (TA40TI, 80) 
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Laskell's brush with death and his subsequent existential crisis force him to take stock of 
his relation to past, present and future. He is struck by an overriding sense of the radical 
contingency of existence and the extent to which a life lived in and for the future, a life lived on the 
basis of promises, is akin to the airless life of the 'well-loved middle class child'. This is the Iffe 
symbolised by the Crooms and their child-like faith in the future, a life cushioned by the 
'progressive'. promise of growth and change. After his illness, however, Laskell no longer feels 
able to make this "distinction between what he now had and was and what he expected to have 
and be. ' The passage from childhood to maturity should be conditioned, rather, by a recognition 
that "the future and the present [are] brought together, that you lived your life now instead of 
preparing and conunitting yourself to some brighter day to come" (TMOTI, 144). 
Maxim's break is linked to such musings in the sense that it forces Laskell to face some of 
the grave consequences which can flow from a ruthless conu-nitment to the future. The concrete 
historical backdrop articulated alongside this break, accordingly, gives Laskell's new sense of 
life's contingency an important set of political implications. The means/end question raised via 
the discussion of Gifford Maxim's actions whilst a communist can thus be informed by a broader 
set of considerations than is common. If nothing else, The Middle of the Journey can be read as a 
rare and striking example of a novel which establishes death as a force with a complex but 
forn-ddable bearing on the political sphere. 
This complexity manifests itself on a number of levels, most obviously in the aftermath of 
Laskell's own illness when his exposure to the tragic, conditioned nature of human existence 
forces him to re-appraise his friends' vision of the political future. However, although the 
narrative is constructed around several dramatic events which touch upon the novel's concern 
with death and tragedy (Laskell's iHness, Maxim's abandonment of the Party) one event, in 
particular, is made to bear most of the weight of these themes. This is the death of a young girl, 
Susan Caldwell, whom Laskell befriends and whose mother, Emily, he has become emotiona. Uy 
entangled with after a sexual encounter. Susan dies after being struck by her father Duck who is 
ashamed at her inability to perform during a school concert. She is unable to read William Blake's 
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famous 'Jerusalem' lyric with any assurance as a result of Laskell's over-elaborate guidance -a 
product of the rarefied literary sensibilities generated by a middle-class liberal education. The 
matter is complicated, however, and the tragic dimensions further accentuated, by the fact that 
Susan was born with a weak heart 
-a fact concealed from her father but revealed to Laskell by 
Emily Caldwell. 
This particular episode strays into the realms of melodrama and seems, initially at least, 
somewhat incongruous in a novel concerned primarily with the life of the mind. However, it is 
not in the action but in the dialogue, the exchange of political-philosophical opinion 
-in the 
sense in which it both explains and is explained by this tragedy 
-that The Middle of the Journey 
comes into its own. A striking feature in this respect is the work's implicit and explicit 
intertextuality. Trilling's novel, as one might perhaps expect from such a celebrated literary critic, 
is littered with allusions to a wide range of philosophical and literary sources; from the title itself 
(a reference to the opening lines of Dante's Inferno) to Spinoza, the Iliad and a whole host of other 
texts 
My aim here will be to focus on two specific instances of the novel's intertextuality in 
order to illustrate the ways in which The Middle of the Joumey engages with the type of questions 
broached by Trotsky, Dewey and, more generally, US left-liberal opinion after the Moscow Trials. 
It might be argued that by focusing on what are, strictly speaking, secondary texts I will be 
subtracting from the primary material, Trilling's novel itself. However it is my belief that The 
Middle of t1te jourizey invites no such approach given the extent to which its characters, as 
inteflectuals, are understood to be the products of ffieir reading as much as "environment' or 
'experience' in the more general sense. Indeed Trifling's literary criticism itself disavows the 
division between literature and experience that a more conventional approach might pre- 
suppose 
-a materialist dimension to his work frequently overlooked. Trilling regards literature, 
primarily, as an experietice in its own right. When composing a preface to a work, for example, he 
writes, his design is 
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to make it more likely that the act of reading will be an experience, 
having in mind what the word implies of an activity of consciousness 
and response. They try to suggest that the work of literature is an object 
that might be freely touched and handled, picked up, turned over, looked 
over from this angle and that, and, at least in some sense, possessed-34 
Most of the characters in The Middle of the Joumey then 
-even the under-educated Emfly 
Caldwell whose (mis)reading of Spengler's Decline of tl-w West helps define 1wr to Laskell and the 
Crooms- can be said to 'possess' texts in this respect. Perhaps more provocatively, it might be 
said that Maxim is, in his commitments to first Marx and then Christianity, possessed Inj (Marxist 
and Scriptural) texts. With such factors in mind then, I will commence by demonstrating how. 
Trilling brings 'The Grand Inquisitor'- Dostoevsky's dark and brilliant meditation on good and 
evil 
-to bear on the pressing political and moral issues raised during the 'Red Decade'. 
Stalinism and "The Grand Inquisitor' 
After Gifford Maxim explains his fear that breaking with the Party may have placed his life in 
danger, Laskell, to give him a 'public' existence, secures his friend an editorial post on The New 
Era, a liberal journal of politics and culture owned by another friend Kermit Simpson. By the time 
Maxim and Simpson pay a visit to Connecticut a few weeks later, Laskell has told Arthur and 
Nancy Croom of Maxim's break. Laskell is surprised, however, to learn that Nancy had once 
agreed to receive secretly marked letters for Maxim related to clandestine CP activity. This was 
agreed without her husband's knowledge and after Arthur had turned down an earlier request 
from Maxim for him to do the same. Arthur Croom, unaware of his wife's actions, responds to 
Maxim's break by attributing it to a moral failing on Maxim's part, as though, Laskefl thinks, the 
Party were somehow 'a fixed point from which all deviation implied something wrong with the 
person deviating' (TMOTI, 156). It is only when a deeply agitated Nancy, realising the possible 
34 Trilling, Priffiaces to the Experience ofLiterature, i. 
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danger she has placed herself and her family in, attributes Maxim's decision to 'insanity' that 
Laskell gets his first intimation of her involvement 
-a fact she confirms when later confronted on 
her own. Laskell's general ambivalence towards the rigid frameworks of guilt and innocence 
within which his friends seek either justification or absolution for their actions is captured when 
he reflects during this episode that 'he did not know whether he was frightened for Nancy or by 
her' (TMOTI, 155). 
The compulsion within many strands of modern political thinking to apportion guflt and 
innocence indiscriminately is forcefully taken up via the person of Gifford Maxim. Maxim 
functions as what might best be described as a "grand inquisitor' of the secular messianic political 
values of the 1930s progressive. In a preface to "The Grand Inquisitor' (a chapter from 
Dostoevsky's The Brotlwrs Karamazov (1880) published, in this instance, as a self-contained 
parable) Trilling claims that 'it can be said almost categorically that no other work of literature 
has made so strong an impression on the modern consciousness or has seemed so relevant to 
virtually any speculation about the destiny of man. "' 
'The Grand Inquisitor' re-tells the story of Jesus Christ's Temptation in the Wilderness, 
the original Gospel account of which was given by St Luke in the New Testament (4: 1-13). For 
forty days Satan offers Jesus all the earthly kingdoms in return for his worship. Jesus, of course, 
resists, choosing freedom over the temptations of temporal power and, famously, Satan, in the 
face of such divinity, departs 'for a season'. Dostoyevsky's tale, however, re-locates events to the 
Court of Seville during the Counter-Reformation. In his 'infinite mercy' Jesus, once more, walks 
amongst the poor dispensing n-dracles. This occurs, we are told, at the height of the Inquisition, 
the day after 'the burning of nearly a hundred heretics 
.... 
ad ? wjorejv Gloriant dei in "a magnificent 
auto-da-f6". '-', 6The Cardinal of Seville, the Grand Inquisitor of the title, assumes the role of Satan 
when Jesus is arrested as a false prophet by the authorities. In Dostoyevsky's re-teHin& however, 
the Inquisitor asks Jesus not to exchange freedom for 'bread' and his own personal gain, as Satan 
" Trilling, Prrfaces to the Eiperience qf Literature. 79. 
-16 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 291. 
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did originally, but to exchange freedom so that bread might be available for the whole of iiiankin& 
'But you did not want to deprive man of freedom', claims the Grand Inquisitor, 
for, you thought, what sort of freedom is it if freedom is bought 
with loaves of bread? You replied that man does not live by 
bread alone, but do you know that for the sake of that earthly 
bread the spirit of the earth will rise up against you and will 
join battle with you and conquer you 
... 
Do you know that ages 
will pass and mankind will proclaim in its wisdom and science 
that there is no crime, and therefore, no sin, only hungry people? 37 
As Trilling writes in his preface, the 'surrender of freedom' requested of Jesus here is 
precisely that which the modern totalitarian state has demanded of its citizens. Moreover, in the 
mass societies of the West, increasing conformity and social passivity testify to the emergence of a 
similar impulse in the development of modern liberal-democratic political cultures. The increased 
stress on the claims of Necessity over those of Freedom- a stress which has defined the political 
terrain of modernity 
- 
makes us alert to the higher stakes of the choice faced by Jesus in 
Dostoevsky's prescient tale. To embrace the claims of Freedom over those of Necessity in such 
circumstances is to burden individuals with what Emmanuel Levinas has described as a'difficult 
freedom'. 38But, as Trilling points out, the idea of Adam's felix cidpa, his'happy sin' [my emphasis] 
in eating from the Tree of Knowledge, and "the fortunate fall' [my emphasis] which followed, 
stems from the fact that it 'made the occasion for Jesus to bring about the redemption and 
salvation of man, bringing him to yet a nobler condition than before his loss of innocence. ' In this 
respect, Trilling continues, 
37 [bid., 296. 
-18 The overlap between the issues I discuss in relation to Trilling in this essay and Levinas' broader theoretical focus on the theme of 
the 'messianic' in theology and philosophy also offer a point of entry for understanding Trilling as a Jewish thinker. This is often 
overlooked by commentators pm-occupied with his 'Amoldian' tendencies or his anglophilia more generally. One of the central 
tensions of The Middle ofthe Journeýv-between responsibility and necessity-is echoed. for instance in the following passage from 
Levinas' essay 'A Religion for Adults' ( 195 7): -Why does your God, who is the God of the poor, not feed the poor'. "a Roman asks 
Rabbi Akiba. -So we can escape damnation", replies Rabbi Akiba. One could not find a stronger statement of the impossible situation 
in which God finds himself. that of accepting the duties and responsibilities of man'. From Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 20. 
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It is not necessary to accept the religious implications of this 
idea to respond to what it says about the nature of man 
- 
that 
man is not all he n-dght be unless he bears the burden of his 
knowledge of good and evil, and the pain of choosing between 
them, and the consequences of making the wrong choice. 39 
Given the importance Trilling attaches to 'The Grand Inquisitor' for the light it casts on 
the politics of modernity then, it is unsurprising that the tale's presence should be felt in a novel 
of his which sought to explicitly engage with this theme. When Gifford Maxim announces to his 
friends that, in the twentieth century, 'we are all of us, all of us, the little children of the Grand 
Inquisitor', he is referring to the secularisation of 1wresy that has played such a significant role in the 
revolutions of the modern age. " This development, however, has meant that the auto-da-fL6 is 
now administered in the name of Man rather than God. At the heart of Trilling's novel is the 
desire to address the question of how projects designed to eradicate human suffering, to elin-dnate 
the spectre of les misgrables, have invariably degenerated into dictatorship and terror. 'Why is it', 
Maxim asks in The Middle of the Journey, 
that as we become more sensitive to the sufferings of mankind 
we become more cruel? 
... 
the more we plan to prevent suffering 
the more we are drawn to inflict suffering. The more tortures we 
think up. The more people we believe deserve to be tortured. 
The more we think people can be ruled by fear of suffering. (TMOTI, 223-24) 
Maxim marshals all his own inquisitorial skills, acquired from his immersion in radical 
politics, to attack what he regards as the moral evasions that mask such realities. This leads him 
to mercilessly compound Laskell's agony over his role in Susan Caldwell's death. The terrible 
unintended consequences of Laskell's own 'good intentions', in this case, cause him to examine 
-19 PMfaces to the Experienee qf Literature, 83. 
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the ways in which questions of individual and collective responsibility manifest themselves more 
generally. For Maxim, as an ex-Marxist now turning to Christianity, the imperative is to acquire 
'company in guilt' for his past. Maxim's Calvinist doctrine of universal guilt provides the moral 
framework for his reactionary turn, driving his efforts to make Laskell feel responsible for Susan's 
death. Yet if this collective burden defines the human condition then what, Laskell is 
understandably led to ask, becomes of individual responsibility? It is obvious, in this way, that 
Maxim is motivated as much by a desire to diminish the blame he must bear for his own actions 
whilst in the Party. This amounts, however, only to an inversion of an earlier worldview. 
To Laskell, Maxim, as a member of the Party, could once be characterised by his efforts to 
involve those around hirn in his virtue. Now, seeking salvation elsewhere, he is trying to 
implicate everyone in his guilt. Maxim's interrogation of Laskell then, indicates to his friend that, 
even after this ostensibly drastic conversion, he 'was still quite the inquisitor, just as good as he 
had ever been' (TMOTJ, 271). Indeed the zeal of Gifford Maxim's anti-Marxism- to the degree 
that it is nourished by religious pre-occupations- can't but help recall Trotsky's characterisation 
of all 'bourgeois morality' as, at root, 'theological'. For the re-born Maxim, heaven is, quite 
literally, as Trotsky sardonically claims, 'the only fortified position for operations against 
dialectical materialism. 141 
Yet Maxim and the Crooms also might be said to share precisely that pre-disposition 
which John Dewey identifies with Trotsky and Marxism more generally at the close of his 'Means 
and Ends' article. 'Orthodox Marxism', Dewey concludes in that piece, 'shares with orthodox 
religionism and with traditional idealism the belief that human ends are woven into the very 
texture and structure of human existence. 142 Trotsky, we might recall, was criticised by Dewey for 
subordinating moral questions to an absolute ('the class struggle') without reference to 
consequences. Maxim and the Crooms have their own absolutes-the 'corruptibility' and 
40 Interestingly Whittaker Chambers, whilst working on the editorial staff of Time Magazine, published a parable in which Satan 
appears in New York. In terms obviously imitating the rhetoric of Stalin, he announces his plans to counter the 'infantile leftism' of 
revisionists by launching a 'Five Hundred Year Plan' of world domination! See Chambers, 'The Devil'. 
41 Trotsky, 'Their Monds and Ours', reprinted in Novack (ed. ), 77teir Morals and Ours, 16. 
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'perfectibility" of man 
- 
their own certainties as to the ends 'woven into the very texture and 
structure of human existence. ' Both are drawn to their respective systems by a clear vision of 
humanity divided in terms of good and evil, guilt and innocence. 'Analogously speaking, one 
critic of the novel has commented along these lines, 'the Crooms posit grace without nature, while 
Maxim asserts nature without grace. 143 
For Laskell, however, both of these positions spell disaster. 'An absolute freedom from 
responsibility', he responds to his friends, '-that much of a child none of us can be. An absolute 
responsibility 
- 
that much of a divine or metaphysical essence none of us is' (TMOTI, 307). Laskell 
is tortured then by a sense of the carnage such 'absolutism' wreaks in the political sphere. It is a 
major paradox to him that questions of responsibility have assumed such immense proportion in 
an age whose theoreticians have continued to assert, with greater and greater force, the impact of 
environment and socialisation upon' human behaviour. Indeed Trilling points to a revealing 
instance of this clash between the will to moralise and the will to undermine prevailing moral 
assumptions when he has Laskell recall that: 
It was an apparent contradiction in Marx's Capital, that would some 
day be worth putting his mind to, that in the great chapters on the working 
day the industrial middle class was denounced on moral grounds, although 
in a preface the writer had explicitly exempted individual industrialists 
from moral censure, saying with an almost gracious reassurance that 
it was not they but the historical process that must be blamed. (TMOTI, 150) 
The bleak incomprehension with which Laskell meets Susan Caldwell's death, in this 
respect, has a much broader application. 'When something involved so many things so 
tenuously', he despairs in the period following this tragedy, 'then it was ridiculous to think about 
it as responsibility' (TMOTI, 273). How, then, given such circumstances, Trilling is also implying 
here, should we think through the meaning of political action where complex social organisms, on 
a much greater scale, ensure that consequences assume an even more opaque form? Within the 
42 Dewey, 'Means and Ends', reprinted in Novack (ed. ). Their Morals and Ours, 73. 
43 Kubal, 'Trilling's The Middl; qf the Journey: An American Dialectic'. 64. 
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terms I have begun to outline here, how can judgement be passed in such a way that the Grand 
Inquisitor's demand for stability and order might be reconciled with the freedom (Dostoyevsky at 
least believed was) embodied in the person of Jesus Christ? 
Herman Melville, marked as his Christianity was by a concern with human 
'corruption', did not share his Russian contemporary's pre-occupation with the corruption of 
Rome. " Perhaps because of this, when he began to write Billy Biidd just before his death in 1891, 
Melville saw the increased scope for speculation an explicitly secular context might provide for 
such themes. Gifford Maxim's first publication in Kermit Simpson's magazine is a review of Billy 
Budd. The responses this review provokes establish the theoretical ground for the exchanges that 
follow when Maxim himself re-appears later in the novel. By having Maxim- The Middle of the 
Joumey's own 'grand inquisitor'- interpret this brilliant meditation on the competing claims of 
Law and Spirit, Trilling is able to bring Melville's formidable political acumen to bear on his own 
characters' very specific historical predicament. Interestingly, the political philosopher Hannah 
Arendt who was workingon her monumental Origbis of Totalitarianisiii (1951) at around the time 
Trilling's novel appeared, herself chose precisely these two texts to support some central 
arguments in a later work On Revolution (1963). It seems more than appropriate then, to compare 
the use made of these two works in Trilling's novel to the meanings attributed to them by this 
important and influential political philosopher. 
Judging Billy Budd 
In Oti Revolutim (1963) Hannah Arendt invokes both 'The Grand Inquisitor' and Billy Budd to 
explore the thought underwriting the revolutions of the modern age. Melville and Dostoevsky are 
important, Arendt believes, in so far as they recognise 'the tragic and self-defeating enterprise the 
I Dostoevsky's profound religious convictions underwrote his deeply reactionary political ideal of a state dominated by the twin 
pillars of Tsarism and the Russian Orthodox Church. Such religious 'fundamentalism'. as it would now be understood, is likewise 
responsible for the image of a heinously corrupted Catholic Church in *The Grand Inquisitor'. 
97 
men of the French Revolution embarked on almost without knowing it. 145 For Arendt, the French 
Revolution signalled a catastrophic turning point in Western political thought and history. With 
the appearance of poverty on the political scene in the aftermath of 1789 'necessity' displaced 
'freedom' as the chief category of political and revolutionary thought. 46Thus, 'compassion' for the 
poor and a belief in their innate 'goodness' became the hallmark of revolutionary zeal, a process 
which reached its zenith when the jacobins came to power, as Arendt explains, 
not because they were more radical but because they did 
not share the Girondins' concern with forms of government, 
because they believed in the people rather than in the 
republic and 'pinned their faith on the natural goodness of a 
class' rather than on institutions and constitutions. 47 
It is this belief in the 'natural goodness' of man that prompted the shift from the republic 
to the people as the locus of sovereignty. Arendt is drawn to 'The Grand Inquisitor' and Billy 
Budd for the way both stories tease out the implications of Rousseau's and Robespierre's innate 
belief in the 'goodness' of man. They do so by re-considering the person of Jesus of Nazareth, 
whom Arendt describes as, prior to the French Revolution, 'the only completely valid, completely 
convincing experience Western mankind ha[s] ever had with active love of goodness as the 
inspiring principle of all actions'. "' In her reading of 'The Grand Inquisitor' Arendt correctly 
identifies Dostoevsky's desire to portray Jesus as 'hav[ing] compassion with aH men in their 
singularity, that is, without lumping them together into some such entity as one suffering 
mankind. ' The 'pity' of the Grand Inquisitor, by contrast, she adds, 'like Robespierre 
... 
de- 
personalised the sufferers, lumped them together into an aggregate-the people toujours 
nialheureux. '49 
4 
-5 Arendt, On Revolution, 82. 
46 Indeed the very terms 'freedom', 'necessity', 'spirit'. 'law' and so forth in this context derive from Hegel and Kant, the 
philosophical titans of German Idealism-a body of theory, according to Herbert Marcuse, itself composed 'hugely as a response to 
the challenge from [the French Revolution] to re-organize the state and society on a rational basis. so that social and political 
institutions might accord with the fi-eedom and interest of the individual'. Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. 3. 
47 Arendt, On Revolution, 75. 
48 lbid,, 8 1. 
49 [bid., 85. 
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Yet Arendt's reading also over-simplifies matters a little here. Recognition of 
Dostoyevsky as a great artist might be said to turn as much on his capacity not to wholly alienate 
the reader from a character in this way. The argument put forward by the Grand Inquisitor is also 
compelling, much more so, in fact, than Arendt suggests in her few brief observations. "The 
greatness of the story', she concludes, 'lies in that we are made to feel how false the [Grand 
Inquisitor's] idealistic, high-flown phrases of the most exquisite pity sound the moment they are 
confronted with compassion. "O But are we? The strength of the tale might equally be said to rest, 
on the contrary, in the persuasiveness of these 'idealistic, high-flown phrases' which the reader 
cannot help but respond to despite the countervailing presence of no less a figure than Jesus 
Christ. To write so trenchantly against the grain of Christian morality, to play so well the part, 
quite literally, of devil's advocate, might be said to be Dostoevsky's real artistic achievement. As 
Trilling comments in his preface to the story, 'the choice, as we confront it 
... 
is by no means 
simple, for the Inquisitor argues his case with the force of rationality and humaneness very much 
on his side. 151 Trilling himself attempted to harness some of this very force when he created 
Gifford Maxim in the Grand Inquisitor's image. 
There is more ambiguity here then than Arendt's definitional objective in this section (to 
distinguish 'compassion' from 'pity') can accommodate. Useful as it may be, this distinction is not 
as tinanibiguously supported by Dostoevsky's story as Arendt seems to imply. Both Trilling's 
preface and the expression given to similar themes in his novel, for instance, suggest an 
alternative understanding of 'The Grand Inquisitor. Trilling's is a more complex 'totalitariaW 
reading built simultaneously around notions of both the Grand Inquisitor's 'idealism' and his 
'practicality'. For Trilling Dostoevsky's character anticipates the emergence of the totalitarian 
dictator whose destruction of the political sphere can be justified as much as a 'practical' or 
I pragmatic' measure as it can in the 'idealistic' terms Arendt criticises. Nonetheless, irrespective 
of the sense in which they are understood, the actions of the totalitarian dictator, like those of the 
-50 [bid. 
-51 Trilling, Prýfaces to the Erperience qf Literature, 82. 
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Grand Inquisitor, are also invariably explained in terms of the 'rationality' and "humaneness' 
Trilling points to in his reading of the tale. 
The Crooms and Maxim, in a similar way, can be viewed as embodying this co-existence 
of the 'idealisticwith the 'practical'. As discussed earlier in relation to Trotsky, it is not just 
'revolutionary'. or 'radical' politics (represented in T/w Middle of Ow foumey by the Crooms and 
communist Maxim) but also politics labelled 'counter-revolutionary' or 'reactionary' (represented 
by the Christian Maxim) which have been associated at various points with 'idealism' and 'high- 
flown phrases'. Likewise, defences of 'the ends justifies the means' doctrines can be seen in 
exactly the same way: 'practical' in so far as they involve being 'realistic' (aware of the need for 
sacrifice) yet also 'idealistic' (in their promise of a world worth making sacrifices for). Hannah 
Arendt allows for no such ambivalence in her reading of the character of the Grand Inquisitor. In 
On Revolution this complex figure is reduced to totem for her views on the meaninglessness of 
'pity' in the political sphere and the excesses of revolutionary ardour. The three or four sentences 
in which she attempts to summarise the meaning of the story are not enough, finally, to seriously 
rival Trilling's deeper understanding of the light cast on the politics of revolution by 
Dostoevsky's creation. 
Arendt does, however, give more attention to Melville's Billy Budd, bringing some of her 
highly original political thinking to bear on a notoriously ambiguous text. This tale of a 
"foundling', a young sailor of no known origin, places a character seemingly representative of 
Adan-dc 'goodness' in a 'Man-of-War' vessel which, as in much of Melville's fiction, stands as a 
microcosm for society. 52The 'society' of the Indontitable however, unlike that of Budd's earlier 
ship, TIw Riglits of Man, is marked by plurality, by the presence of nien rather than 'Man' (Arendf s 
'lumped together aggregate'). Such plurality also, however, allows for the presence of 'radical' or 
'natural' evil. On the Indoniftable this takes the form of John Claggart, the master-at-arms whose 
$evil', in this way, we are informed, is 'a depravity according to nature'. Claggart's former life of 
which, like Budd's, 'nothing was known', is an indication of the author's desire to reveal the 
-12 Tbe novel White-Jacket (1850). for instance, explicitly foregrounds this synecdoche in its sub-title, 'The World in a Man-of-Warl. 
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'natural' dispositions they represent as similarly-in so far as they are not those of men- 
destructive of the 'lasting institutions' of the political sphere. 53 Billy Budd, by virtue of being'one 
to whom not yet has been proffered the questionable apple of knowledge', is unable to recognise 
Claggart's malevolence in his efforts to link him with mutiny. m The shock of this discovery, when 
the accusation is finally made to his face, renders Budd--already afflicted by an impediment in 
moments of anxiety or distress 
-speechless. This speechlessness, itself an expression of pre- 
lapsarian innocence, causes Budd to strike Claggart in frustration. 
After Claggart's death from this blow, the full moral orientation of the story comes into 
view. Captain Vere, the source of final authority on board the Indondtable, must pass judgement 
on Billy Budd. After convening a meeting with several of the frigate's petty officers, Vere 
ultimately overrules the attempts made to save Budd from the punishment prescribed for such an 
offence by martial law. The drama of Billy Budd, the tension it exposes between Freedom and 
Necessity, Spirit and Law, is rooted in Vere's exclamation 
- 
made, incidentally, not following 
deliberation but in the instant immediately after Budd's deed: 'Struck dead by an angel of Godl 
Yet the angel must hang!. 55 Vere, then, instinctively recognises the claims of Necessity over 
Freedom, Law over Spirit, authorising Budd's execution in the name of (martial) Law. 
Melville's tale is set at the end of the eighteenth century when Britain's naval power in 
the early years of the Napoleonic wars had been seriously undermined by mutinies. With this 
development foremost in mind, Vere, when articulating the reasoning behind his decision, 
appeals ultimately to 'the practical consequences to discipline, considering the unconfirmed tone 
of the fleet at the time, should a man-of-war's man's violent killing at sea of a superior in grade be 
allowed to pass for aught else than a capital crime demanding prompt infliction of the penalty. 56 
If Budd and Claggart are meant, initially, to appear as emblematic characters, Vere functions, by 
-1-1 "llie tragedy [of Bil4v Budd]', writes Arendt, 'is that the law is made for men, and neither for angels nor for devils. Law and all 
*lasting institutions' break down not only under the onslaught of elemental evil but under the impact of absolute innocence as well. 
The law, moving between crime and virtue, cannot recognize what is beyond it'. On Revolution, 84. 
Melville, Bilb- Budd. Sailor and Other Stories. 330. 
rhid.. 378. 
Ibid., 390. 
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contrast, as the focal point'for the tale's complex relation to questions of judgement. In actual fact, 
however, this complexity is centred on the itiversion of good and evil, guilt and innocence that the 
text constructs: Budd, the personification of goodness, is guilty of murder; Claggart, the 
personification of evil, dies a victim. 
Since its discovery in the 1920s, Billy Budd has divided critical opinion fairly evenly into 
two camps. To some, Budd's hanging, and, in particular, his cry, immediately prior to his death, 
of 'God bless Captain Vere! ' to the onlooking crew of the Indoniftable, marks the text as Melville's 
final 'testimony of acceptance', the author's conclusive acknowledgement of the claims of Law 
over Spirit. To others, however, the manner of Budd's execution can only be understood as an 
expression of a dark and lacerating irony. Such a grotesque spectacle, they propose, could only be 
conjured up by a mind, on the contrary, deeply troubled by such claims. 57 In On Revolution 
Hannah Arendt's reading of the story clearly adheres to the former interpretation. Arendt seizes, 
in particular, upon Vere's contempt for political ideals 'incapable of embodiment in lasting 
institutions' to bolster the series of careful discrin-driations between the American and French 
revolutions which organise her thesis. Unfortunately, in doing so, she conflates the position of 
Vere with that of Melville himself. Although Melville would undoubtedly affirm Vere's Burkean 
recognition of Law as passed down via 'lasting institutions', it is far from clear that he would 
regard Budd's execution as a straightforward means to this end. Unlike Machiavelli and Arendt, 
Melville was much troubled by the idea of banishinggoodness' from the political sphere. 
The secular, Machiavellian understanding of 'virtue', which, in a number of persuasive 
observations, Arendt associates with Vere, is not nonetheless, as her reading suggests, the only 
one to be derived from the text. The idea of 'Virtue' in Billy Budd is equaUy informed by the 
author's own powerful, albeit complicated, relation to Calvinism. As John Patrick Diggins has 
argued, the work of Herman Melville, in this sense, like the political vision of Abraham Lincoln, 
can be seen as evidence of a 'return of the sacred to political thought'. Those values endorsed by 
Jesus Christ, as the ultimate embodiment of goodness, are thus not treated with Machiavellian 
-57 For an outline of this difference of critical opinion sec Johnson, 'Melville's Fist: The Execution of Biltv Budd', 567-68. 
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suspicion but embraced as an example of, to invoke Melville's own description of Budd, 'certain 
virtues [my emphasis] pristine and unadulterate-58which can ultimately infornt political action. 
When Melville, in a lyrical passage, has Budd 'ascend' against clouds of 'vapory fleece hanging 
low in the East 
... 
with a soft glory as of the fleece of the Lamb of God seen in a mystical vision', 51 
it is clear, Diggins writes, 
[that he] is asking us, the readers, to ponder the Christlike nature of innocence 
and love as exhibiting benevolence and forgiveness. In political terms these 
qualities may be fatal; yet without'the pristine virtues', without the values that 
are sanctioned by the religious imagination, politics alone can never be virtuous. 
The good man may go to his death along with those who are not good, as Machiavelli 
warned, but from the death of goodness radiates the resurrection of life. 60 
I Although Arendt reads Billy Budd as embracing the fundamentally secular vision of the political 
advanced by Machiavelli then, of learning 'how not to be good', Diggins, establishes the text, just 
as as an attempt to de-secularise the classical notion of virtue in a 'synthesis of 
religious sentiment and political obligation. 61 
Perhaps most notable in Arendt's reading of Billy Btidd is her sudden receptiveness to the 
idea of 'necessity', which, in the context of her broader argument at least, is held responsible for 
the impasse in political thinking she associates with modernity. Despite lamenting the 'absolutes' 
which surrender Freedom to Necessity in the work of Marx and others, Arendt nonetheless 
affirms the validity of Vere's decision which, as Diggins notes, is itself 'unqualified, irrevocable, 
absolute. 162 There is then, something of a slippage in meaning between the context in which 
'necessity' is invoked here and its deployment elsewhere in On Revolution. Arendt appears to 
discriminate between what might be described as political necessity, the 'lasting institutions' 
-58 Melville, WIN Budd. Sailor and Other Stories, 331. 
-59 Ibid., 400-40 1. 
60 Diggins, The Lost Soul qfAmerican Politics, 295. 
61 Ibid., 295. 
62 Ibid., 29 1. 
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which function as Vere's 'absolute'63, and biolqgical necessity, a pre-occupation with which under 
Marxist and Jacobin regimes has wreaked havoc as an 'absolute' in the political sphere. 
In On Revolution Arendt offers a brilliant critique of biological necessity as the millstone 
around the neck of modern political thought but it is again questionable whether her choice of 
literary text can be marshalled to this particular effect. A strong sense of inconsistency, if not 
contradiction, remains in her reading of "necessity' in Melville's tale as it stands in relation to the 
far more critical understanding of the term evident elsewhere in her study. What distinguishes, 
we'might ask, in this respect, the 'necessity' championed by Captain Vere in the name of the 
existing order from that upheld by Stalin or Trotsky, for supposedly radical ends, that is, for the 
sake of 'lasting [albeit communist] institutions"? In a line of inquiry we might well imagine John 
Dewey pursuing, we could ask, why do Vere"s ends justify his means? What other consequences 
might his 'unqualified, irrevocable, absolute' decision entail? It is far from clear in Billy Btidd, as 
Arendt suggests, that Melville discerns the idea of necessity in the same way as she herself does. 64 
By contrast the range of responses amongst the characters in The Middle of the joumey to Melviffe's 
work 
-shaped by the trials in Moscow which dramatised so many of the issues later explored in 
On Revolu tion 
-cover some of the possibilities Arendt closes off in her own analysis. 
When confronted by Maxim's review article 'Spirit and Law' both Laskell and the 
Crooms are taken aback by its contents. Maxim's reading of Billy Budd is deeply informed by his 
own personal experience and its changing relation to the prevailing political and intellectual 
climate of the times. Accordingly, he commences by disn-dssing "the modem mind in its most 
vocal part, in itý radical or liberal intellectual part, which, in its limited impression of Billy Budd 
as a 'weakly acquiescent 
... 
oppressed worker' and Captain Vere as 'a conscience-ridden 
63 This understanding is reflected in John Stuart Mill's belief in the 'necessity' that there be 'in the constitution of the State 
something which is settled, something permanent and not to be called into question, something which, by general agreement, has a 
right to be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change'. Such permanence can only be assured by an 
'absolute' commitment to this 'something', which, for Arendt, like Captain Vere, would presumably take the form of 'lasting 
institutions. ' Mill is quoted in Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 22. 
64 The 'uncertain movement' of protest exhibited by the crew when Billy's body is despatched overboard intimates that Melville's 
view of Vere's decision is ambiguous. At the end of the story, after Vere is wounded, it is the petty officers who wished to save Budd 
who go on to defeat the vessel Atheiste (again, a clue as to the importance of Christianity in Melville's politics). As Diggins writes: -ft 
may be true that the preservation of discipline on British warships was essential to the preservation of England's freedom, but it is 
hard to see how Billy's execution contributed to that end. ' Diggins, The Lost Soul ofAmerican Politics, 293. 
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bourgeois', is thus 'not really capable of understanding the story. Billy Budd should be viewed, 
rather, as "a political parable, but on a higher level than we are used to taking our political 
parables. ' For Maxim, Melville's design is to convey 'the tragedy of Spirit in the world of 
Necessity, the tragedy of Law in the world of Necessity, the tragedy that Law faces whenever it 
confronts its child, Spirit' (TMOTJ, 160). 
Maxim then, like Arendt, falls into the 'acceptance' rank of critics. But for him the relation 
between Spirit and Law is not antithetical but dialectical. Maxim may have jettisoned his Marxism 
but his religious Weltanschauung retains a Hegelian vision of opposing historical forces unfolding 
towards the reign of absolute Spirit. Billy Btidd is read by Maxim much as the young Marx read 
Hegel, that is, as an acknowledgement of the fact that 'Spirit and the Law that is established in the 
world of Necessity are kin, yet discontinuous. ' Melville draws on the Old Testament which 
establishes this structure in the tale of Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac. 'It is not merely', 
Maxim writes, "that Vere understands that Billy is his son, the Isaac to his Abraham; it is that BiUy 
understands that Vere is his father and blesses him in his last words. Spirit blesses Law, even 
when Law has put the noose around his neck, for Spirit recognises the true kinship. ' The modem 
progressive, by contrast, disavows this kinship, according to Maxim, by believing "that Spirit 
should find its absolute expression at once', in defiance of Law, with anything less than this full 
and final expression of Spirit worthy only of dismissal as an 'ignominious moral inadequacy' 
(TMOTI, 161). 
The way in which Trilling charts how progressives such as the Crooms might respond to 
I 
this interpretation exposes some oversight in Arendt's reading. The Crooms are struck by the 
extent to which Vere can be seen to represent 'progressive' forces as much as those of the status 
quo. In particular, Nancy Croom, perhaps because of her greater conunitment to those forces, 
quickly sees the analogy with the Moscow trials-a point of comparison which, given her 
intellectual background as a historian of totalitarianism, surprisingly escapes Arendt. Speaking of 
Stalin's purge of senior party figures, Nancy Croom claims, 
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Even if those men were subjectively innocent-I mean even if they had 
good motives for what they did, like Budd-I don't believe that's so, but 
even if it were so-they may have had to be executed for the sake of what 
he calls Law in the world of Necessity. And you remember how they all 
concurred in their punishment and seemed almost to want it. Certainly 
before they died they had a proper appreciation of Law. They realised 
that the dictatorship of the proletariat represented Law. 
(TMOTI, 163) 
Again what is striking here is a commitment to Law which overrides aH other 
considerations, sanctioning sacrifice, even of innocents, to a future kingdom of God or some 
secular substitute. As Nancy admits of the trials: 'Of course God wasn't mentioned, but it was the 
same thing' (TMOTI, 163). Arthur Croom's qualified praise for Maxim's article, on the other 
hand, stems less from the 'idealism' that has increasingly attracted Nancy to communism, than a 
Burkean sensitivity to 'circumstances', to politics as 'the art of the possible'. 'The great danger to 
the progressive movement', he claims, "is that [liberals] 
... 
see economic democracy developing 
over there and that doesn't satisfy them 
-they begin shouting for immediate political democracy, 
forgetting the realities of the historical situation' (TMOTI, 164). These are something close to the 
terms in which the French Revolution is characterised in On Revoltition except 'political" and 
I economic' should be inverted and Arendt, of course, identified the clamour for change as 
originating with "the people' rather than an intelligentsia of 'liberals'. 
My argument here is pot presented as a wholesale rejection of the broader case Arendt 
makes in On Revolution, which is, after all, built around more than a few short forays into 
nineteenth century literature. But it is meant to show that draining the ambiguity from complex 
fictions can significantly undermine the claims of the political philosopher. Arendt would take 
Melville's sympathy for the predicament of Captain Vere without his recognition of Billy Budd's 
virtue; Melville's respect for Law without his appeal to Spirit; and, more generally, she divorces 
the author's politics from its important religious referents. But for Melville the sacrifice involved 
106 
in taking sides in this way is the tragedy of politics in the modem age. As Nancy Ruttenburg has 
written: 
To propose that Melville is here choosing sides 
-between 'acceptance' 
and 'resistance', good and evil, God and the Devil: mutually exclusive 
alternatives that Billy and Claggart are imagined unambiguously to re- 
present 
-obscures the pathos of Billy Budd as Melville's 'last will and 
testament' as it underestimates its achievement as literary art. Most re- 
grettably, it celebrates the sacrificial logic that Melville strives to hold at bay. 65 
Trilling, by contrast, foregrounds the ambiguity Arendt overlooks in Melville's story by having a 
multiplicity of voices articulate a range of responses. Laskell's response is a counterpoint to the 
closed sacrificial logic espoused by Gifford Maxim and the Crooms. For Laskell, his friend's 
transformation not merely into 'disaffected revolutionary' but "the blackest of reactionaries' 
generates feelings of both disbelief and disgust. After hearing the responses of the Crooms, the 
chapter closes with Laskell playing with the idea of re-reading Maxim's review. Yet the ultimate 
significance of Melville's tale as a crucial source of meaning within Trilling's novel is beautifully 
suspended when Laskell tells himself that, at some point, he must also 'consider why Arthur had 
looked at him with a special, personal intensity as he made that rather long speech of his and a 
certain stubbornness that his whole body was expressing' (TMOTI, 164). 
Liberalism in Modulation 
The refusal to establish the meaning of Billy Budd as a fixed entity in The Middle of the Joumey is 
further evidence of what Mark Krupnick has described as Trilling's 'continuing irresolution, or 
what might be called his allergy to closure'. 66 As Krupnick amongst other critics has noted, 
Trilling is a dialectical thinker who never seeks to neatly resolve those tensions he regarded as 
6-1 Ruttenburg, 'Melville's Handsome Sailor: The Anxiety of Innocence% 98. 
66 Krupnick, Lionel Trilling and the Fate qf Cultural Criticism, 188. 
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crucial in his critical project between mind and reality, life and death, will and idea. 67 If the 
strength of Arendts work can be located in her willingness to make and support distinctions 
(between the political and the social, the private and the public and so forth), the strength of 
Trilling's might be said to lie in its refusal to. Both saw the rise of liberal capitalism as destructive 
of particularity and contingency in its dependence on the organisational impulse. Karl Marx's 
work in this respect was, for both, symptomatic of this development, with its vision of a society 
cut adrift from politics altogether and a static, functionalist state responsible for the mere 
"administration of things. ' Trilling saw his critical task, in this way, as an attempt to re-define 
liberalism so as its adherents might, whilst acknowledging the indispensability of organisation at 
some level, also, at the same time, 
understand that organisation means delegation, and agencies, and 
bureaus, and technicians, and that the ideas that can survive delegation, 
that can be passed on to agencies and bureaus and technicians, incline 
to be ideas of a certain kind and a certain simplicity: they give up 
something of their largeness and modulation and complexity in order 
to survive. The lively sense of contingency and possibility, and of those 
exception's to the rule that might be the beginning of the end of the rule 
- 
this does not suit well with the impulse to organization. 68 
It was from within this broad understanding of modernity that Trilling cultivated his 
criticism and sought to outline its relation to society. The importance he attaches to literature as a 
means of countering such tendencies, to the same degree, was attributed to its status as 'the 
human activity that takes the fullest and most precise account of variousness, possibility, 
complexity, and difficulty. '69 In The Middle of the Joumey, however, Trilling's commitment to these 
ideas takes on a more Arendtian cast as his concerns turn to its meaning in the political sphere. in 
terms very similar to Arendt, Trilling's focus is on the negation of political life in the modem age 
67 Trilling touches on this when he cites, elsewhere, F. Scott Fitzgerald's remark that 'the test of a first-rate intelleignce is the abifity 
to hold two opposed ideas in the mind, at the same time, and still function. ' Quoted in Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, 246. 
68 Trilling, The Liberal Imagination. 14. 
69 [bid. 
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which he associates with those revolutionaries whose 'only political purpose was to express their 
disgust with politics and make an end of it once and for all... [and] 
... 
do away with those defining 
elements of politics that are repugnant to reason and virtue, such as mere opinion, contingency, 
conflicts of interest and clashes of will and the compromises they lead to' (TMOTI, xx). These are 
precisely the tensions underlining the confrontation between Dewey and Trotsky who discovered 
I 
that whilst a common basis for truth claims might be established within the confines of a 
commission of inquiry designed to perform a strictly circumscribed task, the moral imperative for 
action in a dmiocratic political realm defined by pluralism becomes infinitely more difficult to 
agree upon. 70 
Trilling can also be seen then as an early advocate of the type of agonistic understanding 
of the political reprised by Arendt in the following decade. Furthermore, the 'disgust with 
politics' exhibited by revolutionaries was regarded by him as no more than 'a bitter refusal to 
consent to the conditioned nature of human existence' (TMOTI, xx). Again this is how Arendt 
seeks to re-orient our sense of. the political in her most famous work The Himian Condition (1959) 
where, as in Vie Middle of Hie Journey, politics is seen as demanding an ontological re- 
conceptualisation. 71 This stress can also be found in the political fiction of Dostoevsky, whose 
novel Vie Possessed, ismissed by many 1930s Marxists as 'reactionary', nonetheless found words 
of praise foregrounding this ontological dimension in a 1938 Partisan Review essay by Philip Rahv. 
For Rahv, Dostoevsky's achievement is in his understanding of revolutionary politics in terms of 
metaphysical failure, that is, its inability to re-conceive values previously articulated within a 
religious framework. Notions of sin, of individual conscience and responsibility were dismissed 
as 'bourgeois morality' when they had, in actual fact, a fundamental bearing on the human I 
condition. 72 
70 See Diggins' discussion of the inquiry and its beating on their subsequent debate in The Promise OfPragmatism, 266-70. 
71 Arendt, however, took her inspiration from the work of Martin Heidegger as opposed to strictly theological sources, seeking to 
reconcile a classical notion of politics with his revival of pre-Socratic ontology. See Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, for a first-rate 
explication of this influence. 
72 Reprinted as 'Dostoevsky in The Possessed' in Rahv, Essays on Literature and Politics 1932-1972,107-128. 
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Towards the end of The Middle of the Jountey LaskeU undergoes a minor epiphany when 
he realises why, during the course of yet another exchange of opinion, his friends seem to have 
grown suddenly angry with him. 'It was the anger', he realises, 'of the masked will at the 
appearance of an idea in modulation' (TMOTI, 308). Again this returns us to Trilling's sensitivity 
to the process by which ideas, unless continually re-interrogated, can fossilise into an extension of 
the will. The central paradox of liberalism, in this sense, is that'in the very interest of affirming its 
confidence in the power of the mind, it inclines to constrict and make mechanical its conception of 
173 the nature of mind. Liberalism, Trilling suggests, requires a conception of itself as a political 
philosophy perpetually in modulation in order to prevent the forms of moral collapse it 
entertained in the 1930s. 
It is, however, a long road, in intellectual history terms, from there to here. In recent years 
considerable anger has been directed at Trilling from within the academic left in the US. For 
many Trilling has come to stand as a neo-conservative talisman or, at the very least, for much that 
was oppressive about cold war liberalism. " However, at least one leffist critic has attempted to 
prevent Trilling's critical legacy from being appropriated by the neo-conservative opponents of 
the Cultural Left. 71 The closing chapter of Harvey Teres' study of the New York intellectuals asks 
'What's Left of Lionel Trilling? '. Teres here skilfully re-positions Trilling in what might be 
regarded as a republican tradition of criticism with both ancient and modern antecedents. 'He 
belongs', it is claimed, 'in the line of the worldly citizen-critics, which extends from Plato and 
Aristotle to Hazlitt and Arnold, critics who. gave pronounced attention to literature's connection 
to the well-being of the polity, and who portrayed that connection, as well as the nature and 
interests of the polity, with unusual specificity and insight'. 76 
71 The Liberal Imagination, 13. 
74 For Cultural Left critiques of Trilling see West, 'Lionel Trilling: Godfather of Neo-Conservatism', reprinted in Rodden (ed. ), Lionel 
Miling and the Critics, 395-403 and Reising. 'Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination, and the Emergence of the Cultural 
Discourse of Anti-Stalinism'. 
75 Hilton Kramer and Trilling's old pupil Norman Podhoretz are the most prominent amongst these. 
76 Teres, Renewing the L, ýfl. 260. 
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Trilling"s most important accomplishment within this role involved a vital revaluation of 
post-Depression American liberalism-a crucial juncture in the republic's history. His anxiety 
was registered at a number of levels, drawing him, for instance, to certain works of modem 
literature because, as Teres points out, "liberalism seemed incapable of sustaining a culture 
autonomous and imaginative enough to produce incisive self-critique. ' It is precisely this 
commitment to self-critique which accounts for the more arresting moments in Die Middle of the 
joumey where political thinking is conveyed as 4 vibrant ongoing process, part of a journey, as the 
title suggests, with no terminus. Laskell, being neither sentimental nor cynical, rejects the notion 
of Adamic pasts or futures. It is, in this way, a very American political novel being concerned, as 
I Trilling himself wrote of E. M. Forster, with 'man in the world without the sentimentality of 
cynicism. '77 
77 Tiilling, E. U. Forster, 23. 
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Liberalism Betrayed: Neo-Conservatism and the Post-War American Left 
in the Recent Fiction of Philip Roth 
America would remember the sixties as a decade of the left. It 
must be remembered instead as a decade when the polarisation 
began. "'We must assume that the conservative revival i's the 
youth movement of the ` 60s, " Murray Kenipton zv), otc in 1961, 
I. n words that would sound laughablefive years later. Forhj years 
later, these are words that are, at the venj least, arguabIc. 
Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm : Barnj Goldwater 
and the Uninaking of the American Consciisus (2000) 
I will go to my grave licing proud of what I hadfoughtfor in the 
I. mpeachnient battle, my last great showdown with theforces I had 
opposed all my life 
- 
those who had defended the old order of racial 
discrimination and segregation in the South and played oil the III- 
securities andftars of the white working class I'll which I grew up... 
Bill Clinton, My Life (2004) 
I Marricd A Coninuoust: Liberalism and the Old Left 
If Lionel Trilling's The Middle of the joimzey offers invaluable insights into the relationship 
between liberals and radicals at the time of the Moscow trials, then it also, in some quite 
striking Nvays, seems to foreshadow the unravelling of this relationship during Senatoi- Joseph 
McCartlvv's meteoric rise to national prominence in the early years of the Cold War. Trilling 
based the character of Gifford Maxim on Whittaker Chambers, a CPUSA member and 
acquaintance of his in the 1930s who by the end of that decade had exchanged communism 
for christianity. Most famously, after the Nvar, Chambers was to e\pose a prominent official 
in the Roosevelt administration, Alger Hiss, as a Soviet spy and, in the process, help create 
I E) 
the climate in which McCarthy could emerge as American anti-communism's very own 
Grand Inquisitor. 
Trilling's novel also projects Maxim into this role by anticipating a moment of liberal 
crisis when this character's Manichean world view might acquire greater currency. As 
Douglas Tallack has noted, it is the carefully honed intellectual response of John Laskell that 
allows Trilling here to appear 'so prophetic of the McCarthy era in his study of Maxim': ' 
[Laskell] was thinking that Maxim... would not religiously retire 
from the world but would go where worldly power lies waiting for 
men to pick it up. He had been seeing the great executive force 
that lay behind Maxim's expression of his view of the nature of 
guilt and responsibility. It seemed to him that the day was not very 
far off when Maxim's passions would suit the passions of others. 2 
It is, in fact, tempting in retrospect to 'read' Arthur and Nancy Croom through the historical 
experience of the Hiss trial, transposing their 'fellow travelling' liberal identities on to those 
of Alger Hiss and his wife (who was also implicated during the trial). It is important, 
however, to remember the major geo-political transformation that had occurred as a result of 
the outcome of World War II. In the early 1940s the domestic context was determined by a 
war economy that helped normalise government economic intervention and thus strengthen 
an emerging liberal consensus organized around the values of social democracy. By 1950, 
however, the context was one of Cold War anti-communism and an incipient national 
security state. The Cold War also brought to a halt those expressions of anti-fascist solidarity 
with the Soviet Union that had played an important role in pre-war and wartime US foreign 
policy. 
Any understanding of liberalism during this latter period, then, must be attentive to 
such national and supra-national developments. We have already seen, in the previous 
chapter, how many American liberals involved in the establishment of an anti-fascist 
I people's front' in the US in the 1930s- notwithstanding the events of the Moscow trials - 
1 Tal lack, N-entieth Century America, 20 1. 
2 Trilling, 7he Middle of the Journey, 300. 
113 
held to the view that the Soviet Union was an ultimately 'progressive' force. The signing of 
the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939 would be the next event to add to the ranks of disabused liberals. 
As Hitler and Stalin cynically divided swathes of Eastern Europe between them like the 
colonial powers of yore, forces previously designated as 'progressive' were now more or less 
indistinguishable from those of 'reaction'. 
Yet a significant portion of liberal sentiment in the US would remain ambiguous 
towards communism in the immediate years after World War Il. The Soviet Union was, after 
all, a wartime ally and its guiding creed could hardly metamorphose into the stuff of 
ideological bite noire overnight. Events, nonetheless, moved quickly after 1945 as 
Czechoslovakia came under the Soviet orbit; tensions* mounted in Berlin (which ultimately 
prompted Moscow to mount a blockade of the city); and the influence of communist parties 
significantly increased in France and Italy. The defining domestic event, however, in terms of 
shaping the contours of post-war liberalism in the United States, was the election of 1948 
when Henry Wallace ran against incumbent Democratic president Harry Truman from the 
left. 
Wallace had been a longstanding member of Roosevelt's cabinet and, after the war, 
had been appointed secretary of commerce in the Truman administration. He rejected 
Truman's hostility to the Soviet Union and soon became, as one intellectual historian has 
characterised him, 'the last remaining spokesman 
... 
for the New Deal and the preservation of 
the wartime alliance'. These views led Wallace to give increasingly vocal expression to his 
differences with other cabinet members on matters of foreign policy. Such outspokenness 
appealed to many disenchanted liberals who thus identified him as 'a man with a mission'. ' 
The schism was publicly acknowledged in September 1946 when Wallace was fired by 
Truman. 
From this point on Wallace sought to build a left-liberal coalition that would 
chaRenge the liberal status quo on everything from US-Soviet relations to issues of economic 
and racial equality within the US itself. The result was the establishment of the Wallace-led 
3 Pells, 7he Liberal Mind in a Consen-ative Age. 63. 
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Progressive Party which threatened to split the Democratic Party vote at the 1948 presidential 
election. However, the Progressive Party, from its inception, was plagued by accusations that 
it was a mere front for communist and far left elements. 4 Related to this was Wallace's own 
failure to overcome his image as the archetypal nalve, 'fellow-travelling' liberal. The fact that 
on the eve of the election Whittaker Chambers testified before the HUAC, portraying the 
New Deal as an ideological haven for subversive leftists such as Alger Hiss (whom Wallace 
himself had once employed when he was secretary of agriculture under Roosevelt) only 
reinforced this impression. ' Such factors 
-combined with an astute Truman campaign re- 
iterating the administration"s firm anti-communist credentials whilst outlining the need for 
progressive social and economic reforms 
-effectively neutralised the Progressive Party as a 
political force. Wallace ultimately took only 2.4% of the popular vote and no electoral college 
seats. 
Henry Wallace's presidential candidacy in 1948 features prominently in Philip Roth's 
I Married A Communist (1998) which, alongside American Pastoral (1997), and The Human Stain 
(2000), ' has been described by the author himself as part of a 'trilogy of novels 
... 
set squarely 
in the ideological ethos of postwar America'. Each of the 'heroes' of these works, Roth adds in 
support of this characterisation, 'comes to maturity while serving in World War II, and 
afterward, willingly or not, each is embedded no less in his historical existence as an 
American than in his personal existence as a husband, a son, a father. Indeed, in these 
representative lives, the historical and personal are an amalgam, they are irrevocably fused. -*7 
Each novel deploys Nathan Zuckerman, an authorial alter ego familiar from Roth's earlier 
fiction, as a narrator, to establish a greater sense of narrative as well as thematic continuity. 
We will return to Roth's idea here of his central characters' lives as 'representative' in 
a way similar, perhaps, to that identified in the novels previously examined. I would like to 
begin, though, with an analysis of I Ma? 7ied A Cominunist (the 'first' novel in terms of the 
4 See Culver & Hyde, American Dreamer, 464-67, 
5 [bid., 112. 
6 Hereafter these novels will be referred to as IMAC, AP and THS respectively. All references will be in the text. 
7 Appelo, Interview with Philip Roth, The term 'heroes' is, interestingly, Roth's own for each of his major protagonists in these 
novels. In this interview he states that, if the trilogy were to be given a title, his own choice would be 'The Hero Of Our Time'. 
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trilogy's narrative chronology). C9 the three works this is the one in which Zuckerman is 
himself most directly involved in the events he narrates. As will be proposed here, I Marfied A 
Communist can be read as the tale of Zuckermaes (and to some degree at least by inference 
Roth's own) early political and intellectual development. This occurs against the backdrop of 
the Wallace campaign which cements the relationship between the young Zuckerman and the 
novel's 'hero', communist activist Ira Ringold; it also offers a set of reference points within 
which Roth chooses to outline the "ideological ethos" that is American liberalism in the early 
post-war years. 
The full story of Ira Ringold's 'representative' life is told by Ira's brother Murray 
who, as Nathan Zuckerman's former high school English teacher, introduces them to each 
other in October 1948. A chance encounter has now brought the ageing Murray Ringold to 
the porch of Zuckerman's isolated home in present-day Connecticut where the. narrative 
unfolds over a couple of long summer evenings. Ira's life is both epic and emblematic, a story 
of American dichotomies particular to a specific mid-century historical moment. One of 
Roth's major triumphs here fies in his unusually complex depiction of the political radical 
-a 
figure that might easily be reduced to the level of caricature in the hands of a lesser novelist. 
Ira Ringold is a man of Whitmanesque multitudes and contradictions. He is the self-reliant, 
independent American who hoboes around the nation taking various manual labour jobs 
during the Depression before serving in the military after America enters the war; yet he also 
represents the second generation, working class, Jewish auto-didact, whose ability brings him 
fame and wealth as an Abraham Lincoln impersonator and as the popular radio actor Iron 
Rinn in the post-war years. 
Ira is a big man in every sense, muscular in physical and intellectual terms, as 
passionate about the life of the great outdoors as he is. about that of the mind. Ira is as equally 
at ease with the country folk who inhabit the area near an isolated shack he keeps as he is in 
the Manhattan apartments of the writers and actors of the New York radio world. It is little 
wonder then, that the young Zuckerman, a gifted student himself, is awe-struck by this 
Jewish-American role model. As an older man, however, Zuckerman, on learning of Ira's 
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tragic fate from Murray, comes to recognise an element of hubris in Ira's restless pursuit of 
himself: 
I had never before known anyone whose life was so intimately circum- 
scribed by so much American history, who was personally familiar 
with so much American geography, who had confronted, face to face, 
so much American low life. I'd never met anyone so immersed in his 
moment or so defined by it. Or tyrannized by it, so much its avenger 
and its victim and its tool. To imagine Ira outside of his moment was 
impossible. For me, on those nights up in the shack, the America that 
was my inheritance manifested itself in the form of Ira Ringold. 
(IMAC, 189) 
Ira's tragedy is brought about by the publication of a schlock memoir entitled I 
Married A Communist by his former wife Eve Frame which, of course, brings him to the 
attention of HUAC investigations into the question of 'subversive' activity in the 
entertainment industry. Frame, a radio actress, plays the role of the assimilationist Jew in 
thrall to the mores and values of the dominant WASP culture. She is encouraged to publish 
her memoir by Bryden and Katrina Grant, a gossip columnist and author of popular 
romances respectively, who represent the epitome of reactionary WASP 'pampered privilege' 
and for whom, Murray recalls, "the Ringolds were the Rosenbergs'(IMAC, 7). 
When Roth's novel first appeared in 1998 several reviewers approached it as an all 
too thinly coded act of revenge for a memoir published by the author's ex-wife, the actress 
Claire Bloom, which revealed intimate details of the couple's marriage. 8 It is certainly the case 
that Eve Frame and her daughter Sylphid are unmistakable portraits of Bloom and her 
teenage child and that Ira's volatile relationship with. Sylphid mirrors Roth's with his own 
step-daughter. If this were not enough, I Married. A Com"itinist also depicts a sexual 
relationship between Ira and a friend of Sylphid's along with all of its disastrous 
repercussions (Bloom too alleged that Roth attempted to seduce a friend of her daughter's). 
Such seemingly personal pre-occupations, at least in part, contributed to an overall 
impression amongst reviewers that I Married A Communist was a less successful work than its 
widely praised, Pulitzer prize-winning predecessor Atnericaii Pastoral. Yet the theme of 
8 See, for example, Kakutani, 'Manly Giant vs. Zealots and Scheming Women', and Grant, 'The Wrath of Roth'. 
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betrayal is much broader than these readings allow, hinging, as it does, on far more tha-n that 
of marital and familial relationships. Betrayal, in fact, is central to the novel's understanding 
of ideology and the idea of political commitment as they find expression within the story's 
historical context. In this sense, as Murray Ringold attests, the personal and the political are 
interlocked in unprecedented ways in the United States during this period, reflecting, to some 
extent at least, the condition of totalitarian societies where the distinction between the two is 
erased: 
To me it seems likely that more acts of personal betrayal were tellingly 
perpetrated in America in the decade after the war 
-between '46 and 
'56 
-than in any other period in our history 
... 
Eve's behaviour fell well 
within the routine informer practices of the era. When before had 
betrayal been so destigmatized and rewarded in this country? It was 
everywhere during those years, the accessible transgression, the 
pertifissible transgression that any American could commit 
... 
Betrayal 
is an inescapable component of living 
- 
who does not betray? 
- 
but to 
confuse the most heinous public act of betrayal, treason, with every 
other form of betrayal was not a good idea in 1951. 
(IMAC, 264-65) 
The idea of betrayal, moreover, is essential to an appreciation of the emergence of the 
young Nathan Zuckerman's political consciousness as he falls under the sway of various 
adult influences only to 'betray' them for others. Once more both the literal and figurative 
role of 'fathers' as well as related notions of cultural patrimony and political legacv loom 
large. We have already seen this process at work in Nathan's admission that 'the America 
that was my litheritaiice [my italics] manifested itself in the form of Ira Ringold'. On the 
national party political canvas this 'inheritance, for Ira and Nathan, is personified in the 
libei-alisni of Henry Wallace that causes the split with Truman. Both Wallace and Truman, 
after all, sought to position themselves at this time as the 'legitimate heirs' to FDR and the 
New Deal. Such 'filial' tension, furthermore, is paralleled in the Zuckerman family. 'This 
division %N, ithin the Democratic Party', Nathan recollects, 'was reflected in the split %vithin mý, 
oNvii household between father and son' (IMAC, 29). 
Nathan's father, 'who had admired Wallace v%-hen he was FDR's prot6gC, opposes 
the Wallace third-party candidacy on the pragmatic grounds that it will divide the 
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Democratic vote and thus pave the way for a Republican victory. 'I %N'as terrificalk, 
disappointed', Nathan confesses, 'to hear my father flatly refuse to vote for the candidate 
who, as I tried to convince him, supported his own New Deal principles'. Wallace stands for 
/a national health program, protection for unions, benefits for workers'; he opposes, Nathan 
adds, "Taft-Hartley and the persecution of labor [and] the Mundt-Nixon bill and the 
persecution of radicals'. The latter he describes to his father as 'the first step to a police 
state 
... 
[Wallace] called it "the most subversive"' bill ever introduced in Congress'. However, 
Nathan is most impressed by Wallace's refusal to address segregated audiences: 'the first 
presidential candidate ever to have that degree of courage and integrity' (IMAC, 30). 
Nathan's influences by this time also include the novels of Wallace supporter 
Howard Fast. He is drawn, in particular, to the vivid Old Left appropriation of Thomas 
Paine's politics offered in Fast's Citizeii Totti Paitie (1943). Paine is here, Zuckerman recalls, the 
'common man" to Jefferson's aristocrat, 'savagely single-minded and unsociable, an epic, 
folkloric belligerent' (IMAC, 25). The parallels with the personality of Ira Ringold are 
unmistakable. The book, of course, is recommended to him by Murray. For Nathan, then, the 
influence of the Ringold brothers serves as a'one-two punch promising to initiate me into the 
big show, into my beginning to understand what it takes to be a man on the larger 
scale 
... 
compel[ing] me to respond at a level of rigor that felt appropriate to who I now was. 
Be a good boy wasn't the issue with them. The sole issue was my convictions! 
Remembering, however, the fact that he ignored his father's request that he refuse 
Ira's invitation to attend a downtown Wallace rally, Zuckerman in late middle-age is now 
able to look more sympathetically on the conflicting demands placed upon others. The 
responsibility of the Ringolds, he reflects, was of a different order to that of the father's, 
"'hich is to steer his son away from the pitfalls in a way the teacher 
doesn't. He has to worry about his son's conduct, he has to worry 
about socializing his little Tom Paine. But once little Tom Paine has 
beeii let into the company of men and the father is still educating him 
as a bov, the father is finished. Sure he's %vorrying about the pitfalls 
- 
if he %vasn't, it Nvould be NN'rong. But he's finished any%vav- Little Tom 
Paine has no choice but to write him off, to betray the father and go 
boldIN, fortli to step straight into life's very first pit. 
(IMAC, 32) 
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Nathan's father also points to Eleanor Roosevelf s and (former secretaý of the interior under 
FDR) Harold Ickes's failure to endorse Wallace. Likewise the CIO union too, he claims, has 
withdrawn its funding and support for the same reason: communist infiltration of the 
Progressive Party. Roth here indicates that his novel is not to be read simply as a hindsight- 
heavy, liberal tirade against the HUAC's persecution of individuals such as Ira Ringold. A 
sense of betrayal was felt too by other 'progressives' (whose politics were equally defined by 
the New Deal era) towards liberals such as Wallace who refused to take the anti-democratic 
realities of communism seriously. Of the infiltration of the Progressive Party, the senior 
Zuckerman believes, Henry Wallace was ultimately "either too naYve to know it or 
- 
what 
was, unfortunately, probably closer to the truth 
- 
too dishonest to admit it' (IMA C, 33). 
The situation is resolved only when Nathan's father asks to meet Ira Ringold after his 
son requests permission to visit Ira at his Zinc Town shack. He wishes to establish, once and 
for all, whether Ira is in fact a member of the Communist party. Before doing so, however, he 
relays to his son and Ira how, in 1930, 'disgusted with the... anti-Semitism and anti-Negro 
prejudice 
... 
with how the Republicans scorned the unfortunate and with how the greed of big 
business was milking the people of this country to death', he himself knocked on the door of 
the Newark Communist Party offices only to receive no reply: 
Luckily, that door was locked. And in the next election Franklin Roosevelt 
became the president, and the kind of capitalism that sent me down to the 
Communist Party office began to get an overhaul the likes of which this 
country had never seen. A great man saved this country's capitalism from 
the capitalists and saved patriotic people like me from Communism. Saved 
all of us from the dictatorial regime that results from Communism. 
(IMAC, 102-103) 
When asked, Ira claims not to be a member of the party and professes his admiration for 
Nathan who, Ira promises, will spend his time at Zinc Town in outdoor pursuits such as 
'swimming and hiking and fishing'. Nathan recalls being relieved that the meeting had 
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concluded without acrimony although, he is only now aware, that this was 'largely because 
Ira was not telling the truth' (IMAC, 105). 
The episode ends very powerfully with Nathan rememberingthe wound inflicted on 
his father's face' after he unthinkingly departs with Ira to celebrate the forthcoming vacation, 
leaving his father alone in his office. It is a look 'of resigned disappointment, his kind grey 
eyes softened by-distressfully subdued by-something midway between melancholy and 
futility', a look that would enter Nathan's consciousness at future moments spent with other 
mentors such as Ira, the communist Johnny O'Day and, later, his tutor at the University of 
Chicago, Leo Glucksman, 'His face with that look on it was always looming up, super- 
imposed on the face of the man who was then educating me in life's possibilities. His face 
bearing the wound of betrayal' (IMAC, 106). 
Ideas of betrayal as they relate to both literal and figurative understandings of 
fatherhood or the notion of maintaining a legacy piore generally are established in a number 
of other ways in I Married A Communist. Ira Ringold, for instance, is first brought to Nathan's 
attention, when, in his capacity as a Lincoln impersonator, he is invited by Murray to read 
Lincoln's Second Inaugural and Gettysburg addresses before the high school students. The 
brothers then go on to re-create the Lincoln-Douglas debates for their young audience. Any 
modern liberal credentials that might be attached to Lincoln are only mildly hinted at here but, 
in the years immediately following the war, we learn, Ira had been much more explicit in 
situating communist ideology within the American political tradition represented by Lincoln. 
It is whilst working at a record plant in Chicago with his friend Johnny O'Day (who had 
recruited Ira to the CPUSA during the time they spent together in a poverty-stricken Tehran 
during the war) that Ira first impersonates the "father' of the modern American nation. Here, 
we learn, Ira had received 'a big hand for giving to the word 'slavery' a strong working-class, 
political slant' (IMAC, 44). By the time he is spotted by the radio writer Arthur Sokolow (who 
goes on to make Ira the "common man' star 'Iron Rinn') the act has been cultivated yet 
further: 
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Ira was [now] onstage for a full hour as Lincoln, not only reciting 
or reading from documents but responding to audience questions 
about current political controversies in the guise of Abraham 
Lincoln, with Lincoln's high-pitched country twang and his 
awkward gianf s gestures and his droll, plainspoken way. 
Lincoln supporting price controls. Lincoln condemning the 
Smith Act. Lincoln vilifying Mississippi's Senator Bilbo. 
(IWC, 45) 
Moreover, Roth builds upon this theme of paternity via the ominous figure of Johnny 
O'Day. This tough Irish-American activist stands, albeit temporarily, as more than a mere 
mentor to Ira and Nathan as a result of their respective encounters with him. The sense in 
which O'Day assumes the role of the father with regard to Ira, for example, is brought into 
focus by a prior stress on the fact that Ira has grown up without parents. As such, 
Zuckerman reflects, 'the orphaned Ira was the perfect target for O'Day'. However, it is only 
when Nathan himself, 'anything but an orphan' (IMAC, 43), several years later in his first 
months at the University of Chicago, falls under his influence that the full significance of 
O'Day's ideological commitment to communism becomes apparent. Interestingly, a single 
meeting with O'Day is enough to produce within Nathan an overwhelming desire to break 
inherited ties 
-both parental and otherwise: 
By the time Igot back on the train that evening, the power of O'Day's 
unrelenting focus had so disoriented me that all I could think about 
was how I was to tell my parents that three and a half months was 
enough: I was quitting college to move down to the steel town of 
East Chicago, Indiana 
.... 
I wasn't asking them to support me finan- 
cially 
... 
I could no longer justify continuing to accede to bourgeois 
expectations, theirs or mine, not after my meeting with Johnny O'Day, 
who, despite all the soft-spokenness concealing the passion, came 
across as the most dynamic person I had ever met, more so even than 
Ira. The most dynamic, the most unshatterable, the most dangerous. 
(IMAC, 232) 
Once more we are also confronted here with evidence of the Ahab-Ishmael dynamic 
delineated in RusseU Banks's Cloudsplitter. Nathan's 'disorientation' in the face of O'Day's 
personal (and political) magnetism here mirrors that of Ishmael's and Owen Brown's in the 
face of the charismatic power of Ahab and John Brown respectively. The description of (YDay 
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which precedes the above passage, for example, offers a neat pr6cis of this political 
archetype: 
Perhaps because there was nothing contradictory in O'Day's 
aims 
... 
because the speech was a pretext for nothing else, because 
it appeared to rise from the core of the brain that was experimce, 
there was a tautened to-the-point quality to w hat he said, the 
thinking firmly established, the words themselves seemingly 
shot through with will 
... 
in every utterance, a wily shrewdness 
and, however utopian the goal, a deep practicality, a sense that 
he had the mission as much in his hands as in his head. 
(IWC, 231) 
Unlike Ira, who must reconcile his radical politics with his emotional and creative 
needs for the bourgeois worlds of the family and the theatre 
-needs that effectively prohibit 
any long-term withdrawal from that world-O'Day 'live[s] the life he proselytize[sl'. This 
takes the form of an ascetic existence in a single rooming house 'cell' with only a typewriter, 
two chairs, 
-a table and a single bed for company. 'It was as though', Nathan claims, I 
'everything that wasn't in that room had vanished from the world' (IMAC, 227). O'Day, like 
Ahab and John Brown, is here seen as locked in his own interiority, -physically and mentally 
isolated in self-imposed exile. O'Day"s obsession with ideology in this novel assumes the 
thematic position occupied by the idea of 'monomania' in the pages of Moby Dick. O'Day's 
room, like his speech, is an effort to generate 'the tang of the real'; yet it is also a room 
without colour, gaiety or a sense of human presence as his own speech is "also the speech of 
someone in whom nothing ever laugh[s]. With the result that there [is] a kind of madness to 
his singleness of purpose' (IMAC, 2M-32). With this perception in particular, the analogy 
with Ahab and Brown could not be more clear 
-all possess what Nathan terms at one point 
'a heart without dichotomies' (IMAC, 238). 
The last we hear of Johnny O'Day in the novel is when Murray tracks him down 
several years later in an effort to help Ira recover from a mental breakdown. gDay refuses to 
visit Ira in hospital as a result of his anger at Ira's 'betrayal' of the party which he 'used 
... 
to 
climb to his professional position. For UDay, Ira's fate at the hands of his McCarthyite 
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inquisitors is no tragedy either in personal or broader political terms. He is, rather, to be held 
in what seems even greater contempt himself as "a fake and 
... 
a dope and 
... 
a traitor. Betrayed 
his revolutionary comrades and betrayed the working class. Sold out. Bought off. Totally the 
creature of the bourgeoisie. Seduced by fame and money and wealth and power'(IMAC, 288). 
Shortly after he meets up with O'Day in Chicago, Nathan Zuckerman finds himself 
pulled towards a new set of intellectual parameters as articulated by Leo Glucksmann, one of 
his tutors at'the University. This ultimately leads Nathan to 'betray' his allegiance to the Old 
Left. Reflecting on the shift in influence from Ira to O'Day to Glucksmann, Nathan offers his 
most explicit statement of the paternity and patrimony themes that underwrite I Married A 
Communist: 
All were remarkable to me in their own way, personalities to 
contend with, mentors who embodied or espoused powerful 
ideas and who first taught me to navigate the world and its 
claims, the adopted parents who also, each in his turn, had 
to be cast off along with their legacy, had to disappear, thus 
making way for the orphanhood that is total, which is 
manhood. When you're out there in this thing all alone. 
(IMAC, 217) 
Leo Glucksmann is the final of these 'adopted parents' that we meet in the novel. The 
'new recruitment phase' overseen by this young professor begins after he requests 
Glucksmann's opinion of The Stooge of Torquemada, what might best be described, in the 
parlance of the times, as an 'anti-anti-communisf drama Nathan has written in the leftist 
progressive mode. Glucksmann, remembered by Nathan as a 'foppishly overdressed boy 
genius' aesthete, offers a withering critique of the work, describing it as 'crap... awful 
... 
crude, 
primitive simple-minded propagandistic crap'. More pointedly, he adds, 'it reeks to high 
heaven of your virtue'. It is the broader, theoretical impetus propelling such criticisms, 
however, that leads Nathan to ultimately question many of his prior convictions, in 
particular, no doubt, the relationship between politics and art 
"Art as a weapon? " he said to me, the word "weapon" rich with 
contempt and itself a weapon. "Art as taking the right stand on 
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everyd-dng? Art as the advocate of good things? Who taught you 
all this? Who taught you art is slogans? Who taught you art is in 
the service of 'the people '? Art is in the service of art - otherwise 
there is no art worthy of anyone's attention. What is the motive for 
writing serious literature, Mr Zuckerman? To disarm the enemies 
of price control? The motive for writing serious literature is to write 
serious literature. You want to rebel against society? I'll tell you 
how to do it 
-write well. (IMAC, 218) 
Here we acquire our first intimation of Roth's interest in problematising a key 
dimension within the ideologies of both the 'Old' and 'New' Left 
-their focus on the politics 
of culture. This interest is at its most explicit, as we shall examine, in The Hi4matz Stabi, the 
final novel in the trilogy Yet by the end of the novel it is not Leo Glucksman, Johnny O'Day 
or Ira Ringold who have had the most lasting impact on Zuckerman. It is, rather, Murray 
Ringold whose impact seems the most profound. Even as a man himself in his sixties, 
Zuckerman is forced to reflect upon the path his own life has taken as a result of his former 
teacher's words of counsel. Observing Zuckerman"s ascetic, solitary existence in rural 
Connecticut, Murray reminds him not to delude himself about the repercussions of effective 
withdrawal from human society 
-whether it be via a Zinc Town shack, a Chicago rooming 
house or a University campus. When Zuckerman claims that he merely 'prefer[s] it this way', 
Murray replies: 
No, I watched you listening. I don't think you do. I don't think for 
a moment that the exuberance is gone. You were like that as a kid. 
That's why I got such a kick out of you 
-you paid attention. You still 
do. But what is up here to pay attention to? You should get out from 
under whatever's the problem. To give in to the temptation to yield isn't 
smart.... Beware the utopia of isolation. Beware the utopia of the shack in 
the woods, the oasis defense against rage and grief. An impregnable solitude. 
Thafs how life ended for Ira, and long before the day he dropped dead. (IMAC, 315) 
Murray fears the notion of retreat in this sense as it presents what he describes at one 
point, in explaining his dislike of Johnny O'Day, as a "moral pass'. If politics requires a 
morality premised on "worldly' consciousness, that is, in the first instance, a moral 
commitment to engagement with the world beyond one's own doorstep, then Zuckerman too 
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seems aware that he may have acquired his own form of 'moral pass'. Pre-occupied now with 
'worlds' beyond this one, he follows the 'wheeling logic' of the planets and stars with the aid 
of a stargazers' map from the Sunday New York Times 'chuck[ing] out the four pounds of 
everything else'. Moreover, he recognises: 
Soon I was chucking out the daily paper as well; soon I had chucked 
everything with which I no longer wish to contend, everything but 
what was needed to live on and to work with. I set out to receive an 
my fullness from what might once have seemed, even to me, not' 
nearly enough and to inhabit only the parts of speech. 
(IMAC, 321) 
It is also apparent, however, that Murray Ringold has paid a heavy price for his own 
determination to remain engaged with society. Refusing to leave his home and job teaching 
mostly black children in inner city Newark 
- 
despite already being mugged twice himself 
- 
Murray's wife Doris is killed after being attacked on the street. Earlier in the novel Murray 
has already alerted Nathan to the omnipresence of betrayal as a theme in ýuman history. As a. 
high school teacher of literature, he feels, he has 'no excuse for finding betrayal anywhere but 
at the heart of things 
... 
It's a. very big subject, betrayal'. After citing Othello, Hamlet and Lear 
as examples, he then moves to the most influential text of all: 
Just think of the Bible. What's that book about? The master story 
situation of the Bible is betrayal. Adam 
-betrayed. Esau--betrayed. 
The Shechemites 
- 
betrayed. Judah 
- 
betrayed. Joseph 
- 
betrayed. 
Moses 
- 
betrayed. Samson 
- 
betrayed. Samuel 
- 
betrayed. David 
- 
betrayed. Uriah 
- 
betrayed. job 
- 
betrayed. Job betrayed by whom? 
By none other than God himself. And don't forget the betrayal of 
God. God betrayed. Betrayed by our ancestors at every turn. 
(IMAC, 185) 
Inevitably. perhaps then, Murray perceives his wife's death in terms of betrayal. 
'Myself with all my principles', he reflects, 'I can't betray my brother. I can't betray my 
teaching 
... 
And so who I betray is my wife. I put the responsibility for my choices onto 
somebody else. Doris paid the price for my civic virtue'. More pointedly, Murray tells Nathan 
of the extent to which Doris's death has forced him to re-evaluate his long-held liberal values: 
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'Do you know what I realized? I realized I'd been had. If s not an idea I like but I've lived 
with it inside me ever since' (IMAC, 317). It may be mere coincidence that Roth here 
illustrates Murray's self-questioning with resort to the motif of "mugging' but it brings to 
mind, nonetheless, Irving Kristol's famous definition of a neo-conservative as 'a liberal who 
has been mugged by reality'. 9 
Indeed the exploration of such themes as the politicisation of culture (via popular 
radio drama in the 1940s and 1950s) and the relationship between race and urban decline (via 
the depiction of Newark in the aftermath of the 1967 riots) indicates, at the very least, a 
concern with items regularly placed at the top of the neo-conservative political agenda. 10 
These 
-and other common topics of neo-conservative discourse receive more sustained 
coverage in American Pastoral and The Human Stain when the 1960s as well as its political and 
cultural repercussions come under greater scrutiny. The broader philosophical context for 
neo-conservatism, however, is set up at the close of I Married A Commimist when Nathan 
ponders Murray's "betrayal' of Doris: 
You control betrayal on one side and you wind up betraying 
somewhere else. Because it's not a static system. Because it's 
alive. Because everything that lives is in movement. Because 
purity is petrifaction. Because purity is a lie. Because unless 
you're an ascetic paragon like Johnny O'Day or Jesus Christ, 
you're urged on by five 
-hundred things. (IMAC, 318) 
This is the chastened hberahsm that finds expression in Triffing's The Middle of t1te jounzey, the 
emphasis on 'movement' and disavowal of the 'static system' paralleling Trilling's " allergy to 
closure'. As we'have seen, in its depiction of Gifford Maxim and via its intertextual embrace 
of Melville's Billy Budd and Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, Trilling's novel is equally 
suspicious of such 'ascetic paragoW figures. 
Yet this branch of liberal thought itself, in its traumatic encounters with the 
ideologies of both the Old and New Left in the post war era, did not remain cohesive and 
9 Quoted in Gerson, Ae Neo-Consenwfive Fision: From 77te Cold War to the Culture Wars, 73. Despite Kristol's 
acknowledgment that he made the remark some time in the 1970s its precise origins remain uncertain. 
10 Gerson, Ae Neo-Consenwtive Vision, 93. 
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divided into several strands. This is, no doubt, the reason why the 'neo-conservative' 
appellation, whilst still useful in charting the development of liberal resistance to 
authoritarian forms of leftism, none the less remains a slippery one. The entry for the term in 
a recent Companion to American Thought, for example, reads 
This highly charged label indicates the worldview or ideological 
stance of conservatives who were once liberals, but who turned 
to the right during the late 1960s and early 1970s. From the start 
neo-conservatism has been largely a reactive phenomenon, 
defining its own positions in relation to the leftward drift of 
American liberalism 
-within the Democratic Party, the news 
media, the universities and the cultural and literary worlds. " 
For the intellectual historian in particular, an important distinction should be drawn here. 
Some to whom the label has been applied, like Lionel Trilling 
- 
whilst far less sanguine 
towards the hard left than liberal predecessors such as John Dewey 
- 
undoubtedly remained 
faithful to a Deweyan commitment to the role of the liberal intellectual and, to take another 
Deweyan motif, the importance of the university in American public life. Others, more 
closely associated with the term perhaps, such as Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, feel 
that, in their failure to confront the illiberal authoritarianism of the Left, the broader 
intellectual culture that dominates the universities has effectively betrayed the liberal 
tradition. " 
One consequence of this is that within the work of this latter group we find what 
Peter Steinfels has astutely described as a "counter-intellectual' impulse. 13 It is towards this 
line, finally, that Nathan Zuckerman seems to lean when he summarizes* Murray Ringold's 
predicament in a way that brings together the trilogy's themes of betrayal, revenge and 
generational conflict: 
11 Matthew Berke's entry under 'neo-conservatism' in Kloppenberg & Wightman Fox (eds. ), A Companion to American 
7hought, 484. 
12 See the editors' introduction in Kramer & Kimball (eds. ), 7he Betrayal of Liberalism, 3-18 for a delineation of this latter 
position. It is important too, to distinguish between the mainly domestic provenance of the thought of this generation of neo- 
conservatives and the foreign policy orientation of the 'neo-conservative' vision advanced by officials and intellectuals such as 
Paul Wolfowitz and William Kristol (Irving's son) who have come to exert notable influence on the Bush administration since 
late 200 1. 
13 Steinfels, Ae Neo-Conservatives, 179. 
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This was the existence that America had worked out for him - 
and that he'd worked out for himself by thinking, by taking his 
revenge on his father by cri-ti-cal think-ing, by being reasonable 
in the face of no reason. This was what thinking in America had 
got him. This was what adhering to his convictions had got him, 
resisting the tyranny of compromise. If there's any chancefor the 
improvement of life, where's it going to begin if not in the school? 
Hopelessly entangled in the best of intentions, tangibly, over a 
lifetime, committed to a constructive course that is now an 
illusion, to formulations and solutions that will no longer wash. 
(IMAC, 318) 
The phenomenon of neo-conservatism is one of the most prominent features of the 
development and transmutation of American liberalism since World War II. It is hardly 
surprising then. that works that take as their subject the 'ideological ethos' of post-war 
America should explore many of the areas and raise a number of ideas familiar from a now 
extensive corpus of neo-conservative literature. Questions, however, pertaining to Roth's own 
understanding of post-war liberalism and the political orientation of his late work with 
regard to the American left and the neo-conservative movement can only be fully examined 
in the context of Roth's own early critical and commercial success as a writer in the 1960s and, 
most revealingly of all, with reference to The Human Stain, the final novel in the trilogy. 
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American Pastoral: Liberalism and the New Left 
Writing in 1998 in Commentary, the house journal of American neo-conservatism, the critic 
Norman Podhoretz reviewed the career of Philip Roth. Claiming to have discovered Roth the 
writer as a newly hired assistant editor of Commentanj in the 1950s, Podhoretz then proceeds 
to chart what he regards as the high and low points of the novelist' s subsequent output. 
Although not without moments of notable critical acuity, the assessments that follow 
generally tell the reader at least as much about the phenomenon of neo-conservatism and 
Podhoretz's own personal political journey as they do about the merits or otherwise of Philip 
Roth's fiction. 
The neo-conservative impulse is reflected in Podhoretz's description of his own 
steady disiffusionment with Roth's work through the 1960s and 1970s. At first this was 
prompted by his gradual realisation of the legitimacy of certain criticisms made by Jewish 
organisations for what they perceived as Roth's 'negative' representation of the Jewish 
community in his early fiction. Despite agreeing to publish Roth's equally controversial 
rebuttal of these criticisms, 'Writing About Jews', as a still left-leaning editor in 1963, 
Podhoretz now claims that he did so despite 'an uneasy (if largely hidden, as much from 
14 
myself as others) sympathy for the Jewish nervousness over Roth's work'. It became clear to 
Podhoretz, however, after his own neo-conservative turn, prompted by the cultural impact of 
the New Left in the 1960s, that Roth's anger could not be attributed simply to the 'self- 
loathing' of the assimflationist Jew, as many of his critics accused. 
Long before the appearance of the bitter satire on the Nixon presidency Our Gang 
(1973), Podhoretz claims to have noted how, from the publication of his first stories, collected 
in GoodInje, Columbus (1959), Roth's contempt had been, in almost equal measure, directed at 
gentile WASP America. By the 1970s Roth was now, to a Podhoretz repudiating what he 
perceived as liberalism's subordination to the values and morality of the counter-culture, the 
'laureate of a new class', of an liberal elite intelligentsia, 'in the sense', he describes, 'that 
14 podhor,. tZ, -The Adventures of Philip Roth', 28.. 
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everything [Roth] wrote served to reinforce their standard ideas and attitudes, to offer 
documentary evidence for their ! aken-for-granted view that America was a country 
dominated by vulgarians, materialists, bores and criminal political leaders'. 
For this neo-conservative critic, the young Philip Roth became something of a totemic 
figure within a new radicahsm that had re-defined liberalism and finally destroyed, in the 
process, what remained of the post-war political consensus. This consensus, of course, had 
, 
been rooted in the idea of liberalism Podhoretz himself had once adhered to. Indeed it was 
'liberalism's alliance with new socio-political forces hostile to fundamental American values, 
Podhoretz believes, that accounted for the considerable commercial success of Roth's work in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. 'More and more people', he recollects, 'had come along who 
were 
-in tune with the disgust for Americans and American life that had been expressed in 
Roth"s work from the beginning and who hence had increasingly come to recognize him as 
their own'. " It is for these political reasons, Podhoretz claims then, that his early enthusiasm 
for Roth began to wane. Although he goes on to say that he has continued to devote much 
time to reading the subsequent output he adds, dolefully, that 'not all of it turned out to be 
well spent. ' 
This, however, was about to change. Whilst discerning a more sympathetic tone in a 
number of mid-period Roth works eventuaRy anthologised in Zuckerrnan Bound: A Trilogy and 
Epilogite (1985) 
-what he'describes as 'a touch of tenderness .... extended towards the Jews he 
had so relentlessly and exuberantly ridiculed in the books that once brought him fame- 
Podhoretz is even more surprised by Roth's Anierican Pastoral (1997). Here, he is delighted to 
detect nothing less than 'a born-again Philip Roth whose entire outlook on the world had 
been inverted. "' So why the change of heart? How had one of neo-conservatism's foremost 
cultural critics 
- 
the author of Breaking Ranks (1983), one of the movement's definitive political 
memoirs 
- 
suddenly come to champion a figure whose earlier work comes close to 
embodying, by his own admission, everyfl-ting he presumably felt the need to 'break ranks' 
with? Is Americaii Pastoral, as Podhoretz suggests, an ambiguous expression of ima culpa, that 
[bid., 32. 
16 [bid., 34. 
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is, a repudiation of liberalism, a guarded neo-conservative 'breaking ranks' narrative? Or are 
there elements of continuity evident that enable it to be situated within a more conventionally 
liberal framework? 
It will be my argument that Podhoretz is far too eager to attach a particular type of 
neo-conservative agenda to American Pastoral and--despite the validity of some of his points 
- 
the argument as a whole fails to properly consider the full breadth and range of a novel that 
P 
represents several contrasting positions on questions of American culture and politics. Before 
proceeding to this argument, however, it is worth pausing to note how such selective reading 
is also evident in Podhoretzs critique of I Married A Cominunist-a novel he admits to 
receiving with considerable disappointment. After the 'delighted astonishment' with which 
American Pastoral is greeted, what is described as the subsequent novel's 'reassuring 
declaration of solidarity with [Roth's] old comrades within the liberal establishment' 
obviously comes as an anti-climax. Explaining his reaction, Podhoretz claims that in this work 
Roth effectively 
signs a loyalty oath (as one might put it) to the old-time liberal 
religion from which he seemed to have defected in Anzerican 
Pastoral. And I mean old-time. Every liberal chch6 about America 
at the height of the cold war is resurrected here 
- 
that its fear of 
the Soviet Union and its hostility to Communism were paranoid, 
that the Communists at home posed no threat worth taking 
seriously, and that the congressional investigations and the 
blacklists were cynical ploys aimed not at quashing communist 
influence but at discrediting liberals and Democrats. 17 
The somewhat anachronistic terminology in which the above criticisms are couched betrays 
the extent to which the neo-conservative politics espoused by Podhoretz are deeply rooted in 
the anti-communism of the early 1950s. Even in 1998-almost fifty years after McCarthyism 
and nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union itself 
- 
Podhoretz is reaching for 
the "loyalty oath' metaphor (a strategy even he seems somewhat self-conscious in 
deploying-'as one might put it) and is still capable of imagining a 'liberal establishment' 
whose cohorts regard each other as 'comrades'. 
17 [bid., 35. 
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Examining some of the novel's features, one would think too that Murray Ringold's 
political journey in particular 
-given his feelings about the deterioration of Newark and the 
death of his wife 
- 
might strike a chord with a neo-conservative critic. The isolated figure cut 
by Nathan Zuckerman at the very end of the story, furthermore, is closer to the jaundiced 
liberalism of Trilling's John Laskell (Trilling was one of Podhoretz's tutors at Columbia in the 
1950s and was, for a time at least, something of an intellectual model for his former pupil). It 
Might also be added that the communist Johnny O'Day is surely the most disturbing 
character in the novel (although the right-wing Grants admittedly are not too far behind). 
Finally, Podhoretz might at least give some credence to the important historical point Roth 
makes here, namely, that 'the iron pole of righteousness' could be destructive and self- 
serving in the hands of anti-communists such as Bryden and Katrina Grant as well as 
communists such as Ira Ringold and Johnny O'Day (IMAC, 318). 
Podhoretz's essay ends with the same strange combination of self-regard, 
condescension and almost paternal forbearance with which it opened. The critic who 
originally 'discovered' the artist as a young man 
-after an all too brief meeting of minds -is 
now disillusioned once more with the artist as an older man. 'After all these years', he regrets, 
'and after a brief interlude in which I thought my troubles with Philip Roth had finally been 
resolved, I find myself disturbed by them yet again! Roth must, it is suggested in conclusion, 
'finally summon the courage to "let go" altogether of the youthful habits of mind and spirit 
from which he seemed to be freeing himself for a while but which, on the evidence of I 
18 Married A Communist, are still putting up a strong fight'. 
Podhoretz is accurate, nonetheless,. in so far as he identifies the presence of a certain 
4 old tinie [my italics] liberal rehgion' in this work 
-but it is not one from which, as he goes on 
to suggest, '[Roth] defected from in Amefican Pastoral'. One of the centra. 1 flaws of Podhoretz's 
analysis fies in his failure to note any continitities between these two texts 
-continuities 
crucial to those questions pertaining to the post-war liberal political tradition under 
consideration here. As a neo-conservative, Podhoretz is too eager to uncover evidence of 
18 Podhoretz, 'The Adventures of Philip Roth', 36. 
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discontinuity, that is, of an author 'breaking ranks' with liberalism, via the " of dramatic 
political self-questioning he himself once underwent. 
Whilst Roth in American Pastoral is merciless in his assault on certain forms of liberal 
compromise that came to the fore in the 1960s, he also gives significant expression to liberal 
values, many of which pre-date the confrontation between liberalism and the New Left 
during this era. These are, for the most part, in line with the 'old-time liberal religion' 
Podhoretz condemns in his remarks on I Married A Communist. The figures through which 
this position finds expression in the respective novels are Murray Ringold and Lou Levov. 
. 
Moreover, Lou Levov's son, the central figure in Anierican Pastoral, Seymour 'the Swede' 
Levov- whose quiet patriotism, commitment to the work ethic and post-ethnic perspective 
Podhoretz would presumably admire 
-is himself the object of criticisin as well as sympathy, 
particularly when interrogated by his outspoken brother Jerry. 
American Pastoral portrays the rise and fall of a New Jersey Jewish family. Although 
the story commences with narrator Nathan Zuckerman's description of a mysterious 
encounter in 1985 with the Swede (named so for his light, distinctly non-Jewish features), it 
0 
only begins to unfold properly after a high school re-union dinner ten years later. Here 
Zuckerman meets his old school friend Jerry, the Swede's younger brother, and learns of the 
tragic events of the Swede"s life. In his vivid recollection of his boyhood hero, the blond- 
haired Jew who effortlessly assumes the mantle of all American masculinity via his athletic, 
military and business success, and the subsequent delineation of his ultimate downfall, 
Zuckerman imbues the Swede with the tragic, mythic status of Fitzgerald's Jay Gatsby. Roth's 
character, moreover, also shares with Gatsby a symbolic historical significance that 
foregrounds the assault on ethnic as well as class barriers to the pursuit of happiness in post- 
war America. The Swede, he notes, was 
the boy we were all going to follow into America, our point man 
into the next immersion, at home here the way the Wasps were 
at home here, an American not by sheer striving, not by being a 
Jew who invents a famous vaccine or a Jew on the Supreme Court, 
not by being the most brilliant or the most eminent or the best. 
Instead 
- 
by virtue of his isomorphism to the Wasp world 
- 
he 
does it the ordinary way, the natural way, the American 
-guy way. (AP, 89) 
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The Swede personifies a very specific, powerful and pre-dominant notion of 
American virtue. He represents the goodness, responsibility and hard work inherent in the 
wholesome post- immigrant dream of the Eisenhower era. Unlike his father and immigrant 
grandfather, the Swede has never had to work in tannery sweatshops but, notwithstanding 
", is fully cognisant of the drive and sacrifice required so that his forebears might bequeath 
a Levov-owned glove factory to him as his own American inheritance. The passages 
describing both the skiff of the traditional glove maker and the immense physical and mental 
exertion required to harness these skiHs to the demands of mass production are as intricate 
and powerful as any in the novel. 
Yet such feelings towards the preceding generations are tempered by a sense of 
alienation. Men like Loý Levov, the Swede's father, Zuckerman recalls in this vein, were 
'limited men with limitless energy'. They are energetic capitalists but not parasites, driven by 
pride rather than naked materialism, men whose intimate acquaintance with poverty, 
hardship and the excesses of the free market during the Depression made of them lifelong 
New Deal liberalý. This was the generation who embraced an American work ethic by means 
of a new sense of social justice that served to re-define the meaning of liberalism in the 
Roosevelt era. The sense of distance between such men as Lou Levov and their Americanised 
white-collar, professional and college-educated sons is apparent when Zuckerman writes that 
Lou was of a generation 
for whom everything is an unshakeable duty, for whom there 
is a right way and a wrong way and nothing in between.... 
whose compound of ambitions, biases and beliefs is so unruffled 
by careful thinking that he isWt as easy to escape from as he seems. 
... 
for whom the most serious thing in life was to keep going despite 
evenjthing. And we were their sons. It was our job to love them. (AP, 11) 
As is the case in I Married A Communist, the role played and influence exerted by the 
father figure generates troubling questions. Early on, for example, we are told of the Swede 
that 'nothing permeated more of his life than his father's expectations'(AP, 38). Later, the 
Swede is forced to acknowledge this "problem of the father, that is, the problem 'of 
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maintaining filial love against the onslaught of an unrelenting father' (AP, 361). Once more 
this does not represent purely personal, emotional bonds and tensions but is also intimately 
connected with the sense of cultural belonging and political allegiance that the Swede is born 
into. The Swede's understanding of his own national identity, for instance, is defined, to a 
notable extent, alongside that of his father's. Their respective ideas of what it means to be an 
American are shown as both a basis for a shared set of values and yet also as points of 
departure. In this respect, the fact that the Swede has been 'bequeathed' an 'American 
nickname' is regarded as significant, setting him apart from those Levovs that preceded him 
in America: 
He carried [the nickname] with him like an invisible passport, 
all the while wandering deeper and deeper into an American's 
life, forthrightly evolving into a large, smooth, optimistic 
American such as his conspicuously raw forebears 
-including 
the obstinate father whose American claim was not inconsid- 
erable 
-couldn't have dreamed of as one of their own. (AP, 207-208) 
In political terms, a symbolic moment arrives during a visit to Hyde Park, New York 
when the Swede is on leave from the Marines. Here, 'stand[ing] together as a family looking 
at FDR's grave 
... 
[the Swede] silent, proudly wearing his new summer uniform', it is now 
clear, "something meaningful was happening' (AP, 208). The liberalism of Roosevelt and the 
New Deal are then, signposted as the key political reference points for the Levovs and World 
War II the defining historical event. That World War H should provide such an important 
backdrop is not simply a product of the Swede's decision to join the Marines or, for that 
matter, the fact that the Levovs are Jews; it is, rather, viewed as both the occasion of and 
catalyst for an unprecedented period of national unity and an emergent sense of trans-ethnic 
solidarity. 
Whilst serving in the military the Swede meets for the first time and ultimately comes 
to share a camaraderie and sense of purpose with men raised on Texas farms and others from 
0 
Italian, Irish, Polish and Slovak backgrounds. Moreover, the immediate post-war climate in 
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which the Swede reaches adult maturity is seen to reflect this process of collective 
reinvention. Zuckerman, a few years younger than the Swede, recalls: 
Our class started high school six months after the unconditional 
surrender of the Japanese, during the greatest moment of 
collective inebriation in American history. And the upsurge 
of energy was contagious 
... 
The Depression had disappeared. 
Everything was in motion. The fid was off. Americans were 
to start over again, en masse, everyone in it together. 
(AP, 40) 
This mood provides the context for the novel's first' section 'Paradise Remembered. 
Interestingly the Jewish neighbourhood of the immediate post-war period is then compared 
to another earlier society prone to moments of republican 're-birth'. 'Am I wrong', asks 
Zuckerman, 'to think we delighted in living there? No delusions are more familiar than those 
inspired in the elderly by nostalgia, but am I completely mistaken to think that living as well- 
born children in Renaissance Florence could not have held a candle to growing up within 
aromatic range of Tabachnik's pickle barrels? '(AP, 42). "Paradise Remembered' ends 
ominously, however, after we learn of how the Swede's life is thrown into disarray by his 
daughter Meredith (Merry) Levov, whose mounting alienation from her family and the 
values they represent, culminates, finally, in a decision to 'bring the [Vietnam] war home to 
America' by bombing the local post office in February 1968, an act which results in the death 
of a local doctor. 
The middle section of the novel, 'The Fall', provides further context for the political 
gulf between father and daughter but also documents the Swede's drift from the pofitical and 
moral views held by his own father. We learn that whilst dutifully rejecting a professional 
baseball career to take over the Newark Maid glove factory, the Swede nonetheless 
confounds other expectations. Most prominent amongst these is his rejection of the middle- 
class suburban life of upwardly mobile Jewish-Americans advocated by his father for the 
greater freedom the Swede imagines another 'non-hyphenated' America can bestow. This is 
made clear, for example, in his decision to marry an Irish-American Catholic, Dawn Dwyer, a 
former Miss New Jersey, with similar assimilationist aspirations. Zuckerman's earlier image 
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of the Swede as a parvenu Moses leading the Jews into an American Israel is further 
accentuated along these lines with the young Levovs' purchase of a stone house in Old 
Rimrock, situated in the heart of rural and affluent WASP New Jersey. 
'The Fall' also deals with the aftermath of the bomb, beginning with the appearance 
of Rita Cohen, who claims to be able to put the Swede in touch with his daughter who is now 
on the run. Subsequently he discovers Merry living in a poor inner-city area of Newark, 
adhering to a rigidly anti-materialistic religious faith which forbids her from harming any 
living being. Indeed, from this point in the novel, with the onset of the latter half of the 1960s, 
Newark, New Jersey is itself regarded as a symbol of post-lapsarian, liberal crisis and can be 
read as providing a deeper, historical context for Murray Ringold"s vivid description of the 
urban blight of late twentieth Newark in the closing pages of I Married A Coninumist. In 
American Pastoral the urban 'battlefields' engendered by the Newark riots of July 1967 are 
constructed as a domestic counterpoint to those in Southeast Asia. This, of course, is very 
much in line with the growing unease amongst liberal intellectuals by this time that the 
war-by its enormous expense as much as moral factors-was undermining progressive 
reform projects at home. 19 
The Swede's inner-city factory 
- 
staffed with mostly local black residents 
- 
comes 
under siege but, after the riots and to the immense frustration of his father, he refuses to re- 
locate. The Swede's father's anger 
- 
again, like Murray Ringold's anger at the continued 
decline of Newark 
-is racially charged and rooted in a sense of not only personal but political 
betrayal. Lou Levov is a liberal committed to racial equality and, more generally, the idea of 
the state as a facilitator of education, social mobility and ultimately self-reliance. Rapacious 
manufacturers and short-sighted unions, in his view, are held equally responsible for 
Newark's ills. As a supporter of the New Deal order in its most recent manifestations- 
Johnson's civil rights legislation and Great Society program -Lou Levov, too, like Murray, 
feels that he's been'had', claimin& 
19 Tomes, Apocaývpse Then, 171-174. 
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... 
they took this city and now they are going to take that business 
and everything that I built up a day at a time, an inch at a time, and 
they are going to leave it all in ruins! And that'll do 'em a world of 
good! They burn down their own houses 
- 
that' U show whitey! 
... 
Oh thaf 11 do wonders for a man's black pride 
-a totally ruined 
city to live in! 
... 
And I hired 'em! How's that for a laugh! I hired 'end 
(AP, 163-64) 
The racial situation in the United States in the 1960s played a major role, of course, in 
the re-definition of American liberalism during this time and, by the end of the decade, was 
equally a central focus of the emergent neo-conservative critique of this transformation. In 
1963 Norman Podhoretz himself published a hugely controversial essay that in many ways 
set the agenda for white, liberal discussions of the race question in the years that followed. 
'My Negro Problem-And Ours', published in 1963 in Commentanj, hit a nerve within 
Northern liberal intellectual circles by idenfifying a slippage 
- 
within his ozvn (then still 
liberal) worldview as well as that of his peers 
-between politics and experience. Like Lou 
Leyov and Murray Ringold, Podhoretz saw himself as atypical in so far as he was a liberal 
who had had personal contact with blacks. By contrast, he claims: 
... 
everywhere we look today 
... 
we find the curious phenomenon 
of white middle-class liberals with no previous personal 
experience of Negroes 
- 
people to whom Negroes have 
always been faceless in virtue rather than faceless in vice 
- 
discovering that their abstract commitment to the cause of 
Negro rights will not stand the test of a direct confrontation. 20 
Podhoretz in this piece also points to what he regards as the many broader 
consequences of such liberal bad faith which include white residents' abandonment of inner 
cities and public schools, opposition to re-districting and the annexation of suburbs (thereby 
weakening city tax bases). These are, ironically, some of developments later liberal historians 
would draw attention to in accounts of the Newark crisis 
. 
21 For neo-conservatives, on the 
other hand, the relationship of such phenomena to problems of urban decline and racial 
20 Podhoretz, 'My Negro Problem-And Ours', 98. 
ý1 See Kenneth T. Jackson's account of the riots, 'Days of Rage': 'Me Life and Death of Newark' in McPherson & Brinkley 
eds. ), Dqvs ofDestiny, 418-39. 
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inequality would be understood as symptomatic rather than causal. The Swede, however, is 
hardly as selfless, by comparison with his father, as he might appear in this instance. 
Pressured, generationally speaking, from 'above' by the hard-headed liberalism of a father 
observing the family business under threat, the Swede is equally pressured from 'below', so 
to speak, by the New Left radicalism of his daughter: 
Whatever it cost him to deny his father relief from his suffering, 
stubbornly to deny the truth of what his father was saying, the 
Swede could not submit to the old man's arguments, for the 
simple reason that if Merry were to learn 
... 
that Newark Maid 
had fled the Central Avenue factory she would be all too 
delighted to think, "He did it! He's as rotten as the rest! 
My own father! Everything justified by the profit principle! 
Everything! Newark's just a black colony for my own father. 
Exploit it and exploit it and, when there's trouble, fuck it! " 
(AP, 165) 
Merry Levov, of course, bears comparison with a number of characters encountered in earlier 
chapters. Like Gifford Maxim in Trilling"s The Middle of the Jourizey, Merry is depicted as in 
I 
thrall to a series of obsessions and beliefs or'improbable dream[s] of purification' (AP, 95). As 
a child her attention shifts from Catholicism to an infatuation with Audrey Hepburn; as a 
young adult the same type of 'perfectionism' that underwrites John Brown's militant anti- 
slavery and personal asceticism leads her, in a similar manner, to political violence and then 
on to Jainism. Indeed, in a remarkable fantasy sequence in which the Swede prays to black 
militant Angela Davis for his daughter's safeyeturn, the latter analogy is made explicit. Here, 
in communion with 'St Angela', the Swede is told that: 'The disobedience of oppressive 
laws 
... 
including violent disobedience, goes back to abolitionism- his daughter is one with 
John Brown! (AP, 160). Drawing on the same religious vocabulary Trilling makes use of in his 
novel, Roth also has the radical Rita Cohen remark of Merry: 'We can only stand as witnesses 
to the anguish that sanctifies her' (AP, 176). 
The idea of a "sanctifying anguish' equally recalls Billy Budd-in fact it is not too 
much to say that Rita Cohen's above characterisation might itself have been pulled from the 
final execution scene in Melville's story. Like Billy Budd, Merry is afflicted with a stammer 
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which frustrates communication and is seen to pre-dispose her to violence. She shares with 
Budd and John Brown a 'radical innocence' and sense of virtue that ultimately proves 
destructive. Melvifle's Bifly Budd and Banks's John Brown, however, are far more ambiguous 
characters whose actions cannot be interpreted simply in terms of psychopathology. As 
Robert Boyers has noted in one of the few dissenting reviews amidst the effusive critical 
praise heaped on American Pastoral, in this way, Roth 'sets up as representative figures of 
disorder and 'reality' persons who are mad and whose attachment to disorder is so 
pathological that they make it impossible for us to consider seriously the actual sources of 
discontent in American society'. 22 
This is a fair criticism in so far as it goes. The 'pathology' of the New Left in Anierican 
Pastoral certainly misrepresents a diverse movement that incorporated many democratic 
elements. Such a relatively narrow focus also, no doubt, explains the novel's appeal to a neo- 
conservative critic such as Podhoretz. If, however, we focus primarily on the central figure of 
the Swede-the character the author himself has, after all, designated as the 'hero' in 
American Pastoral-we find that the mainstream values of bourgeois liberalism and the 
affluent society of mid-century America do not go unchallenged. The association of the 
Swede with the concept of the "pastoraY is at the very heart of the novel's political and moral 
concerns. Within the American context, furthermore, this idea of the pastoral is intimately 
connected with the nation's political foundations in Lockean liberalism. It is to this 
relationship then, that we need to turn, in order to make full sense of the essentially political 
basis of the powerful criticisms levelled at the Swede by other characters in American Pastoral. 
The narrative structure of American Pastoral previously alluded to is important in this 
respect, as it immediately establishes a loaded political-historical as well as literary context 
against which the meaning of the Swede's story might be deciphered. The text to return to 
here is Paradise Lost rather than its Old Testament source material. Like John Milton's epic 
poem, Roth's novel deploys the pastoral in order to evoke a secular vision of Eden and a fall 
from innocence that must be attributed to the intrusion of History. The United States 
-as the 
22 Boyers, 'The Indigenous Betserk', 41. 
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work of the 'myth" critics previously referred to demonstrates -offers a particularly pertinent 
modern context for the re-enactment of the Fall myth. 23The crucial connections between this 
defining cultural characteristic and a specific tradition of political philosophy, however, 
remain largely unexamined. 
The prominence of the philosophy of John Locke within America's dominant liberal 
political tradition, in this respect, is worth noting. For Locke, the economy and not the polity, 
nature and not the public sphere (or the agon of classical politics) is the arena of freedom. 
Consequently, as Vidal traces in the pages of Burr, the modern age demanded a new political 
philosophy 
- 
liberalism 
- 
which acknowledges this 'natural law'. When Locke comments that 
'in the beginning all the world was America' in his Second Treatise on Government he is, as John 
Diggins has observed, "implying that liberal man was born of his primal encounter with 
nature'. Such primal encounters form the backbone of the classic American literary canon 
where political freedom is conceived of in terms of man's ability to master the natural 
environment. This mastery affords a distance from the state and the political realm by carving 
out a zone untouched by History or what Diggins breaks down into 'time, custom and Old 
World memory'. 24 
The idea of such a flight from history is a crucial component of what we might better 
understand 
- 
following William Empson, Leo Marx and Lawrence Buell 
- 
in terms of the 
pastoral mode as (liberal) ideology. 15 In Roth's novel the idea of the pastoral as ahistorical 
informs the reader's perception of the hero's plight. The Swede has geared his whole life 
toward the evasion of conflict and, accordingly, acquired no understanding of the political, 
0 
no inclination of the storm 
-clouds gathering to sweep History into his carefully demarcated 
world. The family home in Old Rimrock, in this way, provides the novel with its 'garden of 
23 See Smith, Virgin Land; Marx, Me Machine in the Garden; and Lewis, 71e American Adam. 
24 Diggins, 77#e Lost Soul ofAmerican Politics, 118-19. 
25 Although works such as Leslie Fiedler's Love and Death in the American Novel (1960) and D. H. Lawrence's Studies in 
Classic American Literature (1923) were using the idea of the 'pastoral' as a way of reaching an undemanding of American 
literary culture, it is with William Empson's Some Versions ofthe Pastoral ( 1935) that the concept is critically assessed as an 
ideological strategy within English literature. Lao Marx's 7he Machine in the Garden: Technologv and the Pastoral Ideal in 
America, ( 1964) harnesses this approach to the American cultural context. Lawrence Buell's 'American Pastoral Ideology 
Reappraised' ( 1989). meanwhile, is an excellent later analysis of the pastoral mode in American literary culture. 
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Eden', that is, a primary pastoral context within which the tragic dimensions of this intrusion 
might be fufly gauged. 'How had the Swede, in this sense, writes Zuckerman, 
come to be history's plaything? History, American history, 
the stuff you read about in books and study in school, had 
made its way out to tranquil, untrafficked Old Rimrock, New 
Jersey, to countryside where it had not put in an appearance 
that was notable since Washington's army wintered in the 
highlands adjacent to Morristown. History which had made 
no drastic impingement on the daily life of the local populace 
since the Revolutionary War, wended its way back out to these 
cloistered hills and, improbably, with all its predictable un- 
foreseeness, broke helter-skelter into the household of the 
Seymour Levovs and left the place in a shambles. 
(AP, 87) 
The Swede's own retreat from the political 
-tied as it is to Old Rimrock's status in the novel 
as refuge from History 
-is also made more explicit on occasions. This is evident, as we have 
already seen, in his reasons for refusing to close the Newark Maid factory but also manifests 
itself in other ways. A decision to join a political group, New Jersey Businessmen Against the 
War, for example, is motivated by anxieties surrounding his own deteriorating relationship 
with his daughter rather than any major misgivings about the war itself. 
The Swede had never belonged to a political group before and 
would not have joined this one and volunteered for the steering 
committee and paid a thousand dollars toward their protest 
ad in the Newark News had he not hoped that his conspicuous 
involvement might deflect a little of her anger away from him. 
(AP, 100) 
It is, appropriately enough, at the end of "The Fall' section of the novel where the full 
ramifications of the Swede's Lockean pre-occupation with the private sphere and the 
d economy' at the expense of American politics and society more generafly are made manifest. 
This emerges after the Swede discovers that not only were later acts of political violence on 
Merry's part responsible for three additional killings but that she herself, in subsequent years, 
has been raped twice whilst in hiding in inner city Newark. It is only now, on turning to his 
brother Jerry for advice having failed to persuade his daughter to leave an infested slum, that 
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the Swede must confront the fuH range of his own limitations and the extent of his 'fall' into 
what, elsewhere in the novel, is described in terms of 'the fury, the violence and the 
desperation of the counter-pastoral 
... 
the indigenous Aýnerican berserk' (A P, 86). 
Jerry is relentless in his criticism. He begins by castigating his brother for refusing to 
take Merry away from Newark against her will, viewing this as merely another manifestation 
of the Swede's capacity for 'accession", his inability to make difficult choices that disrupt 
I appearances'. This ultimately explains the 'unrevealed' nature of the Swede's character 
which eludes the type of sharp definition that, for Jerry, can only emerge as a result of 
directly confronting the realities of personal and/or political miffict. This too, Jerry adds, has 
a deleterious moral effect on those around the Swede by prompting in them either frustrated, 
implacable opposition or the type of compromise premised less on judgement than on an 
overly refined sense of propriety. Hence, in Jerry's view, the Swede's 'choice', for example, to 
I 
marry an Irish Catholic, against his father's initial wishes, should be seen as no such thing. 
If Dad had said, 'Look, you'll never get my approval for this, 
never, I am not having grandchildren half this and half that, 
'then you would have had to make a choice. But you never had 
to make a choice. Never. Because he let you slide through. Everybody 
has always let you slide through. And that is why, to this day, 
nobody knows who you are. You are unrevealed 
- 
that is the story 
Seymour, unrevealed. That is why your own daughter decided to 
blow you away. You are never straight about anything and she 
hated you for it. You keep yourself a secret. You don't choose ever. 
(AP, 276) 
If such indecision leads to a form of 'paralysis', it also engenders a lack of self-knowledge. 
This is itself, Jerry goes on to suggest, a product of a fundamentally 'false image' of those 
social and economic relations within which that self must be situated. The Swede is 
imprisoned by the WASP illusion of pastoral family life; his identity and, in Lockean terms, 
his understanding of 'freedom' is delimited by the narrowly circumscribed economy of glove- 
making. 'You have no idea what this country is', his younger brother reminds him, 'aH you 
know is what a fucking glove is' (AP, 276). Yet it is in this respect, Jerry notes, that is, to the 
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extent that the world of glove-making itself constitutes a lost, pastoral order that the Swede 
most resembles his father: 'you're still in your old man's dream-world, Seymour, still up 
there with Lou Levov in glove heaven. A household tyrannized by gloves 
... 
Oh where A 
where is that outmoded America, that decorous America where a woman had twenty five 
pairs of gloves? ' (AP, 277). 
Yet, ironically, it might equally be said that Jerry's somewhat unforgiving, over- 
assertive characterisation here along with his undoubtedly inflated sense of self-worth also 
resembles that of no-one so much as Lou Levov himself. Both, in their own ways, are 
proponents of a 'strong' liberalism that champions a morally premised commitment to 
'intervention". The aggressive liberal individualism of the son with its minoritarian emphasis 
on the 'rights' of the self or 'minority' here overlaps with the robust New Deal liberalism of 
the father with its majoritarian emphasis on the broader 'rights' of society as a whole or the 
'majority'. It is precisely this overlap, it might be said, that has ensured that they have 
remained at loggerheads. Such disagreements range from that which his mother recalls 
concluding with a fifteen year old Jerry 'scream[ing] 
... 
at his own father, his "rights"', his 
"rights"' to later furious rows connected with Lou's interference in his younger son's divorce 
arrangements. 
It is also this "strong' liberalism that serves to differentiate them from the Swede 
whose 'weak' liberalism, by ultimately positing no more than a politics of disengagement, 
thereby generates a moral vacuum. Both the Swede's brother and father criticise him, in this 
respect, for what they regard as his naYve embrace of the American pastoral. 'Out there 
playing at being Wasps', Jerry exclaims, 'a little Mick girl from the Elizabeth docks and a 
Jewboy from Weequahic High. The cows. Cow society. Colonial old America. And you 
thought all that faqade was going to come without cost. Genteel and innocent. But that costs, 
too, Seymour. I would have thrown a bomb. I would become a Jain and live in Newark' (AP, 
28o). 
Lou Levov's objections, meanwhile, whilst similarly suspicious of the dominant 
WASP culture, can be situated within a historical context that even more forcefully 
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undermines the Swede's attachment to the idea of Old Rimrock as a de-politicised pastoral 
idyH. 'You're dreaming. I wonder if you even know where this is, Lou asks the Swede, 'The 
Klan thrived out here in the twenties 
... 
This is rock-ribbed republican New Jersey, Seymour 
I 
this place was Republican when Roosevelt was living. Republican during the New Deal. 
Think about that! When his son suggests that this was merely party political (Republicans 
disliked FDR 'because he was a Democrat), Lou is quick to remind him of the cultural 
context within whiýh New Deal values were once sharply contested: 
No, they didn't like him because they didn't like the Jews 
and the Italians and the Irish 
-that's why they moved out 
here to begin with. They didn't like Roosevelt because he 
accommodated himself to these new Americans. He under- 
stood what they needed and he tried to help them. But not 
these bastards. They wouldn't give a Jew the time of day. 
(AP, 309) 
I 
Needless to say, both Lou and Jerry Levov believe that the Swede has completely mishandled 
the situation with his daughter. For his closest male relatives the Swede has come to occupy 
the type of moral no-man's land many neo-conservatives would later identify as the defining 
feature of mid-century liberalism. This is the 'de-vitalised' centre of post-Vietnam American 
politics. 'Refusing to give offence, ' Jerry says, 'Blaming yourself. Tolerant respect for every 
position. Sure, it's 'liberaY 
-I know, a liberal father. But what does that mean? What is at the 
center of it? Always holding things together. And look where the fuck it's got you! ' (AP, 279). 
It might be surmised then, at this point, that such characters represent a certain 
'distancing' from mainstream liberalism insofar as it can be said to find expression in the 
Swede's position. Yet, before identifying such 'distancing' too explicitly with neo- 
conservative political values, it is perhaps instructive, once more, to note another example of 
the type of continuity overlooked by Norman Podhoretz in his analysis of Roth's novels. The 
final section of American Pastoral, "Paradise Lost, which immediately follows Jerry's tirade, 
begins in the summer of the Watergate hearings, the recorded proceedings of which the 
Levovs tune into on television each evening. During this period Lou Levov's pre-occupation 
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with the corrupt Nixon administration verges on the obsessive. This involves the writing of 
numerous letters to the various heroes and villains that rise to prominence over the course of 
the Watergate saga. 
The Swede is here reminded of those occasions during the previous decade when his 
father would send Merry copies of the letters he mailed to Lyndon Johnson voicing his 
opposition to the war in Vietnam. Lou Levov would attempt to present such acts as an 
alternative avenue of democratic opposition to the war to a granddaughter whose political 
views he believed were becomingout of control'. Moreover, some of the more extreme views 
of the New Left 
-such as Merry's facile equation of American foreign policy with 'fascism'- 
are undermined by her grandfather's invocation of his own historical experience as a liberal 
during the New Deal and McCarthy eras. A recent past that was regarded by the New Left 
generation as, at best, remote and, at'worst, irrelevant 
-incorporating Father Coughlin (that 
son of a bitch'), the Dies committee (isolationist, bigoted, know-nothing fascists) and Roy 
Cohn (A disgrace. A Jew and a disgrace') (AP, 289) 
- 
is here recalled by Lou Levov in order to 
revive those historical moments when the notion of 'homegrown' U. S. fascism was perhaps 
more sustainable. 
Unlike the Swede then, Lou Levov is only too willing to challenge Merry's views. 
This is yet another instance of the disparity between the forms of liberalism Lou and his elder 
son might be said to represent. For the Swede, Merry is not to be argued with or confronted 
but only to be "left alone, her radicalisation and increasingly unstable behaviour dismissed as 
a 'phase'; but for Lou the imperative of assunung personal responsibility for a member of his 
family is the overriding factor: 'No, I will ? iot leave her alone. This is my granddaughter. I 
refitse to leave her alone. I refuse to lose a granddaughter by leaving her alone' (AP, 291). 
This, of course, echoes Jerry's frustration and anger at the Swede's refusal to take his 
daughter out of Newark by force. Indeed the strength of Lou Levov's views, views that 
underwrite his disdain for passivity 
-in the realms of the political as well as the personal - 
come to the fore as a consequence of the Watergate scandal. The Swede is unable to 
comprehend passion of any description in such a context. 'It is as though', he reflects, 'in his 
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uncensored hatred of Nixon, Lou Levov is merely mimicking his granddaughter's vituperous 
loathing of LBJ' (AP, 299). But Lou's contempt for Nixon in Americayt Pastoral is rooted in the 
historical experience of McCarthyism. For Lou Levov, Nixon will always be the 'Tricky 
Dicky' he became in the aftermath of his initial rise to national prominence as the young 
congressman instrumental in securing the conviction for perjury of Alger Hiss. In the 
immediate years after this Nixon rode the wave of McCarthyism afl the way to the vice- 
presidency, his electoral strategy based primarily on the direction of anti-communist 
innuendo at various Democratic opponents. 26 
Nixon's victory in the 1968 presidential election was premised on an ostensibly broad 
appeal to a 'silent majority' alienated not only by New Left radicalism but, more generally, by 
the way in which values such as self-reliance, the work ethic and the cult of the American 
'self-made man' had been undermined by a New Deal order that had outlived its usefulness. 
It was, as one historian has asserted, Nixon's 'career-long populist conservatism [which] 
rhetorically associated government activism with an effete, out-of-touch, and profligate 
Democratic party' that provided "a formula for future republican triumphs' 
. 
27More than any 
other figure it was Richard Nixon who capitalised on the 'de-vitalised' centre ground 
explored in Anterican Pastoral. 
However, as Garry Wills has described in Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made 
Man, the principles to which Richard Nixon himself was committed belonged to a pre-New 
Deal consensus that united figures such as Herbert Hoover and Woodrow Wilson. These 
were the principles of 'classical liberalism' and 'market competition' first established in the 
early national period and consolidated in the decades following the Civil War. As Wills notes 
in an introduction to a new edition of his study: 
26 Most famous amongst these, perhaps, was the notorious (and successful) Senate campaign Nixon fought in 1950 against Helen 
Gahagan Douglas whom he labelled as a communist sympathiser ('the Pink Lady' who was 'pink right down to her underpants). 
Nixon also, more circumspectly, resorted to sexual and ethnic slurs during the campaign by insinuating that Douglas had slept 
with President Truman and 'unintentionally' referring to his opponent as 'Helen Hessenberg' (Douglas was married to Mervyn 
Douglas, a Jewish film director whose original name was Hessenberg). The Nixon team was also responsible for an anonymous 
phone call campaign that informed votels of Douglas's Jewish association. See Anthony Summers' The ArOogance of Power, 83- 
87. 
27 Responding to a number of revisionist accounts of the Nixon presidency that emphasise its 'liberal' features, this historian 
remarks: '[Reagan] ratcheted up the anti-govemment oratory and cemented the negative associations with liberalism. 
successfully transforming the word 'liberal' into an epithet. In the flamboyantly conservative Reagan era, Nixon appeared 
progressive'. David Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, 322. 
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These were far from what people were calling liberalism by 
the 1960s 
- 
big government, compassion for the poor, 
tolerance of dissent. [Nixon] was not a liberal in that sense. 
His liberalism was that of the Social Darwinians, and he 
was as dated as those obsolete specimens. " 
Thus Wills recognises Nixon as a synýptom (rather than spokesperson) of the 'weak' 
liberalism the Swede might be said to represent in Ainericatt Pastoral. This liberalism of 'self- 
deceptions', Wills identified at the time, has 'an air of pusillanimity about it, of flight from 
pursuing truths. It refuses to take uncomfortable realities into account, whether these be in 
the realm of social theory, of political fact or of psychological challenge. Its symbol is Nixon's 
refusal even to deal with blacks or dissident students, as if the "silent majority" were the 
whole of society. 29 The Swede too, we might add, notwithstanding his less reactionary 
politics, refuses to 'deal' with such elements in any meaningful way. As Wills claims 
elsewhere in Nixon Agonistes, it was precisely this disengagement fr6m 'uncomfortable 
realities' that ensured that a great degree of New Left ire was directed at supposedly liberal 
institutions such as the media and the academy. 
This same 'crisis of the self made-man' that helps explain Nixon's electoral triumphs 
also goes some way to accounting for the rapid coalescence of neo-conservative thought 
during roughly the same period. However, although there were deeply troubled New Deal 
liberals who 
-anticipating the neo-conservative turn in American political culture-would 
opt for Nixon over McGovern by 1972, there were many more for whom he and the 
'0- Republican Party remained and would continue to remain anathema. 30 From the evidence of 
American Pastoral and I Married A Commimist it can be said that figures such as Lou Levov and 
Murray Ringold might safely be included in this category. For such types Nixon stands for 
nothing less than the betrayal of the modem American promise 
-a tyrant, like all tyrants, 
28 Wills, Nixon Agonistes, xiv. 
29 Ibid., 598. 
10 In voting for Nixon in 1972, Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb became the first of those who were later characterised as 
neo-conservatives to embrace the Republican Party. The process of 'breaking ranks', in party political terms, would be complete 
by the 1980 electoral victory of Ronald Reagan who not only garnered the votes of the neo-conservative intellectuals but went on 
to give several of them important posts in his administrations. See Gerson, Me Neo-Consen-alAw Vision, 135,189,249-50. 
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disguised as a 'patriot' 
, 
whose crimes, like those of Aaron Burr, came close to destroying the 
repubhc. 
Watergate, in particular, in both novels, serves as a defining moment in post-war 
political life 
- 
the juncture when liberalism itself stood on the verge of collapse. "'These so- 
called patriots", Lou Levov exclaims during the hearings, "would take this country and make 
Nazi Germany out of it 
... 
These people have taken us to the edge of something terrible"' (AP, 
287). Such anti-Nixon, republican invective reaches its zenith, however, in the elderly Murray 
Ringold's remarks to Nathan Zuckerman concerning the collective amnesia surrounding 
Nixon's funeral in 1994. This is occasioned by his recollection of spotting his brother Ira's old 
McCarthyite antagonist, Katrina Bryden, on television amongst the mourners. In his 
description of Katrina Bryden as "the Republican hostess of Washington' during the 
Eisenhower years, Murray draws a parallel with the decadent years of imperial Rome: 
In the 
, 
hierarchical anxieties of the Washington dinner party, 
Katrina's capacity for rivalry, the sheer cannibal vigor of her taste 
for supremacy 
-for awarding and depriving the ruling class of 
their just desserts 
- 
found its 
... 
imperium, I think the word would 
be. That woman drew up an invitation list with the autocratic sadism 
of Caligula 
... 
[and] straddled Washington society like fear itself. 
(IMAC, 276) 
As a 
-congressman, moreover, Bryden Grant, we learn, had Richard Nixon for a 'mentor'. 
'Nixon had Alger Hiss, Grant had Iron Rinn, Murray recalls of their simultaneous rise to 
prominence. Indeed, the career of Bryden Grant stands alongside that of Richard Nixon as a 
metaphor for the cotititiuffij of those reactionary, illiberal elements as well as the corrupt 
moral ambition of American political culture between the 1950s and 1970s. Ultimately, 
'[Bryden) too was capsized by Watergate. Threw his lot in with Nixon and, in the face of all 
the evidence against his leader, defended him on the floor of the House right down to the 
morning of the resignation. That's what got him defeated in'74. But then he'd been emulating 
Nixon from the start' (IMAC, 276-77). 
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NixoWs funeral itself, Murray finds 'barely endurable'. The ceremony's shallow, 
patriotic rituals testify to a flattening of historical consciousness as 'that most rousing of all 
those drugs that make everybody forget everything, the national narcotic, "The Star Spangled 
Banner"" is joined to 'the elevating remarks of Billy Graham, a flag-draped casket, and a team 
of interracial pallbearing servicemen'. All this is designed 'to induce catalepsy in the 
multitude'. As if this is not enough for Murray, he finds that, for the eulogies, 'the realists 
take command, the connoisseurs of deal-making and deal-breaking, masters of the most 
shameless ways of undoing an opponent, those for whom moral concerns must always come 
last, uttering all the well-known, unreal, sham-ridden cant about everything but the dead 
man's real passions' (IMA C, 278). 
Surveying the audience listening to such speakers as 'New Democrat' Bill Clinton 
('under the spell of his own sincerity') and Henry Kissinger ('the court Jew 
... 
high minded, 
profound, speaking in his most puffed-up unegoistical mode'), Murray locates a rogues' 
gallery of Watergate and post-Watergate corruption and ineptitude. As well as Katrina Van 
Tassel Grant there is Gerald Ford ('charged with intelligence), Ronald Reagan ('his famous 
salute 
... 
always half meshugeh'), the 'Iran-Contra arms dealer' Adnan Khashoggi, the 'burglar' 
G. Gordon Liddy, Spiro Agnew (that 'most disgraced of vice-presidents) and Dan Quayle 
('lucid as a button') (IA4AC, 279). Murray's final analysis, as one might expect, is scathing. The 
sense of despair registered both here and elsewhere by Murray in the novel would seem to 
intimate that the p0st-war liberal tradition that took Nixon as its b&e noire is dead. Some of 
its greatest enemies are merely gathered in the thirty seventh president's home state for "the 
Final Cover-Up': 
All of them mourning platitudinously together in the California sunshine 
and the lovely breeze: the indicted and the unindicted, the convicted and 
the unconvicted, and, his towering intellect at last at rest in a star-spangled 
coffin, no longer grappling for no-holds-barred power, the man who turned 
a whole country's morale inside out, the generator of an enormous national 
disaster, the first and only president of the United States of America to have 
gained from a handpicked successor a full and unconditional pardon for all 
the breaking and entering he did while in office. (IMAC, 279) 
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The final section of American Pastoral, entitled 'Paradise Lost', takes the form of an 
extended account of a dinner party held by the Swede and his wife during the summer of the 
Watergate hearings. Amongst several topics of conversation -are the candidacy of George 
McGovern in the 1972 presidential election and the recent movie Deep Throat 
- 
the first 
pornographic film to find mainstream commercial success. Roth here maps out both the 
major party political divisions as well as the origins of the 'culture wars' that would help 
define the national conversation in the U. S. in the final quarter of the twentieth century. 
George McGovern, as a result of embracing policies that appealed to many amongst 
New Left as well as more traditional Democratic party constituencies, remains the most left- 
wing candidate to win the party presidential nomination since WWII. Indeed the particularly 
vituperative rhetoric McGovern directed at his incumbent opponent, Richard Nixon 
- 
comparing, for example, Nixon and his administration to Hitler and Nazi Germany 
respectively in the 1972 campaign 
-helped define McGovern's radicalism. If Richard Nixon, 
by this point 
-after events such as the Kent State kiffings and the bombing of Cambodia - 
had surpassed Johnson in the New Left pantheon of American 'fascism', such analogies also 
resonated with older liberals such as Lou Levov who recalled the accusations of anti- 
Semitism that attended the young Nixon's congressional and senatorial campaigns. 
Prominent too amongst liberals who came of age in the 1950s were images of Nixon as the 
respectable face of the far right or, in Irving Howe's memorable description, as 'a well oiled 
drawbridge between McCarthyite barbarism and Eisenhower respectability'. 31 
The early conversation at the dinner party begins with an effort to fink the popularity 
of Deep Throat with the broader political climate. Guests are divided over the issue of whether 
the film's audience consists of Nixon/Agnew voters 'hypocritically pretending to deep moral 
piety' or, by contrast, 'McGovernites' such as themselves, most of whom, have seen the film 
and are influenced, to varying degrees, by the values of the libertarian sexual politics of the 
counter-culture. It is at this point that Lou Levov intervenes to point out that he is one 
31 McGovern cited the bombing of Cambodia as 'the most barbaric thing 
... 
since the Nazis were in power' and, reacting to the 
Watergate break-in, described it as 'the kind of thing you expect under a person like Hider'. McGovern and Howe are both 
quoted in Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, 59,99. 
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McGovern supporter who finds the values of the film deeply objectionable. 'What these two 
things have got to do with each other, he exclaims, "is a mystery to me' (AP, 344). Later, 
elaborating on this view, Lou combines a number of prior political refrains in order to 
disavow any connection between the liberalism articulated by McGovern and the relaxation 
of broader cultural norms: 
What does McGovern have to do with that lousy movie? I voted for 
McGovern. I campaigned in the whole condominium for McGovern. 
You should hear what I put up with from Jewish people, how Nixon 
was this for Israel and that for Israel, and I reminded them, in case 
they forgot, that Harry Truman had him pegged for Tricky Dicky 
back in 1948, and now look, the reward they're reaping, my good 
friends who voted for Mr. Von Nixon and his storm troopers. Let 
me tell you who goes to those movies: riffraff, bums, and kids 
without adult supervision. Why my son takes his lovely wife 
to such a movie is something I'll go to my grave not understanding. 
(AP, 350) 
It is here, in the final chapters of American Pastoral, that Roth begins to introduce 
issues of 'cultural' politics first placed on the agenda by the New Left but cultivated and 
refined, mainly in the academy and sections of the media, by what later became designated 
the "cultural left. Important amongst these are the kind of questions pertaining to sexual 
politics, gender -roles and censorship raised by a phenomenon such as Deep Throat. For Lou 
Levov the subversion of previously stable cultural values is yet another indicator of broader 
socio-political crisis. More specifically, the 'lack of feeling for individuals that a person sees in 
that movie' as well as 'the lack of feeling for places like what is going on in Newark' are both 
reprepentative of social atomisation on a massive scale. Without feeling some connection, 
however tenuous, to family, community or country, he claims, 'you are just out there on your 
own'. The scale of historical rupture is immense for someone of Lou's background and 
values: 'I sometimes think that more has changed since 1945 than in all the years of history 
there have been' (AP, 365). 
Chief amongst Lou's antagonists at the dinner table is Marcia Umanoff, a New York 
based literature professor and the wife of an old school friend of the Swede's. She is described 
as a 'militant nonconformist of staggering self-certainty much given to sarcasm and 
153 
calculatedly apocalyptic pronouncements designed to bring discomfort to the lords of the 
earth" (AP, 339). Marcia stands, amongst other things, for the increasing relativism of the 
times rejecting, via provocative analogy, Lou Levov's contempt for the new mainstream 
culture (she collapses the distinction, for instance, between Linda Lovelace's appearance in 
Deep Throat and the young Dawn Dwyers's decision to enter the Miss America pageant). 
For Marcia, moreover, the personal is not only political but the political itself must 
never be reined in by merely "personal' considerations. Nothing, for example, least of all 
conventional notions of 'civility' and 'sensitivity, can prevent her from repeatedly 
proclaiming the virtue of the North Vietnamese. 'She never for a moment compromised her 
political convictions or her compassionate comprehension of international affairs', the Swede 
reflects, 'not even when she saw from six inches away the misery that had befallen her 
husband's oldest friend' (AP, 342). It is clear that Marcia's self-righteous posturing here 
signposts the marginalisation of the American Left by the mid 1970s- a process that would 
ultimately confine the type of left-liberal politics associated with George McGovern to 
universities and a few media outlets by the 1980s. Marcia Umanoff is, finally, characterised by 
the emptiness of her 'talk 
... 
senseless, ostentatious talk, words with the sole purpose of 
scandalously exhibiting themselves, uncompromising, quarrelsome words expressing little 
more than [her] intellectual vanity and the odd belief that all her posturing added up to an 
independent mind' (AP, 343). This, as we shall see, is a critique that will find expression in 
another historical context in TIw Human Stain. 
The notions of promiscuity and permissiveness that underpin the group's discussion 
of Deep Throat and, by extension, the 'mainstreaming' of the counter-culture by the 1970s, 
however, also go no small way towards characterising the relationships between the guests. 
- 
We, learn, for example, of the Swede's own affair with a friend's wife Sheila Salzman. Sheila 
and her husband Shelly, meanwhile, have concealed from the Swede the fact that it was they 
who sheltered his daughter in the immediate aftermath of the bomb attack. Most 
dramatically, perhaps, the Swede discovers during the dinner party that his wife has been 
having an affair with a neighbour William Orcutt, a scion of the local WASP community, in 
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order, he imagines, to 'rid [herself] of the stain of our child, the stain on her credentials 
... 
the 
stain of the destruction of the store'. This, itself, he speculates, is a desperate attempt to 
'resume the uncontaminated life' (AP, 385). 
As narrator of the three novels Nathan Zuckerman has come to represent the 
prominent yet politically problematic role of the pastoral in the United States with its 
timeless, utopian promise of 'uncontaminated life. Zuckerman the writer, enfolded away in 
pastoral isolation, is free from the obligations to 'society' yet also at moments troubled by the 
wider implications of his own retreat. The Human Stain, of course, betrays such pre- 
occupations with themes' of 'contamination' and 'purity' in its very title. Indeed Zuckerman 
foregrounds a broader context for such themes at the very beginning of his narrative with a 
forthright piece of invective directed at those who, by the summer of 1998, viewed the 
presidency of Bill Clinton as irremediably "stained'. 
0 
a 
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I The Human Stain: Liberalism and the Cultural Left 
The endless American quest for 'purity' is, of course, as we have seen in earlier chapters, an 
impulse that has been both promoted and policed within a copious liberal political tradition. 
At the close of the twentieth century the failed attempt to impeach President Bill Clinton 
prompted yet another crisis in the relationship between liberalism and the moral impulse in 
American political culture. The spectre of an earlier president threatened with impeachment, 
Richard Nixon, it might be recalled, loomed large in I Married A Comitiunist and Attiericati 
Pastoral. The extent, however, to which the action in The Himiati Staitz is more directly 
contextualised with reference to events unfolding simultaneously within national political 
institutions is especially significant. The frames of reference provided by the Clinton 
presidency in this way play an even greater, if distinctly more ambiguous role here than 
those various contexts offered by Nixon's career did in the earlier works. 
The Human Stain is also a reflection of as well as, somewhat more consciously no 
doubt, a reflection upon the Clinton years; its action takes place over the latter half of 1998, 
Clinton's anizus horribilus. It begins with a diatribe aimed at the president's opponents but 
closes, notably, with a scene, we are explicitly told, that occurs early the following year, 'on 
the first February Sunday after the Senate's decision not to remove Bill Clinton from office' 
(THS, 344). This framework is augmented with a substantial number of allusions that invite 
an examination of the various forms of political aflegiance and opposition - many of them 
novel 
-generated by America's forty-second president. 
For Norman Podhoretz, reviewing The Human Stain alongside Saul Bellows 
Ravelstein in Commentary, the function of Clinton in the novel is easily explained. The 
I peculiar choice 
... 
of the [Clinton] impeachment as a moment of historical impact to compare 
with McCarthyism and Vietnam' represents nothing less than a loss of political nerve on the 
author's part. 'Here again', Podhoretz complains, 'as in I Married A CoiwrtutuSt [Roth] gives 
full play to the side of himself that has remained stuck in and intransigently uncritical of the 
liberal attitudes with which he grew up'. The portrait of the Vietnam veteran Lester Farley, 
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for example, it is claimed, is constructed from a repertoire of liberal clich6. 'Has Roth 
forgotteW, Podhoretz continues, 'what he revealed about these very chchC-s in Aii [sic. ] 
American Pastoral? Or is he once more offering reassurance to those who worried after reading 
that book that he might be converting to neoconservatism? " It is difficult to detect any 
reservations of this specific type or indeed any negativity on political and/or aesthetic 
grounds amidst the abundance of critical praise that met Americatt Pastoral. As previously 
noted Robert Boyers identified a feature of the novel that might be viewed in terms of clichL&-- 
its tendency to represent New Left politics pre-dominantly as a species of psychopathology. 
This did not, however, prompt Boyers to entertain the notion that the author had undergone 
a "conversion' to neoconservatism. The robust articulation of liberal politics evident 
elsewhere in the work and referred to earlier in this chapter, presumably satisfied most critics 
on that score. 
t 
Podhoretz is astute, nonetheless, in drawing attention to a dimension overlooked in 
most other reviews of The Human Stain. 'Not a word, not a syllable, in the passages devoted 
I 
by Roth to the Clinton scandals', he remarks, 'so much as hints that the President (iinlike Silk) 
committed and suborned peýury, and that this was the legal basis on which the attempt was 
made to remove him from office'. 12When one considers the extent to which The Human Stain 
is a novel chief amongst *hose concerns is the pofitics of lying, the morality and 
consequences of systematic deceit, this is indeed a puzzling omission. 
As is the case, however, with I Married A Communist and American Pastoral the 
overarching theme here is betrayal both in personal and in broader political and ideological 
contexts. The Human Stain is a novel not so much concerned with Bill Clinton but the values 
of an age in which he could emerge as such a divisive figure. Like Richard 
-Nixon, Clinton 
was a president whose character seemed to generate as much rancour as his policies, 
arousing amongst his supporters a strong sense that he was being -unfairly maligned and 
persecuted whilst provoking powerful levels of animosity as well as feelings of 'betrayal' 
within the ranks of his adversaries. 
32 Podhoretz, 'Bellow at 85, Roth at 67', 40. 
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Moreover, the Nixon/Clinton analogy also extends to the realm of political strategy. 
A. s John J Coleman and others have observed, Clinton, like Nixon, can be classified as a 'pre- 
emptive' president, in so far as he sought to re-define the political centre by 'seek[ing] to 
occupy a middle ground largely defined by the priorities of his opponents'. Similarly, both 
sought to do so as a means of detaching themselves from a 'liberalism that was perceived as 
blaming society first and holding individuals accountable for their behaviour last. 33 Such 
motives might equally explain Coleman Silk's decision to 'pass' as white. Yet there are too, 
other reasons, as I will be arguing, for reading Silk through the prism of the Clinton image as 
well as the Clinton years. 
The subtle acts of 'triangulation' required to sustain the 'pre-emptive' strategy 
themselves require the acumen of the proverbial 'political animal' (Clinton and Nixon 
certainly qualify on that count). Unsurprisingly then, perhaps, the strategies of such pre- 
emptive presidents inevitably return us to the "character' issue. The success of any 'pre- 
emptive' president, as Coleman also notes, is frequently 'offset by devastating attacks on his 
character and extraordinary political and personal distrust. 34This too, it might also be said, 
has been as much in evidence in the U. S. public at large as well as within such presidents' 
own political constituencies. One only has, for example, to recollect the defining popular 
soubriquets of "Tricky Dick' and 'Slick Willie'. This link between politics and 'character' is 
indeed explicitly affirmed with regard to these two figures in I Married A Coinmunist via 
Murray Ringold's excoriating comments on Clinton's eulogy at Nixon's funeral: 'Clinton 
exalting Nixon for his "'remarkable journey" and, under the spell of his own sincerity, 
expressing hushed gratitude for all the "wise counsel"' Nixon had given him' (IMAC, 278). 
The connection between the two, however, as Roth here implies, has attributes 
relating to matters of pofitical substance as weR as those of style. Historians have already 
begun to reflect in some detail on the various facets of the relationship and the strength of the 
33 John J. Coleman, 'Clinton and the Party System in Historical Perspective' in Schier (ed. ), 7he Postmodern Presidency: Bill 
Clinton's Legacy in US. Politics, 153. 
34 [bid., 154. 
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similarities between the Clinton and Nixon presidencies-" Nixon, they note, generated 
enormous suspicion-from the right as well as the left-as a consequence of embracing 
certain ideas originating from the first wave of neo-conservative thought in the latter half of 
the 1960s. Probably the most important amongst these is evident in Nixon's commitment, 
early in his first term, to social policies that challenged both the shibboleths of New Deal 
orthodoxy and 'paleo-conservative' disdain for welfare per se. As one historian has 
commented, in his 1968 campaign, 'Nixon gave detailed speeches 
... 
quoting "'new liberals", 
who he said were rejecting bureaucracy and embracing private sector initiatives'. 36 
Most notable was the retention by Nixon of Daniel Patrick Moynihan from previous 
Democratic administrations as a domestic policy advisor. Moynihan's authorship of a 
controversial 1965 report on urban unrest makes him a revealing choice. The Moynihan 
report went against the grain of the liberal consensus and, by extension, the social order in 
place since the New Deal by associating urban blight and black poverty with a 'tangle of 
pathology' within the black urban community. Whilst being careful to explain this in terms of 
the terrible legacy of slavery as much as individual responsibility, Moynihan nonetheless 
found himself accused of racism by black radicals, the New Left and many white liberals 
who, in the charged atmosphere that followed the August 1965 race riots in Watts, Los 
Angeles, proved reluctant to defend him. The Moynihan Report subsequently went on to 
become something of a touchstone for the neo-conservative movement. By the mid-nineties, 
moreover, its influence also mirrored that of neo-conservative ideas on a much broader range 
of U. S., politicians than had been the case in the Nixon years. As Mark Gerson has observed, 
the speeches of such prominent political figures of the nineties a6Newt Gingrich, Bill Bradley 
and, most tellingly of course, Bill Clinton himself contained "more than an echo of old articles 
sitting in bound volumes of [the neo-conservative journals] Conintentanj and 7he Public 
htterest'. 37M Gerson goes on to contend, the transition in American politics in large part 
35 Presidential funeral pieties aside, the personal relationship between Clinton and Nixon was surprisingly warm given the two 
men's respective party-political affiliations. Moreover, as David Greenberg documents, unlike every succeeding president, 
Republican or Democrat, who saw any association with their disgraced predecessor as highly undesirable, Clinton went so far as 
to invite Nixon to the White House for a private meeting in 1993. See Greenberg, Nixon's Shadow, 300-301. 
36 John J. Pitney Jr., 'Clinton and the Republican Party' in Schier (ed. ), 7he Postmodern Presidency, 174. 
37 Gerson, Ae Neo-Conservative Vision, 349. 
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facilitated by the neo-cgnservative penetration of the public sphere has been remarkable. Not 
least, he adds, in the way it has altered what it means to be an 'unrepentant left-fiberal' at the 
end of the twentieth centýry: 
The tone of the ideas, rhetoric, and language used by both 
parties is drastically different to what it was only ten or fifteen 
years ago. Consider, for instance, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. His 
politics have not changed much in the last thirty years; in fact, 
his views on social policy have been remarkably consistent... 
Now the [Moynihan] report IS regarded as conventional wisdom 
by the vast majority of the political sýectrum and Moynihan is 
regarded as one of the last unrepentant left-liberal Democrats. 38 
The Human Stain negotiates many of the implications of this shift in U. S. political 
culture. Indeed central to Roth's concerns in this novel are many of the issues that neo- 
conservatism has helped to place on the political and cultural agenda: the relationships 
between rights and responsibility, sex and morality, community and individualism, identity 
and difference to name but a few. It is also, importantly, a novel dominated by a character 
who, in disavowing his black origins in order to "pass' as white, can be viewed in terms of an 
ideal crucial to any understanding of the tension between liberalism and neo-conservatism 
over the last three decades. This is the notion first posited by John Rawls 
- 
the most 
important and influential liberal political philosopher of that period 
- 
of a self perceived 
through a 'veil of ignorance. 
For Rawls, a primary condition of social justice must be the assumption of the 
subject' s 'original position' prior to ties of class, race, gender and so forth, an assumption that 
makes it possible to "nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and 
tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage'. 19 One of 
Rawls's most trenchant critics, Michael Sandel, has also designated this as an 'unencumbered 
self or a self premised on 'grounds of self-*respect [that] are antecedent to any particular ties 
38 Ibid., 349-50. 
39 Rawls, A Aeoq ofJustice, 136. 
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and attachments, and so beyond the reach of an insult to "my people". 10 Given the broad 
range of pre-occupations associated with liberal thought at a particular historical moment 
then, as with the other novels in the trilogy, Ae Human Stain can be read in the context of, to 
invoke Michael Sandel, 'America's search for a public philosophy. 
The 'hero" of The Human Stain is Coleman Silk, a Jewish neighbour of Zuckerman's 
and former classics professor at nearby Athena college. After a distinguished academic 
career, including several successful years as dean, Silk resigns from his post after a classroom 
reference to two absent black students as 'spooks' is construed as racist and made the subject 
of a formal complaint. Silk himself is unaware of the students' race (they are frequent 
absentees) Put nonetheless refuses to offer the level of contrition demanded by the college 
authorities. A protracted legal battle ensues which Silk blames, amongst other things, for the 
early death of his wife. Silk's success as dean, ironically, is built on the removal of a 
complacent WASP academic culture at the college and its replacement by more youthful and 
ambitious staff who now act as his persecutors. The sensitivity of this new generation of 
scholars to questions of 'identity politics' first raised in the 1960s and 1970s, represents both 
a generation gap and a transition in the meaning of liberal values. This irony is compounded, 
of course, when we learn fairly soon after that Silk is, in actual fact, black himself and has 
been 'passing' for white for most of his adult Iffe. 
After his resignation and the death of his wife, the now 71-year-old Coleman 
becomes involved in a Viagra-assisted sexual relationship with a 34-year-old cleaning woman 
named Faunia Farley. As a result he is tormented, in contrasting ways, by both his partner's 
mentally unstable and abusive ex-husband, Lester, a veteran of the Vietnam war, and 
Delphine Roux, a Languages and Literature professor and former colleague of Silk's at 
Athena. Lester Farley's hostility is motivated not merely by sexual jealousy but also by anti- 
Semitism, revenge (he holds Faunia responsible for the tragic death of their two young 
children in a fire) and what might best be described as a sense of betrayal and ahenation 
familiar from earlier cultural representations of the Vietnam-scarred sociopath. Lester is also 
40 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, xiv. 
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identified as the couple's probable murderer after their car is deliberately forced off the road. 
Delphine Roux's objections to Silk take a less directly menacing form but nonetheless, Roth 
appears to suggest, also have important socio-political as well as psychological origins. 
Initially Roux is responsible for an anonymous note informing Silk that 'everyone knows 
you're sexually exploiting an abused, illiterate woman half your age' (THS, 38). Whilst 
embracing a more or less feminist position Roux's contempt for Silk mirrors the contempt of 
many (neo)conservatives for Bill Clinton insofar as both are morally oriented, that is, centred 
on notions of 'propriety' and 'appropriate behaviour" (whether in the classroom or the Oval 
Office). Coleman reveals his experience to Zuckerman 
- 
including the details of his 
relationship with Faunia- "fittingly enough', the narrator claims, during the summer of 1998 
when 'Bill Clinton's secret emerged in every last mortifying detail'. It is within this broader 
cultural and political climate of 'persecution' then, that we are, by several means, invited to 
view Coleman Silk's life. 
Zuckerman's description of Clinton's travails begins with an acknowledgment of 
both the transformation and persistence of American sexual mores. His first point of 
comparison, in this way, recalls both a more reproving past and, interestingly, that sense of 
great social change evident in the confidence with which Marcia Umanoff feels able to equate 
pornography with beauty contests in American Pastoral. "We hadn't, Zuckerman claims, 'had 
a season like it since somebody stumbled upon the new Miss America nude in an old issue of 
Penthouse, pictures of her elegantly posed on her knees and on her back that forced the 
shamed young woman to relinquish her crown and go on to become a huge pop star' (THS, 
2). 
Zuckerman's bilious attack on Clinton's antagonists, moreover,. might not only aid an 
understanding of late twentieth-century questions of gender and sexual morality but also, 
more obliquely if no less consequentially, those of race too. Clinton himself was, of course, 
the first president young enough to have had his political development shaped, to any 
Significant extent, by the events and ideas of the 1%0s. He avoided (and in a letter to the 
authorities protested) the Vietnam draft; he also played the saxophone, enjoyed rock 'n roll 
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and admitted to having smoked (though, mercifully, not inhaled) marijuana. Most 
importantly, perhaps, Clinton acquired the Democratic party presidential nomination in 1992 
by appealing to the "broadminded' sexual politics of theý'baby boomer' generation. Clinton's 
victory in the primaries and subsequent presidential election- notwithstanding his 
confession of a long-term adulterous relationship 
-was a signal that the sexual revolution of 
the 1960s had helped expand the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for those wishing to 
assume even the most prominent position in American public life. 
Yet Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, Zuckerman remarks, 'revived America's 
oldest communal passion, historically perhaps its most subversive and treacherous pleasure: 
the ecstasy of sanctimony' (THS, 2). In 1992, amidst earlier allegations of infidelity, a number 
of journalists such as A. M. Rosenthal had praised the Clintons for 'present[ing] to the 
American public a gift and a lasting opportunity' by insisting on their right to privacy 
following media inquiries about their marital history. This 'giff, it was claimed, came in the 
form of 'the presumption that Americans had achieved adulthood. 41 After citing Rosenthal's 
remarks, the novelist and political commentator Joan Didion noted in an article first 
published in September 1998 at the height of the impeachment crisis, that many Americans, 
by contrast, had a continuing appetite for affirmations of American 'innocence" rather than 
such presumptions of their own 'maturity'. For critics such as William J. Bennett, author of 
The Death of Outrage: Bill, Clinton and the Assault on American Ideals (which also appeared that 
year), Didion explained, the protracted investigation of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr 
had, on this basis, assumed biblical significance. "American innocence itself', Didion 
concluded, "was now seen to hang on the revealed word of the Referral'. 42 
In The Htiman Stain the release of the type of intimate sexual detail evident in much of 
Starr's Referral represents an atavistic, puritanical belief in provoking a 'calculated frenzy' 
designed primarily to shame individuals guilty of transgres*sing communal values. Only then, 
after a sufficient release of 'outrage', can the lost, collective sense of virtue begin to be 
41A. M. Rosenthal, New York 7-Imes, January 28 1992. Quoted by Didion, Political Fictions, 218. Didion's piece was originally 
published as 'Clinton Agonistes', 7he New York Review ofBooks, 22nd September 1998. 
42 Joan Didion, Political Fictions, 236. 
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restored. The eagerness 'to enact [such] astringent rituals of purification' as those overseen by 
the Office of Independent Counsel is thus itself evidence of the American nation's refusal to 
mature and discard the myth of innocence. In this respect, Zuckerman laments, the summer 
of 1998 was 
when the moral obligation to explain to one's children about 
adult life was abrogated in favour of maintaining in them 
every illusion about adult life, when the smallness of people 
was simply crushing 
... 
when 
- 
for the billionth time 
- 
the 
jumble, the mayhem, the mess proved itself more subtle than 
this one's ideology and that one's morhhty. It was the summer 
when a presidenf s penis was on everyone's mind, and life, in 
all its shameless impurity, once again confounded America. 
(THS, 3) 
The trope of 'impurity", of course, manifests itself most obviously in the title of the 
novel but elsewhere Roth returns to pursue the idea in ways previously encountered in the 
. 
first two parts of the trilogy. In the first chapter of 77te Human Stain, for instance, Zuckerman 
notes the romanticised notions of country life propagated mainly by those ex-city dwellers 
who have recently moved in to the local community. Letters to the area weekly praising the 
'wholesomeness' of the local farm's organic milk view its consumption, Zuckerman remarks, 
'as if it were no less a religious rite than a nutritional blessing'. Similarly the overblown 
marketing material that accompanies the milk promotes its 'nourishment' of the 'soul' and 
the 'spirit. As in American Pastoral then, the idea of the pastoral as 'pure' is subjected to 
critical pressure. The passage closes by linking such sentiment to the broader infantilisation of 
American political culture that will sound a recurring note in 77te Huinan Staitz. For 
Zuckerman, the hyperbole that accompanies the local milk allows 'otherwise sensible adults, 
liberated from whatever vexation had driven them from New York or Hartford or Boston [to] 
spend a pleasant few minutes at the desk pretending that they are seven years old' (THS, 46). 
The most important spheres for Zuckermanýs ruminations on this trope in The Hinywi 
Stain, however, are those of sex and sexual morality. This extends to the narrator himself 
whose position on these and other questions undergoes drastic revision as a result of his 
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encounter with Coleman Silk. After curiously seeming to 'disappear' as the speaking voice in 
American Pastoral about a third of the way through the narrative, Nathan Zuckerman once 
again, as he did in I Ma? 7ied A Communist, assumes a position in the final installation much 
closer to centre stage. 
At the beginning of the story Zuckerman reveals details of a recent bout of cancer 
surgery that entailed the removal of his prostate. This results in impotence and episodes of 
incontinence. Living the same hermetical existence described in the final pages of I Married A 
Communist- removed from what he here describes as the 'sexual caterwaul'- Zuckerman 
finds that his circumstances have helped reduce the impact of any 'postoperative shock' that 
might normally be expected to attend such a condition. The fact is, he states, 
The operation did no more than to enforce with finality 
a decision I'd come to on my own, under the pressure of 
a lifelong experience of entanglements but in a time of full, 
vigorous and restless potency, when the venturesome 
masculine mania to repeat the act 
-repeat it and repeat it 
and repeat it 
-remained undeterred by physiological problems. (THS, 37) 
As his friendship with Coleman Silk develops, however, Zuckerman is prompted to 
radically re-assess his initial decision to withdraw from the world. The intrusion of such a 
complex, sexual and vigorously hinnan presence as Silk at this late stage of his life, he admits, 
has resulted in a certain 'loss [ofl equilibrium'. Overwhelmed, as he has become, by the 
power of Silk's 'transgressive audacity', Zuckerman can only bemoan the bloodless, asocial 
and emasculated existence he has imposed upon himself over the past few years. Hence, in 
reflecting on an earlier evening spent in part dancing sentimentally with Silk to some old 
swing records, Zuckerman claims that 'having danced around like a harmless eunuch with 
this still vital, potent participant in the frenzy struck me now as anything but charming self- 
satire'. The conclusion the narrator draws from this realisation crucially informs the vision of 
sexual morality at the novel's heart- 'How can one say, "No, this isn't part of life, " since it 
always is? The contaminant of sex, the redeeming corruption that de-idealizes the species and 
L-11. 
eeps us everlastingly mindful of the matter we are' (THS, 37). 
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This inversion of Judeo-Christian configurations of 'original sin'- corruption itself as 
a'form of redemption 
-is extended later in the novel. In a remarkable passage Zuckerman 
designates the paganism of ancient Greece as the source of a 'great reality-reflecting religion' 
commensurate with the supercharged, chaotic and complex realities embraced by Faunia and 
Coleman. This follows Faunia's invocation of the 'human stain' trope in connection with a 
'hand-raised' crow harassed and bullied by other crows, alienated from the species, unable to 
find the 'right voice' in which to communicate as a result of excessive contact with humans. 
Zuckerman goes on to substantiate Faunia's observation stating that "we leave a stain, we 
leave a trail, we leave our imprint. Impurity, cruelty, abuse, error, excrement, semen 
-there's 
no other way to be here. Thus such 'fantas [ies] of purity' as those implicit. in both the Hebrew 
God ('infinitely alone, infinitely obscure, monomaniacally the only god there is, was, and 
always will be') and the 'de-sexuahsed Christian man-god and his uncontaminated mother' 
(THS, 242) must be disavowed. Instead Zuckerman wonders if the classics professor Silk has 
ever discussed with his lover, 
Zeus, entangled in adventure, vividly expressive, capricious, 
sensual, exuberantly wedded to his own 
' 
rich existence, anything 
but alone and anything but hidden. Instead the divine stain 
... 
As 
the hubristic fantasy has it, made in the image of God, all right, 
but not ours 
- 
theirs. God debauched. God corrupted. A God of 
life if ever there was one. God in the image of man. (THS, 243) 
In another episode Zuckerman, hearing music from Silk's house, imagines the couple 
alone inside: 'There they dance, as likely as not unclothed, beyond the ordeal of the world, in 
an unearthly paradise of earthbound lust where their coupling is the drama into which they 
decant all the angry disappointment of their lives'. The vision presented here is of an inverted 
Eden in which-as is the case in Melville's Billy Budd-notions of absolute guilt and 
innocence ultimately coalesce. The 'incongruously allied' Silk and Faunia, irredeemably 
corrupted and "entrenched in disgust' with life, have nonetheless attained a purity of sorts in 
their Budd-like capacity to locate in each other 'the simplest version possible of themselves' 
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(THS, 203). It is this that leads Zuckerman to believe that Silk ultimately revealed the secret of 
his racial origins to Faunia. 
In the American context, of course, nothing has 'stained' the body politic as much as 
this idea of racial origins. The liberal tradition's affirmation of individualism, egalitarianism 
and democracy has been perpetuaRy undercut by the subordinate status of. Native 
Americans, immigrant groups and, perhaps most glaringly, African-Americans. Very few 
Americans would now doubt that the single most implacable 'stain' ort the national historical 
record is that of the constitutionally protected slavery that existed until the Civil War. This, of 
course, was foRowed by over a half a century of institutionalised segregation in the South. 
Race also continues to 'contaminate' public discourse pertaining to a seemingly infinite 
variety of matter: from affirmative action policy to the hugely disproportionate number of 
blacks executed by the state to the relative absence of black actors in mainstream Hollywood 
cmema. 
It is hardly surprising then that racial dimensions also managed to emerge in a 
controversy that dominated the media for the best part of a year. Perhaps because none of the 
main protagonists was black the incredible degree of support the president maintained 
among the black community was only casually remarked upon. When one now considers, 
however, the vehemence with which such support was expressed by a number of black 
writers and intellectuals, it does seem somewhat extraordinary given the fact that this 
particular drama was performed by an all-white cast. Toni Morrison, for example, described 
Clinton as 'our first black President' but then added the telling, hard-headed qualifier, 
'Blacker than any actual black person who could ever be elected in our children's lifetime'. 
Morrison then goes on to note, with dark irony: 'After all, Clinton displays almost every trope 
of blackness: single-parent household, born poor, working-class, saxophone-playing, 
McDonald's-and-junk-food-loving boy from Arkansas'. After noting the fact that 'African- 
American men seemed to understand it right away', Morrison then reflects: 
And when virtuafly all the African-American appointees began, 
one by one, to disappear, when the President' s body, his privacy, 
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his unpoficed sexuafity became the focus of the persecution, when 
he was metaphoricafly seized and body-searched, who could 
gainsay these black men who knew whereof they spoke? 43 
Morrison was far from alone in her appraisal that Clinton's 'blackness' in this 
figurative sense formed a subtext of what she describes as Starr's 'sustained, bloody, arrogant 
coup d'6tat' 
. 
44 The rhetoric of black commentators such as Ida E. Lewis ratcheted up the 
symbolism to an even greater degree. In the process, however, pieces such as Lewis's 'Bill 
Clinton as Honorary Black I frequently deployed the racial essentialism without any of the 
covering irony that underwrote at least parts of Morrison's analysis: 'Black people know that 
men-'s (and women's) lying about sex is ancient practice. They know that the Starr 
investigation is much less about sex than it is about overturning an election 
... 
The right wing 
powers-that-be are working overtime to write the final chapter of The Niggerization of Bill 
Clinton'. In remarks no doubt designed to play upon the notorious self-description of 
Supreme Court judge Clarence Thomas as the victim of an 'high-tech lynching' during his 
1991 nomination hearings, Lewis re-appropriates both elements of Thomas's provocative 
metaphor for Clinton's 'constituencies': 
The right wing has not rested in its shameless resolve to drag Clinton, 
his wife, and, unforgivably, their daughter, through the electronic 
gutters of America. In the process they are decapitating the office he 
holds, and the constituencies his will embodies, as surely as the good 
ole boys down in Jasper, Texas, last June reduced decency, humanity 
and compassion to bloody clumps of torn flesh littering a county road. 45 
Clinton can here be viewed not only as symbolically black as these writers contend, 
but also as someone whose predicament- privacy destroyed, sexuality policed, 
0 metaphorically seized and body-searched', wife and children exposed to public scandal -is 
analogous to that undergone by Coleman Silk in The Human Stain. Still, what writers such as 
Morrison and Lewis elide in their focus on Clinton's "blackness' is what has been identified 
by others such as Steven E. Schier and Christopher Hitchens as the variable nature of Clinton's 
4 
-1 Toni Morrison, 7he New Yorker, 5th October 1998,32. 
44 [bid. 
45 Ida E. Lewis, 'Bill Clinton as Honorary Black', 5. 
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identity in all aspects, 'race' most certainly included. For Schier, this allowed Clinton to 
appeal to what he characterises as an increasingly "post-partisan' public, 'evenly divided on 
major issues' and no longer motivated by traditional effinic party political loyalties 
. 
46 
Hitchens takes up the more sinister dimension to this 'variability' by focussing on Clinton's 
cynical deployment of "triangulation' on racial matters. 
Morrison fails to mention, for example, when she invokes the gradual disappearance 
1. 
of African-American appointees, that some of the more prominent of these were at Clinton's 
own instigation. As Hitchens observes, the minor controversies that attended Lani Guinier's 
appointment as head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of justice and Jocelyn 
Elders's as surgeon-general might have been ridden out had Clinton shown the merest hint of 
political courage. Guinier made the mistake of discussing the advantages of proportional 
representation in the South only to be labelled a "quota queen' by neo-conservative critics; 
Elders committed the even more heinous crime of proposing an open discussion on 
masturbation (as well as protected intercourse and abstinence) at a forum on the topic of sex 
and American teenagers. Clinton didn't hesitate to abandon both women at the first whiff of 
anti-liberal 'controversy'. No black person's "disappearance' as a result of a Clinton decision, 
however, was more final than that of Ricky Ray Rector 
-the retarded Arkansas death row 
inmate whose execution Clinton, then still governor of the state, authorised at the height of 
the 1992 Democratic primaries. Clinton, clearly, was not going to have his nomination 
chances scuppered by this potential 'Willie Horton'. 47 
Yet, Hitchens goes on to note, Clinton was always keen to advertise his credentials on 
the race issue 
-so long as he didn't alienate conservative white voters in the process. Thus, 
relatively innocuous moves such as the promotion of black figures to non-senior 
administration posts, the offering of apologies for past wrongs such as slavery and the 
Tuskegee syphilis experiment as well as regular visits to black chur 
. 
ches could be undertaken 
with little political faHout. Similarly, during his darkest hour in 1998 Clinton re-discovered 
46 Steven E. Schier, 'American Politics After Clinton' in Schier (ed. ), The Postmodem PresidencY, 259. 
47 Horton was the black prisoner released by Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis in the 1980s who went on to commit 
further crimes including rape. The Republican Party's advertising which drew attention to Horton during Dukakis*s 1988 
presidential election campaign is widely viewed as a significant contributory factor in his failure at the polls. 
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the benefits of being photographed with the Reverend Jesse Jackson and launched his famous 
'atonement' prayer at a fund-raiser held in a black church. A classic instance of Clinton 
triangulation" on a race issue was his promise to 'mend not end' affirmative action thereby 
indicating that such a policy had been unacceptable in the form it has largely taken since the 
Johnson civil rights legislation (to appeal to neo-conservatives and the Tight) but cannot be 
dispensed with completely'(to maintain the support of the left). By such 'last minute 
improvisations' on these issues, Hitchens concludes, Clinton 
had, without calling any undue attention to the fact, become 
the first president to play the race card both ways 
... 
His 
opportunist defenders, having helped him with a chameleon- 
like change in the color of his skin, still found themselves 
stuck with the content of his character. 48 
It is for such reasons that Clinton was able to generate hostility from both the "left' 
(Hitchens was only fleetingly isolated amongst left-liberals in his refusal to view Clinton as 
the 'lesser evil' during the impeachment crisis) and the right (Podhoretz was a relatively 
restrained conservative critic of Clinton) as well as picking up votes from those across the 
political spectrum who took a more sanguine view of his actions. The left took issue with 
what they regarded as Clinton's 'anti-egahtarianism- particularly in his approach to 
economic matters such as welfare-whilst the right was more angered by Clinton as a 
I 
cultural figure. 'At all times', Hitchens writes, Clinton's retreat from egalitarian or even 
di 49 progressive" positions has been hedged by a bodyguard of political correctness'. Whilst 
Podhoretz could share Hitchens's disdain for Clinton as a creature shaped by 'political 
correctness' by 1999, he could also write in praise of Clinton's domestic economic and foreign 
policy on the basis that it concurred with the neo-conservative agenda. Despite being 'a 
scoundrel and a perjurer and a disgrace to the office he has held', Clinton has, nonetheless, in 
ideological terms, Podhoretz claims, successfully 'de-McGovemized' the Democratic Party, 
pulling it 'in a healthier direction than it had been heading in since its unconditional 
48 Hitchens, No One Lefi io Lie To, 48. 
49 [bid., 28. 
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surrender to the Left thirty years ago. w Give us the policy without the personality, Podhoretz 
seemed to be saying; roll back the cultural effects of the 1%0s: the sexual and moral 
turpitude, the political correctness, the ethical and cultural relativism. 
It is these issues of character and culture exemplified in many ways by the Clinton 
presidency that recur in The Human Stain. As has been charted in differing contexts by critics 
such as Russell Jacoby, Richard Posner and Todd Gitlin, the impact of 1960s cultural politics 
has waned in many'areas of American public life since the 1980s but has, to a great extent, 
colonised the American academy which now constitutes the main sphere of influence for the 
cultural left. 51 The acceptance of certain ideas of sexual freedom (particularly with regard to 
homosexuality) and the importance of "micro-political' change in the realms of language and 
social attitudes (so-called 'political correctness') that originated with the new social 
movements of the 1960s are now features of most campuses in the United States. Jacoby, 
Posner and Gitlin associate this development with a diminution of the standing of an earlier 
American left-liberal intellectual culture which spread beyond the university. Moreover, this 
confinement of many left-liberal intellectuals has led to a pernicious narrowing of public 
debate as their interests in 'micro-politics' and esoteric 'theory' serve only to alienate them 
from a broader public. 
Roth,, however, constructs Coleman Silk as a victim not only of a cultural left in the 
1990s that views him as an establishment figure who abuses his position in order to exploit 
women and denigrate blacks, but also as a victim of an earlier pre-civil rights environment 
that closed off most avenues of opportunity on the basis of his skin colour. Like Clinton, one 
could argue, Coleman Silk has, to paraphrase Hitchens, 'played the race card both ways'. He 
draws a good deal of moral and intellectual strength from the stock bestowed upon him by a 
proud black family in order to break his attachments to that family as a condition of 'passing' 
as white. It is important to add, however 
-given the pressure placed on him as both a young 
50 Podhoretz, 'Life of His Party: Hový Bill Clinton Saved His Party', 3. 
51 See Jacoby, 77te Last Intellectuals (1987) and 7he End of Utopia (1999); Gitlin, 7he Twilight of Common Dreams (1995) and 
Posner, Public Intellectuals (2002). 
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'black' and an old 'white' man to comply with social and cultural expectation 
- 
that Silk can 
also be said to have had the race card played against him both ways. 
Notwithstanding this, as some of the most powerful passages in 77te Himiati Staiii 
attest, the scale of SiWs 'betrayal' cannot be underplayed. Roth draws out the full weight of 
Silk's predicament not only in the vivid portrayal of the elderly Silk but also in the intimate 
and astutely drawn picture of the Silk family's lives and history. As was the case with the 
earlier works in the trilogy, we see that one of the central formative relationships of the 
protagonist is between himself and his father. Silk's father was the owner of an optician's 
store that went bust during the Depression. A graduate then forced to work as a railcar 
steward, Coleman's father is a cultural conservative whose erudite lucidity, like Murray 
Ringold's, is wielded like a weapon. He is described, in this respect, as 'The father who never 
lost his temper. The father who had another way of beating you down. With words. With 
speech. With what he called "the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Dickens"'. Skill with 
language, once acquired, is seen by the senior Silk as a means of transcending many of the. 
contingencies upon which 'identity' depends in so far as, unlike a business or a job, 'no one 
could ever take [language] away from you' (THS, 92). 
The theme of 'betrayal' is alluded to in this early depiction of Silk's family 
background., Each of the Silk children, we learn, have middle names taken from 
Shakespeare's Julius Caesar which is described as 'Mr Silk's best-memorized play, in his view 
English literature's high point and the most educational study of treason ever written' (THS, 
92). Walter Antony, Silk's elder brother, is named,. of course, after Caesar's successor who 
distanced himself from the assassination plot; Ernestine Calpurnia, Silk's younger sister, is 
named after Caesar's loyal wife; and Coleman Brutus is named after Caesar's former ally, the 
most treacherous of his assassins but also, interestingly, the most suspicious of his power and 
the most republican in his politics. Brutus too, it was rumoured, was Caesar's son from an 
affair in his early life. 
The epiphanic moment which first triggers Silk's betrayal comes with his arrival as a 
0 
-black Howard University in Washington D. C. (an option heavily pressed on student at the all 
17-1 
him by his family) and his father's death shortly after. The motivating impulse is, however, 
not initially at least, one of rebellion against his father's influence, but rather one of sympathy 
as to the lengths his father went to in order to shield him from realities he is, as yet, 
unfamiliar with. Racially abused and refused a hot dog at Woolworth's in the nation's capital, 
Silk ruminates upon this previously unconsidered aspect of his father's experience as a black 
American in the early twentieth century: 
Never before, for all his precocious cleverness, had Coleman 
realized how protected his life had been, nor had he gauged 
his father's fortitude or realized the powerful force that man 
was 
- 
powerful not merely by virtue of being his father. At last 
he saw all that his father had been condemned to accept. He saw 
all his father"s defencelessness, too, where before he had been a 
na*fve enough youngster to imagine, from the lordly, austere, some- 
times insufferable way Mr. Silk conducted himself, that there was 
was nothing vulnerable there. But because someone had called him 
a nigger to his face, he finally realized the enormous barrier against 
the great American menace his father had been for him. 
(THS, 105-106) 
It is, symbolically, at his father's funeral that Coleman begins to formulate the 
philosophy 
- 
that is, I will be arguing, the inherently American, liberal philosophy 
- 
that will 
underpin his decision to renounce his racial origins. This is the subject as construed in 
classical liberalism-what is described in the novel as the 'raw I'-against which, for John 
Locke, as we saw in chapter one, the American context, can be viewed as a primary site. 
"Overnight', Silk reflects on his brief spell at Howard, 'the raw I was part of a we with all the 
we's overbearing solidity, and he didn't want anything to do with it or with the next 
oppressive we that came along either' (THS, 108). Yet, in its resistance to such co-option, this 
predilection equally cuts against the assimilationist grain within American culture. Coleman 
Silk's quandary can here be viewed as a dramatic project of self-fashioning that works 
through the tensions between liberalism and republican, individualist and communitarian 
imperatives also examined in earlier chapters. In a key passage, the first intimation of how 
Coleman will ultimately seek to resolve these issues is made apparent. Should he settle for 
always being a 'nigger' to the " they' of Woolworth's and a 'negro' to the 'we' of Howard? 
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No. No. He saw the fate awaiting him, and he wasn't having it. 
Grasped it intuitively and recoiled spontaneously. You can't let 
the big they impose its bigotry on you anymore than you can let 
the little they become a we and impose its ethics on you. Not the 
tyranny of its we and its we-talk and everything that the we wants 
to pile on your head. Never for him the tyranny of the we that is 
dying to suck you in, the coercive, inclusive, historical, inescapable 
moral we with its insidious E plufibus ununi. Neither the they of the 
Woolworth's nor the we of Howard. Instead the raw I with all its 
agility. Self-discovery 
-that was the punch to the labonz. Singularity. 
The passionate struggle for singularity. The singular animal. The 
sliding relationship with everything. Not static but sliding. Self- 
knowledge but concealed. What is as powerful as that? 
(THS, 108) 
The powerful Emersonian flavour of this passage recalls the nascent modernist 
consciousness of Owen Brown in Cloudsplitter, sandwiched between past and future, rejecting 
both the 'they' of the Southern 'slaveocracy' and the 'we' of non-militant abolitionism. The 
self envisioned here is, largely, that of a self 'unencumbered' by those values connected with 
tradition and society that in some way constrain this Emersonian project of self-discovery and 
'self-reliance'. For Silk, living in mid-century America, the greatest of these encumbrances 
happened to be his skin-colour. Despite having passed as a 'white' boxer in his teenage years 
(Silk and his coach operating a Clintonesque "don't ask, don't tell' compromise policy), it is 
only on joining the navy soon after his father's death that he finally decides to deliberately 
conceal his racial identity. Silk disavows the idea that such a move represents an abrogation 
or betrayal of any kind. After dating a girl in New York City, Steena Palsson, herself a 
Dakotan of Scandinavian forebears, who believes Silk to be white, he decides to introduce her 
to his family without forewarning her of his racial origins: 
He would get her to see that far from there being anything wrong 
with his decision to identify himself as white, it was the most 
natural thing for someone with his outlook and temperament 
and skin color to have done. All he'd ever wanted, from his early 
childhood on, was to be free: not black, not even white 
-just on 
his own and free. He meant to insult no one by his choice, nor was 
he trying to imitate anyone who he took to be his superior, nor 
was he staging some sort of protest against his race or hers. 
(THS, 120) 
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The dinner with the Silks goes well but Steena then breaks down in tears on the way home 
claiming that she is unable to continue with the relationship. When Silk meets the woman 
who will become his future wife some years later, Iris Gittelman, he claims that he, like her, is 
Jewish. In his review of The Human Stain, Norman Podhoretz claims to be mystified by what 
he regards as the author's failure to elaborate on the provenance of this particular decision of 
Silk's. After having introduced, in this way, a Jewish dimension to the novel, he would 'have 
expected [Roth] to do more than he does with the changes in American society which have 
persuaded Silk that pretending to be Jewish has in some quarters become a greater advantage 
than passing as a WASP". 52 Podhoretzs view indeed appears to be substantiated by an 
interview Roth himself gave to Charles McGrath, editor of the Nezv York Tinies Book Reviezv, 
shortly after the novel's publication, in which he states that Coleman's choice is 'strictly 
utilitarian' and has 'nothing to do with the ethical, spiritual, theological, or historical aspects 
of Judaism". 
Yet this is in response to McGrath's view that The Huynatz Staiii is 'a book 
... 
about 
issues of race and Judaism and where the two intersect' (emphasis added) and Roth here 
appears to be responding to questions that might have some bearing on Judaism or the 
Jewish faith rather than Jewish or Jewish-American culture in a wider sense. " The idea that 
the choice is 'strictly utifitariae, as the author also claims, is also at least partially at odds 
with certain passages of the book. Early on, for instance, a strong note is struck regarding the 
way in which Jews were viewed by the Silks as blazing something of an assimflationist trail in 
mid-century America. 'For Coleman's father, we learn, ' the Jews 
... 
were like Indian scouts, 
shrewd people showing the outsider his way in, showing the social possibility, showing an 
intelligent colored family how it might be done' (THS, 97). Podhoretzs assessment -that the 
novel 'ignores the Jewish issue almost entirely'-is, furthermore, belied by the careful 
sketches of Iris's family. It is even more surprising in the light of Coleman's own summary of 
52 Podhoretz, 'Bellow at 85, Roth at 67', 37. 
S3 McGrath, 'Zuckennan's Alter Brain': An Interview with Philip Roth. 
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the historical, intellectual and cultural context that informed his decision to 'pass' as a Jew. 
Those years in New York City, he believes, represented 
a moment when Jewish self-infatuation was at a postwar pinnacle 
among the Washington Square intellectual avant-garde, when the 
aggrandizing appetite riving their Jewish mental audacity was be- 
ginning to look uncontrollable and an aura of significance emanated 
as much from their jokes and their family anecdotes, from their laugh- 
ter and their clowning and their wisecracks and their arguments 
- 
even from their insults 
-as from Commentanj, Midstream, and the 
Partisan Review, who was he not to go along for the ride... 
(THS, 131) 
Notwithstanding the author's own disavowals of the novel's connections with 
Judaism, then, Podhoretz's failure to acknowledge such passages as pertinent to Coleman's 
story appears a little remiss. It is particularly puzzling given that this 'self-infatuated' milieu"s 
representative figures are seen by many to include Podhoretz himself who began his career 
and subsequently became editor at Commentary in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, Podhoretz, 
and, more tangentially, Philip Roth himself were part of a Jewish-American intellectual 
generation that followed from prominent immediate post-war figures such as Lionel Trilling 
and Irving Howe, coming of age, so to speak, in the 1960s when the issue of race was, it 
seemed, never more than a few months away from being the subject of a Commeiztanj 
'roundtable' discussion. As historians such as Seth Forman have shown, the relationship, 
both intellectual and political, between blacks and Jews was one of the most controversial and 
explosive subjects on the cultural agenda of these years. 
Such relationships were, inevitably, shaped by the imperatives of the dominant 
political tradition, a tradition that the type of upwardly mobile Jews celebrated in A? nerican 
Pastoral (and unlike an increasingly vocal number of blacks as the 1960s took their course) 
maintained a considerable degree of faith in. This belief in the capacity of American political 
culture to neutralize cultural and eflu-tic differences previously viewed as a barrier to 
achievement, Forman argues, is rooted in a particular Jewish-American historical experience. 
'Knowing that the United States bore no responsibility for Jewish history and so offered the 
Jews no special quarter, he writes, 'Jews set about adjusting their Jewishness to American 
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life, and the connecting link for Americanization was hberalism'. 54The specifics of the Jewish 
past such as a long history of persecution, furthermore, 'bound Jews to the American ideals of 
equality and freedom much more intensely than even the "real Americans" and thus made it 
possible for Jews to carve out a place for themselves in American life by helping Blacks'. 
This Jewish sense of solidarity with oppressed African-Americans finds several 
outlets in the trilogy's other works, particularly American Pastoral. The continuing loyalty of 
both the Swede and Lou Levov to the black employees at their glove factory, for example, is a 
common refrain in that novel's commentary on race relations in post-war Newark. Likewise, 
Murray's refusal to abandon inner-city black school children forms the basis of the tragic 
coda to the events described in I Married A Communist. Forman goes on to speculate that such 
commitment underwrites the Jewish-American understanding of modern liberalism and 
represents a further stage for Jews on the path to assimilation. Looking back on this period he 
believes that: 'Liberalism and involvement in Black affairs was, in large measure, an 
accommodation of Judaism and the Jewish past to American life'. Roth's decision to have 
Coleman Silk 'pass' as an American Jew then, at least at some level, would appear to -be a 
further recognition of this cultural dynamic. 
Looking more closely at the ideas of ethnicity and 'Americanization' emerging from 
the Jewish New York intellectual circles that the novel invokes, we find that many anticipate 
that sense of a 'raw Y identity that Coleman Silk seeks to fashion for himself in 7he Humatt 
0. 
Staitz. Writing in Commentanj in 1950, for instance, Harold Rosenberg speculates that "being an 
American means being free precisely in that the American possesses that room, and can keep 
multiplying and transforming himself without regarding 
... 
his nationality. '55This, Rosenberg 
also claims, is related to modernity more generally and, In particular, what he defines as 'the 
modem condition of freedom to make ourselves according to an image we choose'. 160ver 
twenty years later, Robert Alter, responding in a cultural climate more hostile to this idea as a 
" Forman, Blacks in the Jewish Mind: A Crisis of Liberalism, 17. 
55 Rosenberg, 'Jewish Identity in a Free Society', 5 10. 
56 [bid., 509. 
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result, no doubt, of the entrenchment of new forms of 'identity' politics, asserted that'people 
pre-occupied with their own identity are not whoHy free'. 57 
It is fair to say that the 'culture wars' that have dominated American intellectual 
debate since the 1980s are premised, in large part, on a rejection of the type of assimilation 
projects embraced in both theory and practice by successive post-war generations of Jewish- 
Americans. Instead, the identity politics of the 1960s has fashioned a new discourse of 
multiculturalism that promotes the retention of ethnic and racial identities. This finds 
widespread institutional expression in everything from affirmative action employment policy 
to re-appraisals of the process of literary canonisation in the American academy. Although 
such changes have been the subject of continual critique from neo-conservative and more 
entrenched liberal quarterS58, by the mid-1990s the post-civil rights era sensitivity to issues of 
race and gender also began to be re-appraised by some younger left-liberal critics who came 
of a ge during this time. 
This critique of 'multiculturalism' and identity politics amongst a new generation of 
scholars has led to some tentative proposals along the lines of what David A. Hollinger has 
described as a 'post-ethnic' understanding of American identity. Indeed, one of the strategies 
deployed by Hollinger in his irnportant study Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism, 
which first appeared in 1995, involves pointing to the degree to which various scientific and 
cultural histories have effectively established the category of 'race" itself as an 'invention' or 
'fiction'. This fact, however, as the author freely admits, has no bearing on the reality of 
I racism' in America. 'Racism is real', he writes, 'races are not59- a distinction that somewhat 
serves to separate Hollinger from 'color-blind' neo-conservatives who, with an often similar 
level of conviction, view racism itself as something of a "fiction'. 60 The 'de-raciahsation' of 
Jews in America during the twentieth century is instructive in this context. As Hollinger 
S7 Alter, 'A Fever of Ethnicity', 70. 
58 See Bloom, Me Closing ofthe American Mind for an example of the former and Schlesinger Jr., Me Disuniting ofAmerica 
for the latter. 
59 Hollinger, Postethnic America, 39. 
60 This would explain, for example, Hollinger's support for affirmative action programmes-a frequent target of neo- 
conservative criticism-which he takes the opportunity to re-assert in a postscipt to the 2000 re-edition of Postethnic America. 
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notes, it stands in contrast to the process of 'racialisation' that might be said to have occurred 
with regard to other ethnic groups such as Latinos: 
Jews were once widely thought of as a race, but are no longer. 
This transformation did not result primarily from scientific 
advances in biology and physical anthropology. Rather, the 
prejudice against Jewish Americans within American historical 
experience is judged to be less severe and damaging than the 
prejudice against Latinos, who, because of that greater perceived 
victimization, are now said to constitute a race. 61 
Here, too, we might find clues as to the appeal of Jewish American identity as a basis for 
Coleman Silk"s re-invention of himself. In the post-war context of mass Jewish assimilation, 
Coleman's decision to assume the 'ersatz prestige of an aggressively thinking, self 
- 
analytic, 
irreverent American Jew reveling in the ironies of the marginal Manhattan existence' is both a 
renunciation of race and a recognition of the fallibility of any notionally 'pure' ethnic identity. 
By coming to see himself as a Jew, Coleman finally attains a form of 'singularity 
... 
his inmost 
ego-driven ambition all along'. It is precisely the gap that emerged between Jewish and 
African-American experience, between altered ideas concerning race and ethnicity in post- 
war America, that explains the particular form Coleman's 'passing' takes: 'As a heretofore 
unknown amalgam of the most unalike of America's historic undesirables, he now made 
sense' (THS, 132). 
One contemporary black critic who picks up on the idea of the renunciation of race as 
an indispensable feature to any twenty-first century notion of progressive politics is Paul 
Gilroy. In Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race (2000) Gilroy laments the 
damage done to black political thought by a pre-occupation with 'race' and 'racial identity'. 
This is achieved, at one point, by retrieving an episode from recent history wherein blacks 
played a significant role in the fight against'race thinking' in its most extreme historical form. 
Recalling the testimonies of black allied soldiers involved in the liberation of Nazi death 
camps at the end of World War 111, Gilroy concludes that such 'encounters are powerful 
61 Hollinger, Postethnic America, 38. 
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reminders of the arbitrariness of racial divisions, the absurdity and pettiness of racial 
typologies, and the mortal dangers that have always attended their institutionalisation'. 62 
I Behveen Camps-which was, interestingly, re-titled Against Race: Imagining Political Culture 
Beyond the Color Line for American publication 
-closes with a call for a new, 'planetary 
humanism' and 'strategic universalism' that 're-connect[s] 
... 
with democratic and 
cosmopolitan traditions that have been all but expunged from today's black political 
imaginary'. " 
Race 'passing', as one recent literary critic has identified, is itself a part of such 
democratic and cosmopolitan traditions, albeit a controversial and, until fairly recently, 
relatively hidden one. Whilst many scholars of 'passing' have tended to focus on its more 
problematic aspects--regarding it at best as a misguided form of 'resistance' to racial 
categories; at worst, a form of race betrayal- Kathleen Pfeiffer"s Race Passing and Anierican 
Individtialis? n (2003) has re-situated the phenomenon in a broader cultural context. In this 
schema 'passing' is understood with reference to the emphasis placed on individualism 
within the pantheon of American democratic values. Passing narratives, for Pfeiffer, in this 
way, primarily represent a 'celebration of achievement and independence, the sense of 
unlimited possibility that characterizes the ""rags to riches" mythology 
-the consent-based 
structure of value'. " This latter notion is drawn from the work of Werner Sollors, who in his 
work Beyond EthniFity (1986) distingdishes between a 'language of consent' (which stresses 
'our abilities as mature free agents and "architects of our fate" to choose our spouses, our 
destinies and our political systems') and a 'language of descent' (which stresses 'our position 
as heirs, our hereditary qualities, liabilities and entitlements'). 65 'America', SoHors adds, 
is a country which, from the times of Cotton Mather to the present, 
has placed great emphasis on consent at the expense of descent 
definitions. The widely shared public bias against hereditary 
privilege 
... 
has strongly favored achieved rather than ascribed 
identity, and supported 'self-determination' and 'independence' 
62 Gilroy, Between Camps, 305. 
63 [bid., 356. 
64 Pfeiffer, Race Passing and American Individualism, 5. 
65 Sollors, Beyond Ethnicitv, 6. 
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from ancestral, parental and external definitions. 66 
Race Passing and American Individualism highlights this powerful tradition of US 
political thought-perhaps best exemphfied by Abraham Lincoln-that understands 
American democracy as contingent, a work-in-progress, an unconsummated idea or, in 
Lincoln's own words from the Gettysburg Address, a 'proposition' (to be realised). This is 
fused, moreover, with what might be described as an Emersonian political ontology that 
foregrounds the 'power of the individual, as opposed to the group, to effect change'. 'Passing' 
is, in such Emersonian terms, principally a metaphor for all subjectivity and Pfeiffer's study, 
accordingly, concludes with a stray but, in this context, telling remark from 'Self Reliance': 
'We pass for what we are'. 67 
The final chapter of Race Passing and American Individualism deploys a few elements 
from The Hunian Stain in support of its thesis (noting, for instance, Silk's funeral eulogy in 
which he is described as 'an American individualist par excellence' (THS, 311) by a former 
black colleague in the faculty); but the conception of subjectivity Pfeiffer works with in her 
study is also given profound expression in Roth's novel. This is evident not only in the 
'sliding' notion of self that underwrites Silk's own subjectivity but also in the resigned voice 
of the narrator, Nathan Zuckerman. In each novel in Roth's trilogy, characters driven by such 
ideals have met tragic ends as a result of what we might call a crisis of expectation. 
Chastened, perhaps, by his encounters with 'Swede Levov', the Ringold brothers and now 
Coleman Silk, Zuckerman reflects at Silk's funeral that 'the expectation of completion, let 
alone of a'just and perfect consummation, is a foolish illusion for an adult to hold' (THS, 315). 
It is this idea of a 'stable' and 'complete' self, of course, which has underwritten the identity 
politics of the cultural Left since the 1960s and given rise to popular notions of racial 'pride', 
"kinship' and 'loyalty' amongst minority groups. Thus what Werner Sollors categorised as 
'the language of descent' has been privileged over the 'language of consent', 'achieved' 
identity has given way to 'ascribed' identity and a 'dissensus' has replaced a 'consensus'. 
66 [bid., 37. 
67 Pfeiffer, Race Passing and American Individualism, 15 1. 
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Black legal scholar Randall Kennedy, however, is another commentator who has 
taken issue with the idea that 'descenf matters more than "consenf or, tciýnvoke his own 
phraseology, 'loyalties of blood' outweigh 'loyalties of will'. In his 1997 essay 'My Race 
Problem 
-And Ours" (a provocative allusion, of course, to Podhoretz's controversial piece), 
Kennedy eschews the notion of 'racial pride' in favour of what he believes 'should properly 
be the object of pride for an individual: something that he or she has accomphshed. 68As well 
as citing such prominent black figures from American history as Frederick Douglass in 
support of this distinction, he also asks why, given the contribution of numerous zt)Wte 
abolitionists and civil rights advocates in the struggle towards racial equality, gratitude felt 
for achievements in this sphere should be 'racially bounded'? In this context, Kennedy 
invokes a number of figures such as Elijah Lovejoy, Viola Liuzzo and James Reeb- but one 
might also add John Brown to this roll-call. 
'My Race Problem 
-And Ours' also carries an implicit debt to the notion of liberalism 
most ably articulated in the late twentieth century by John Rawls. Kennedy's rejection of the 
idea of racial kinship is motivated by a desire to 'avoid its burdens and 
... 
be free to claim 
what the distinguished theorist Michael Sandel labels "the unencumbered self". ' Sandel, of 
course, believes that such a conception of self 'fails to capture those loyalties and 
responsibilities whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable 
from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are 
-as members of this family, or 
city or people or nation, as bearers of that history, as citizens of this repubfic'. 69 In other 
words, Rawls fails to recognize that any "self' is always a situated self; subjectivity is always 
inter-subjectivihj. 
Kennedy, however, questions the inherent political conservatism that underpins 
Sandel's communitarian critique of Rawls. The 'deference to tradition' pre-supposed by an 
unquestioning adherence to such pre-existing 'loyalties' and 'responsibilities', Kennedy 
claýs, frequently serve to stifle social change and inhibit progressive political projects. 
Furthermore, not only do such 'feelings of primordial attachment' posit an unduly static 
68 Kennedy, 'My Race Problem-And Outs'. 55. 
69 Sandel, Democraiýv 's Discontent, 14. 
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(rather than, to use Zuckerman term, 'slidine) model of subjectivity, but they 'often represent 
mere prejudice or superstition, a hangover from childhood socialization from which many 
people never recove. r'. 70 This too is how Coleman Silk frames himself philosophically in The 
Human Stain: in the voluntarist discourse of the Rawlsian liberal centre ground: 
[Silk] was not a firebrand or an agitator in any way. Nor was he 
a madman. Nor was he a radical or revolutionary, not even intellectually 
or philosophically speaking, unless it is revolutionary to believe that 
disregarding prescriptive society's most restrictive demarcations and 
asserting independently a free personal choice which is well within the 
law was something other than a basic human right. 
(THS, 155) 
Kennedy, also stresses the importance of the 'unencumbered self to critical thinking and 
includes himself amongst those 'animated by a liberal, individualistic and universalistic ethos 
that is skeptical of, if not hostile to, the particularisms 
-national, ethnic, religious and racial - 
that seem to have grown so strong recently, even in arenas, such as major cosmopolitan 
universities, where one might have expected their demise. 1171 
Such liberal voluntarism, the preference for 'achieved' over 'ascribed" understandings 
of identity can be viewed as a reaction not only to conservative and/or communitarian efforts 
to disavow the Rawlsian idea of an 'original' or "unencumbered' self, but also to the "identity' 
politics of the 'cultu'ral' left. Since the 1960s, the American left has ceased to designate 
economics as the primary sphere within which to address injustice and, instead, has turned to 
the cultural realm. Thus the 'identity' of both individuals and social groups, no longer came 
to be seen as malleable-, a product, primarily, of unequal economic relations that has in the 
past and can continue to be re-shaped by egalitarian political movements. Identity became, 
rather, a more or less fixed category requiring varying degrees of contrition or celebration 
depending upon the levels of historical humiliation it had either experienced or might be held 
accountable for. 
70 Kennedy, 'My Race Problem and Ours', 57. 
71 [bid., 58. 
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The American philosopher- and social commentator Richard Rorty also laments the 
shift from 'achieved' to "ascribed' forms of American identity and the concomitant rise of a 
cultural Left. A consequence of this is what he describes in his 1997 William E. Massey 
lectures as the 'eclipse of [a] reformist left' that embraced a more inclusive, radical and, 
ultimately, patriotic agenda. Like Kennedy, Rorty sees the US academy 
- 
the arena where the 
cultural left has made its influence most conspicuously felt-as indicative of this trend. If 
1968 might be said to be the moment when left-liberal intellectuals first became suspicious of 
those patriotic values that sustained left-liberal Wallace supporters in 1948, then the 
humanities faculties of American universities had, by 1998, institutionalised such suspicion. 
The fact that culture has superseded class as the organizing category for the American Left is 
evident in the myriad forms of cultural and ethnic studies courses and degrees available (in 
gender, queer, African-American studies). 'Nobody, however, as Rorty caustically notes, 'is 
setting up a program in unemployed studies, homeless studies or trailerpark studies'. 72 
For Rorty, the cultural Left and the conservative 'punditocracy" have combined to 
keep issues of culture rather than economics at the top of the US political agenda. The prime 
motivation for the cultural Left, in this respect, he claims, appears to be 'to do something for 
people who have been humiliated 
-to help victims of socially acceptable forms of sadism by 
making such sadism no longer acceptable. '73 It is within this context of a response to a 
historically sited sense of "humiliation' that we might situate Delphine Roux's relationship 
with Silk in The Human Stain and, in particular, her reaction to his affair with Faunia Farley. 
The pair'initially clash after a female student approaches Roux complaining that the 
plays of Euripides taught in Silk's class are 'degrading to women' (THS, 184). Silk responds 
with disdain to such 'narrow, parochial ideological concerns' or what he regards as a 
symptom of the politicisation of culture since the 1960s. For Silk, the only way to respond to 
the plays is as an itidividual rather than from a perspective selected from the arsenal of 
identity politics. As someone who has been 'reading and thinking about these plays A [his] 
lifPI, he resents the attempt to undermine a pedagogical hierarchy based on acidevemetit. Roux 
72 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, 80. 
73 [bid. 
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responds that this may be so but he has never confronted such texts 'from Elena's feminist 
perspective'. SiJk emphatically rejects the idea that the meaning of a text can be generated 
from such 'narrow, parochial ideologicar cultural (or theoretical) sources. '"Never even"', he 
thus replies, "'from Moses's Jewish perspective. Never even from the fashionable 
Nietzschean perspective about perspective"' (THS, 191). 
Coleman Silk's cultural concerns, of course, invariably have a political dimension too. 
Earlier in the same chapter Silk overhears on campus 'three young guys, new to the faculty 
since his day 
... 
relaxing together, talking over the day's Clinton news before heading home to 
their wives and children! Their conversation is described as a 'chorus'- an obvious 
indication that, as in a Greek tragedy, what is thus being said constitutes a detached reflection 
on the main action (THS, 151). It is perhaps unsurprising that much of what is said in the 
following passage about Monica Lewinsky has significant bearing on the novel's broader 
themes and motifs. 'She was talking to everybody, one of the young men begins, 
She's part of that dopey culture. Yap, yap, yap. Part of this 
generation that is proud of its shallowness. The sincere performance 
is everything. Sincere and empty, totally empty. The sincerity that 
goes in all directions. The sincerity that is worse than falseness, and 
the innocence that is worse than corruption 
... 
Their whole language 
is a summation of the stupidity of the last forty years. Closure. 
There"s one. My students cannot stay in the place where thinking 
must occur. Closure! They fix on the conventionalised narrative, 
with its beginning, middle and end 
-every experience, no matter 
how ambiguous, no matter how knotty or mysterious, must lend 
itself to this normalizing, conventionalising, anchorman chch6. 
(THS, 147) 
We find here, then, an example of what was described in chapter three in connection with 
Lionel Trilling as a certain 'allergy to closure. Silk picks up this theme, as well as that of an 
increasingly moribund post-1960s intellectual culture in his response to the student complaint 
of misogyny in Euripides. 'They know, like, nothing. After nearly forty years of teaching such 
students, he claims, 'I can tell you that a feminist perspective on Euripides is what they least 
need. Providing the most naive of readers with a feminist perspective on Euripides is one of 
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the best ways you could devise to close down their thinking before if s even had a chance to 
begin to demolish one of their brainless "likes"" (THS, 192). 
Shortly after the Euripides episode, Delphine Roux receives the 'spooks' complaint 
from a black female student and Silk's fate is ultimately sealed. It is only when, however, 
Roux later learns of Silk's relationship with Faunia that the themes of 'humiliation' and 
'sadism' Rorty draWs attention to in relation to the cultural Left come fully to the fore. Roux is 
clearly frustrated by the fact that Silk is unimpressed by her impeccable academic credentials 
(tcole Normale Sup6rieure, Yale) and her rise to department chair whilst still in her twenties. 
She believes that Silk uses the notion of 'intellectual independence' as a screen for the 
maintenance of unequal power relations, particularly those pertaining to race and gender. 
Thus his 
-relationship with Farley is cast as an act of revenge on those women -such as 
herself 
-who questioned and eventually overturned the intellectual and institutional 
authority that was acquired on the basis of such relations: 
With no more female students who dared question his bias for 
himý to intimidate, with no more black girls needing nurturing 
for him to ridicule, with no more young women professors like 
herself threatening his hegemony for him to browbeat and insult, 
he had managed to dredge up, from the college's nethermost 
reaches, a candidate for subjugation who was the prototype of 
female helplessness: a full-fledged battered wife. 
(THS, 194) 
Roux, moreover, perceives the Silk-Farley relationship as a projection of her own 
relationship with the ex-dean. She perceives Farley as a 'mirror-image' of or 'substitute for 
herself, a woman, like Roux, who is half his age and employed by the college 'yet a woman 
otherwise my opposite in every way'. The Silk-Roux psychodrama is given much currency in 
the novel yet, as with Greek dramas such as Medea, it would be a mistake to read this in 
reductive terms as a misogynist tale of a neurotic woman unable to secure the attention of the 
man she desires. The character of Delphine Roux is very carefuHy drawn, her resistance to 
male power sympathetically described but, more interestingly, the 'crisis of identity' she 
undergoes is analogous to that experienced by Silk himself. This explains why Roux is so 
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unnerved by the fact of her own transparency in Silk's eyes. As a once inteflectually gifted 
child himself, Silk alone is able to identify and thus expose the nature of her internal struggle: 
To this day, she continued to be disquieted by Coleman Silk's presence 
just to the degree that she wished for him now to be unsettled by her. 
Something about him always led her back to her childhood and the 
precocious child's fear that she is being seen through; also to the 
precocious child"s fear that she is not being seen enough. 
(THS, 185) 
Delphine Roux is depicted in the novel as a highly intelligent individual 
'encumbered' by the social and professional disguises she is forced to assume. Like Silk, she 
chooses to 'pass' for what people take her to be: a beautiful, precocious but intellectually aloof 
French feminist professor. Yet the type of solidarities and identifications this imposes are an 
encumbrance to Roux-. This finds expression in her alienation from her immediate American 
surroundings 
- 
the students absorbed in popular culture, uninterested in her prestigious 
French intellectual pedigree; but it is also evident in the deeply ambivalent attitude she has 
towards her upbringing. This manifests itself in her earlier decision to reject the French higher 
education system for a place at Yale 
-the first step in what is characterised as an 'imperfect 
revolt against her Frenchness' (THS, 272). Like Silk, she is also forced to define herself against 
the image of an over-bearing parent who stands for much that she wishes to escape: 'family 
ideals as they were set in the thirteenth century 
... 
the pure and ancient aristocracy of the 
provinces, all of them thinking the same, looking the same, sharing the same stifling values 
and the same stifling religious obedience! Roux's mother, we learn, 'embodied those values' 
(THS, 275). 
It is her status as a woman in this specific cultural context, however, that perhaps 
constitutes the major aspect of Roux's crisis of identity. She struggles to establish good 
relationships with a 'cabal' of women tutors on the campus, prefening the company of the 
male tutors and visitors who are less dismissive of her cashmere and leather clothing and less 
disapproving of her more open sexuality. She is, in this way, caught not only between two 
cultures but also between contrasting ideas as to the significance of gender relations in these 
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cultures more generally: 'AR they see is Delphine using what she understands they 
sarcastically call "her little French aura" on all the tenured men. Yet she is strongly tempted 
to court the cabal, to tell them in so many words that she doesn't like the French aura 
-if she 
did she'd be living in France' (THS, 271-72). Likewise, in intellectual terms, Roux feels caught 
between the traditional humanism exemphfied by a writer such as Milan Kundera- whose 
lectures in Paris helped ignite her love of literature 
-and the expertise in literary theory she 
must continue to embrace in order to succeed as a foreign female scholar of literature in the 
United States. 
It is within such contexts that we once again return to both this novel"s and the 
trilogy's single most powerful theme: betrayal. To the cabal of women tutors, for example, 
'everything is an issue, everything is an ideological stance, everything is a betrayal- 
everything's a selling out. Beauvoir sold out, Delphine sold, etcetera, etcetera' (THS, 269). 
For Delphine Roux, the theme of betrayal also extends to the philosophical 
-aesthetic sphere. 
'The humanist, for example, we learn, 'is the very part of her own self that she sometimes 
feels herself betraying'. Even Kundera himself functions as a conduit for such feelings of 
betrayal. The shame imposed by a professional life that wilfully disregards those humanist 
aesthetic principles espoused by Kundera that once enchanted her has now 'become at times 
like the shame of betraying a kindly, trusting, absent lover' (THS, 266-67). Delphine Roux, at 
the end of the novel, is as besieged by social forces as Coleman Silk. This is a consequence, it 
might be said, of their unrelenting pursuit of an 'unencumbered self. If Roux's ultimate fate 
is to be 'isolated in America' then the same conditions of such isolation attend the fate of Silk: 
De-countried, isolated, estranged 
... 
in a desperate state of bewildered 
longing and surrounded on all sides by admonishing forces defining 
her as the enemy. And all because she'd gone eagerly in search of an 
existence of her own. All because she'd been courageous and refused 
to take the prescribed view of herself. She seemed to herself to have 
subverted herself in the altogether admirable effort to make herself. 
(THS, 272) 
This brings us back to the accusations of treachery, betrayal and deception levelled at 
presidents such as Bill Clinton and Richard Nixon discussed earlier. Truth and politics, 
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however, as Hannah Arendt warned, have always been wary partners. In an essay 
responding to one of the defining moments of the Vietnam war (and a high profile instance of 
Nixon administration mendacity), 'Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers' 
(1971), Arendt perceives a more intimate relationship between lying and political action: 
In order to make room for one's own action, something that 
was there before must be removed or destroyed, and things 
as they were before are changed. Such Change would be impossible 
if we could not mentally remove ourselves from where we 
physically are located and imagine that things might as well 
be different from what they actually are. In other words, the 
deliberate denial of factual truth 
- 
the ability to he 
- 
and the 
capacity to change facts 
-the ability to act ---, are interconnected; 
they owe their existence to the same source: imagination. 74 
The pertinence of this observation to the decision made by Coleman Silk to 'pass' is clear. 
Silk, in pursuing the logic of the American self-creation goal to the point that he does, is a 
man of action par excellence. Lest this escape us, Arendt goes on to state that those 'who act, to 
the extent that they feel themselves to be the masters of their own futures, will forever be 
tempted to make themselves masters of the past, too. '75 The formidable extent of such 
'mastery' on Silk's part, of course, is evident in the awful finality of the break he makes with 
his 'black' past. To be 'unencumbered' of one's past in this way then 
- 
to be ftee in a Rawlsian 
sense 
-obviously involves a degree of denial, a capacity to imagine the world otherwise that 
can only be enacted by 'living a lie' on some level. This voluntarism, premised on a wilful 
'ignorance' of present social and historical realities is, of course, apparent in the deep 
ambiguity that underwrites Rawls's 'veil of ignorance' formulation. Nonetheless, Arendt's 
claim in an earher essay, 'Truth and Pofitics', that "our ability to lie 
... 
belongs among the few 
obvious, demonstrable data that confirm human freedom', strikes the same complex note. 76 
Indeed Martin Jay, in a review of former Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos's 
memoir All Too Human: A Political Education and Christopher Hitchens's No One Left To Lie To, 
74 Arendt, *Lying in Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers', (] 971), reptinted in Crises of the Republic, 5. 
75 [bid., 11-12. 
76 Arendt, 'Truth and Politics' in Between Past and Future, 250. 
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invokes Arendt to defend Bill Clinton from the various charges of 'betrayal'. For Hitchens, 
Clinton's slippery weaving or 'triangulatioW between populist democratic rhetoric (If s the 
economy stupid'), corporate conservatism and the politics of personal ambition and power- 
lust (what Hitchens sees as his "ruthless vanity) constitutes a betrayal of (New Deal) 
liberalism. Stephanopoulos"s understanding of Chnton's treachery has, obviously, a more 
personal dimension but the same ideological aspect is never far from the surface. As Jay 
notes: 'For [Stephanopoulos], as for Hitchens, 'triangulation' is "just a fancy word for 
betrayal"'. 77 
Jay here usefully distinguishes between 'the Big Lie, the Orwellian reversal of the 
truth typical of totalitarian societies' and what he describes as 'democratic fabulation. The 
former, he claims, 'seeks to still the conflict of disparate opinions and install a monolithic 
belief system to which no alternative is possible 
... 
[and] 
... 
the imaginative potential of lying is 
squashed in the name of a perfectly realised myth, which can brook no critical resistance. The 
latter, however, is characterised by a public realm premised on the free exchange of 'opinion' 
that, by its very existence, downgrades the idea of 'truth' in the political sphere. Jay then goes 
to explain both the process and outcome of the Chnton-Lewinsky crisis as products of such 
'democratic fabulation' that'allow a thousand mendacious flowers to bloom". 
The problem with critics of such self-created, 'shding' subjects as Clinton, Jay 
suggests, is that they ignore this context of "democratic fabulation'- the only political context 
that makes room for such subjectivity. As Jay says: 'Not only does Hitchens discem a 
consistent pattern of duplicitous triangulation in everything Clinton has done, he is also 
confident of knowing all the motives underlying the President' s actions. No action is 
overdetermined or indeterminant; they all serve the same triangulating function: maintaining 
political viability at the cost of betraying a liberal agenda'. 78 
It is precisely the idea of 'overdeterminatioW 
- 
that is, of an effect produced by more 
than one cause 
- 
that heavily informs Roth's novelistic constructions of 'character. This is the 
case not only in 7he Hunian Stain where Coleman's act of 'passing' and his affair with Faunia 
77 Jay, 'Mendacious Flowets', 2 1. 
78 Ibid., 22. 
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Farley are obviously 'over-determined' in this sense but also in the other novels. It 
underwrites too the theme of 'betrayal' as it is articulated through the conduit of character. If 
figures such as the Swede, Ira Ringold, and Coleman Silk are, as Roth himself claims, 
representative, they are so in complex 'over-determined' ways 
-as both the agents and the 
victims of the various social, cultural and ideological forces of their times. They are not only 
accused of 'betrayal' on the basis of reductive interpretations of their character but, as we 
have seen, also 'betrayed' themselves by the promise of a specific mid-century expression of 
American liberalism. This might best be described as a 'paleo-liberalism' squeezed to the 
margins of American life by the end of the century as a result of the rise of neo-conservatism 
and the cultural Left. 79This is the 'majoritarian' liberalism of the mid-century 'proud decades' 
of American life that was both anti-McCarthy aizd unambiguously anti-communist. The 
emphasis here is on the relationship of the individual to the republic or broader izatioiial 
collective rather than any ethnic sub-group. Its more profound liberal moorings, on the other 
hand, are given their most trenchant theoretical expression in the work of John Rawls. 
If a political position can be consistently traced in these late novels of Philip Roth 
then this is surely it. Such 'paleo-liberalism' is perhaps best characterised by its unapologetic 
commitment to the idea of America and, in this way, is deeply rooted in the aspirational, 
optimistic yet pragmatic politics of the founding fathers discussed in chapter one. It is also 
this specific form of patriotic ardour that connects this politics to the republican origins of the 
United States. The post-war political developments most hostile to this 'paleo-fiberahsm'- 
what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. famously described as the politics of the "vital center'- are those 
that come under the strongest fire in these novels. They include the un-American 
'Americanism' of McCarthyist demagoguery; the toWitarian terminus point of communist 
politics; the infantfle "popular democratic' political theatre of the New Left during the 
Vietnam years; the conservative and neo-conservative assault on the private sphere that 
produced such hysteria over Clinton's sexual behaviour in the nineties and the anti-Aitist, 
79 1 wish to distinguish this understanding of 'paleo-liberal' from that now commonly propounded by contemporary 
conservatives and neo-conservatives who deploy the term pejoratively to dismiss those who 'stubbornly' cling to a 'minoritarian' 
liberalism rooted in the identity politics of the 1960s. It is this 'McGovemite' wing of the Democratic Party that Norman 
Podhoretz praises Bill Clinton for narginalizing in the 1990s. 
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anti-Americanism of the late twentieth-century cultural Left. It is this notion of the American 
political novelist as, in some sense, 'republican', that I believe unites the fictions examined 
thus far and that will now be explored in greater detail. 
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Writing the Republic: Mo by Dick and the Form of 
American Political Fiction 
I cannot praise afugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, 
that never sallies out and sees her adversanj, but slinks out of the race, 
where that immortal garland is to be runfor, not without dust and heat.... 
Milton, Areopagitica 
Artisticform, correctly understood, does notformulate content that 
has already been prepared and discovered, but rather allows it to be 
found and seenfor thefirst time. 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems in Dostoevsky's Poetics 
In the latter half of the 1960s Irving Howe developed and refined some of the themes he had 
discussed in the previous decade connected with the relationship between politics and the 
American novel. In Politics and the Novel (1957) Howe, taking his cue from the myth critics, 
had, for his purposes been more or less content to dismiss the American novel as hopelessly 
imprisoned by a 'politics of isolation".. His 1967 essay 'Anarchy and Authority in American 
Literature', however, somewhat retreated from this view by tracing a latent political strain in 
classic American fiction, that is, 'a politics concerned with the idea of society itself, a politics 
that dares consider 
-wonderful question- whether society is good and-still more 
wonderful 
- 
whether society is necessary. " From this Howe remarks on a 'paradox' that 
would seem to completely re-conceptualise the status of politics in American literature as it 
was understood in his earlier study: 
The paradox of it all is that a literature which on any manifest level 
is not really political at all should nevertheless be precisely the 
literature to raise the most fundamental question in political theory: 
What is the rationale for society, the justification for the state? ' 
Accordingly, what we find in this 'fundamental' form of political questioning, he avows, is 'a 
strong if subterranean current of anarchism'. Howe is then careful 
-perhaps too carefu I -to 
' 'Anarchy and Authority in American Literature' reprinted in Howe, Selected Writings: 1950- / 990,107. 
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distinguish this 'anarchisf strain from its nineteenth-century European variants which he 
associates, by implication, with urbanism, industrialisation and 'a spectrum of emphases 
from Populism to terrorism. ' What he wishes to convey, rather, is that sense of 'anarchism as 
a social vision arising spontaneously from the conditions of preindustrial American culture, 
anarchism as a bias of the American imagination releasing its deepest, which is to say its most 
frustrated, yearnings'. 2This is something akin, we might say, to the almost visceral, emotion- 
invested idea of 'persuasioW discussed previously. Here then, as in the conclusion to his 
chapter on the American political novel in Politics aiid the Novel, Howe wishes to draw a 
distinction between America and Europe. 
One of the political novels Howe refers to As representative of the type American 
culture is incapable of producing is Dostoevsky's The Possessed. Anarchism of the 'European" 
cast,. as understood by Howe in his 1967 piece, is, of course, one of this novel's chief concerns. 
Yet, as Howe himself notes in his chapter on Dostoevsky (which focuses largely on The 
Possessed), the cultural context for this exploration of anarchism stands in sharp 
contradistinction to those of Western Europe familiar from the novels of a writer such as 
Joseph Conrad. It is one of a continental land mass which is 'neither wholly Asiatic or 
European, characterised by an intellectual culture in which, in Howe's phrase, a 'mania for 
totality' looms ever large as the twentieth century approaches. Modern Russian literature, as 
it begins to find expression in the novels of Dostoevsky, is an outlet for an understanding, in 
Howe's words, of 'religion as a branch of politics and politics as a form of religion', informed 
by ideas such as myth, prophecy and salvation-ideas far from the concerns of European 
realism. 'The school of criticism which treats the novel mainly in terms of social manners 
will', in this respect, Howe continues, "consequently face great difficulties when confronted 
wifli a writer like Dostoevsky. '3 
It is clear that this cultural context ensures that, at least in some respects, 
Dostoevsky's novels would appear to resemble more closely the loose, prophetic 
theologically informed romances of Herman Melville or Nathaniel Hawthorne than the sober 
2 [bid. 
I 
' Howe, Politics and the Novel, 52. 
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and secular political fictions of a Stendhal or Conrad. As with so much else though, Alexis de 
Tocqueville had already alerted the mid-nineteenth century reading public to the shared 
sense of providential design underwriting American and Russian national identity. His 
fascinating comparative analysis of the two nations at the close of Volume I of Dettiocracy i. 11 
America also serves to illuminate the differing cultural contexts that give shape to the 
respective expressions of 'anarchism' in Dostoevsky and classic American literature. 'The 
American', he notes, 
fights against natural obstacles; the Russian is at grips with men. The 
former combats the wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civilization 
with all its arms. America's conquests are made with the plowshare, 
Russia's with the sword. 
To attain their aims, the former relies on personal interest and 
gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of 
individuals. 
The latter in a sense concentrates the whole power of society 
in one man. 
One has freedom as the principal means of action; the other 
has servitude. 4 
Though the former can, in quite straightforward fashion, be associated with 
'democratic" characters such as Natty Bumppo and Huck Finn, the latter might equally be 
seen in the 'autocratic' light of Aaron Burr, Captain Ahab or John Brown as weH as a figure 
I 
such as Pyotr Verhovensky, the charismatic anarchist revolutionary leader in The Possessed. 
These are all, to embrace the apposite metaphor, 'Tsarist' figures seeking to annihilate the 
agency or autonomous capacities of their foHowers; their aim is to operate as 'concentrations' 
of 'the whole power of society in one man. The nineteenth century American context, 
nonetheless, is democratic rather than autocratic. Accordingly, the 'Tsarist' usurper figure is 
re-constituted in American culture as the ambivalent classical dictator who seeks to wrest 
control of republican institutions ftom the people but also claims to act in their name. What 
connects Russia and the United States then, in their shared cultural compulsion to explore 
such figures is an awareness of their respective cultures' powerful self-conceptions of the 
nation-state in terms of 'manifest destiny'. Both, after all, turned out to be the most significant 
4 Alexis dc Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 1,412. 
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imperial powers of the twentieth century, the respective architects, as Tocqueville so 
curiously anticipated, of a 'bi-polar' world for close to five decades: 'their point of departure 
I 
is different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each seems called by some secret design of 
Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world. '5 
Equally, in pursuing this connection, we might take note of what Mikhail Bakhtin 
identifies as the stress on 'simultaneity' evident in Dostoevsky's work 
-a stress that would 
appear to resonate with notions more familiar from the repertoire of myths uncovered by the 
post-war group of American literary critics. just as Howe, like these earlier critics, reads 
much classic American literature 'spatially", Bakhtin views Dostoevsky's work as expressive 
of a 'persistent urge to see A things as being coexistent and to perceive and depict all things 
side by side and simultaneously, as if in space rather than time. 6 This leads, Bakhtin 
continues, to a very specific conception of novelistic character: 
[Dostoevsky's] characters recall nothing, they have no biography, 
in the sense of something in the past or of something fully ex- 
perienced and endured. They remember from their past only those 
things which have not ceased to be current for them and which 
continue to be experienced in the present: an unexpiated sin or 
crime, an unforgiven insult 
... 
Therefore there is no causality in the 
Dostoevskian novel, no origination, no explanations based on the 
past, on the influence of the environment or of upbringing, etc. The 
hero's every act is in the present, and in this sense is unpredetermined; 
it is conceived of and depicted by the author as being free. 7 
Dostoevsky, we might conclude, is a purveyor of nineteenth-century Russian 
"Adams'-those representations of 'anarchy' that stand in extreme tension to Tsarist and 
Orthodox Christian 'authority'. Not only do the above examples of a perspectiveless, 
ahistorical view of 'an unexpiated. sin or crime, an unforgiven insult' obviously bring to mind 
Captain Ahab or John Brown, they also recall the predicaments of those 'Adamic' figures 
associated with the idea of destructive "innocence' explored in earlier chapters. These would 
3 Ibid. 
6 Mikhail Bakhtin, Probkms in Dostoevskv's Poetics, 23. 
7 Ibid., 24. 
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include Owen Brown, Seymour Levov or Coleman Silk but this Bakhtinian understanding of 
character equally returns us to the invocations of Melville's Billy Budd and Dostoevsky's 
Grand Inquisitor in Lionel Trilling's 77w Middle of t1w fountey covered in chapter three. The 
chief concern that connects such fictions is the meaning of such Adamic 'innocence' in the 
domain of the political-a sense of innocence, many contend today, that finds in the 
American literary tradition more expression than it merits historically. 
Irving Howe, nonetheless, is surely right to suggest that amongst Dostoevsky's major 
achievements as a novelist of politics is his capacity to problematise this will to innocence. As 
he writes of Dostoevsky's characters: 'None escapes humiliation and shame, none is left free 
from attack. In the world of Dostoevsky, no one is spared, but there is a supreme consolation: 
no one is excluded! This 'will to innocence' is connected with an aversion to politics and the 
'dirty hands' and shabby compromises, the potential for 'humiliation and shame" it entails, an 
aversion that the American liberal tradition 
-especially in its privileging of the economy over 
the polity as the realm of 'freedom'-has done much to engender. It is precisely this 
perception of the political that the republican impulse in American political fiction seeks to 
confront, counter and, ultimately, correct. 
ý In Political Fiction and the American Self John Whalen-Bridge usefully puts forward an 
understanding of 'republican criticism' as a criticism premised on a repudiation of the 
conventional notion that 'politics is "Other" to the concerns of literature'. 8 However, this 
important if tentative attempt to define an American literary tradition of 'radical 
republicanism'- in the aýsence of an account of what might differentiate a 'radical' form of 
republicanism from any other in Whalen-Bridge's study 
-requires further substantiation. The 
'republican' proposal appears briefly at the close of a chapter in the middle of Political Fictioiz 
atid Hie Atiterican Self before quickly fading from view. Whalen-Bridge's concluding chapter, 
whilst usefully suggesting, amongst other things, that 'novels that combine politics with 
literary purpose' should not be sidelined in favour of 'novels aboitt politics', nonetheless 
8 Whalen-Btidge, Political Fiction and the American Sey. 95. 
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leaves the republican impulse which would enable us to discriminate between the two, 
undefined. 
It is my view that that there is a clearly discernible tradition of American political 
fiction whose formal narrative qualities locate it within a nexus of republican values that 
serve to distinguish it from other fictional works. This is not to say that such political fictions 
are unrelated to what John Carlos Rowe has described as the 'liberal tradition [ofl aestlietic 
dissenf grounded in an "Emersonian 
... 
assumption that rigorous reflection on the processes of 
thought and representation constitutes in itself a critique of social reality and effects a 
transformation of the naYve realism that confuses truth with social convention'. 9 For Rowe, 
this "Emersonian aura" has marginalized a literature rooted in political action rather than 
contemplation but, once more, the political design of his analysis appears to be no more than 
to extend the range of both the historical and contemporary literary canons. We are asked, yet 
again, to 'purify' an American past and create some new American Adams (with a few Eves 
thrown in for good measure), only this time from the raw materials provided by politically 
'innocent' victims of the by now familiar catalogue of American oppression (slavery, racism, 
sexism, genocide and so forth). The novels that I examined in earlier chapters, however, were 
not selected on the basis that they fail to discuss the various blights on the American 
historical record but that they do so whilst problematising 
-rather than seeking to sustain at 
all costs 
- 
the idea of innocence in these or any other highly charged political contexts. 
i 
Moreover, in their adherence to a set of recognisable formal qualities, they remain within the 
philosophical contours of what I take to be a usable Emersonian tradition of 'aesthetic dissent. 
The particular narrative feature that connects a broad range of American political 
novels can be characterised by the tension between what we might describe as a 'conflicted 
narrator' and an ambivalently viewed central character who is the prime focus of the 
narrative. The novelistic template for this form, as I will demonstrate, is inaugurated with 
Herman Melville's Moby Dick but goes on to provide the architecture for numerous American 
political novels from Henry Adams's Democracy (1880) through to Robert Penn Warren's All 
9 Rowe, At Emerson 's Tomb: Me Politics of Classic American Literature, ix, 1. 
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judgements pre-supposed in the Bakhtinian schema, it also ultimately demands 'an end or at 
least a suspension of interpretive wonder. ' As Whalen-Bridge concludes: 
The political act itself requires the suspension of interpretation. 
One of the things literature often resents about politics is just this 
delimitation of a horizon of possibilities., an exclusion of some 
possibilities 
-which will frequently strike some literary observers 
as "unimaginative'. Politics, from a strictly literary point of view, 
opens the door to a flawed dimension of human existence. Literary 
study favours -open-ended interpretation (the celebration of 
Bakhtin's heteroglossia), whereas politics tends towards a finality 
of meaning that is called monologic. 10 
It is, accordingly, an act of discrimination (with all the connotations that term houses) 
that results in a final choice between competing interpretive judgements that is the sine qita 
non of political action. In politics, 'dialogue' must always eventually give way to 'monologue' 
insofar as one option 'discriminates' against others that are either compromised via 
absorption or excluded altogether. Whalen-Bridge's point here constitutes another 
breakthrough in our understanding of political fiction; but, if we go on to pursue the idea of a 
republican-oriented literature (as well as criticism), we can perceive the degree to which, in 
the American political novel at least, the dynamic between those literanj inclinations that 
favour the dialogical and those political inclinations that lean towards the monological 
provide a fruitful basis for both comprehending a political tradition and thinking about 
politics more generally. 
In order to do this we must first take account of the opinion William R. Everdell puts 
forward in his magisterial history of republicanism The End of Kings (1983). 'The essential 
republican principle', he posits, "is that no one person shall rule the community, that 
everyone shaff have a part in the public's business. "' This most basic of prohibitions against 
autocracy is at the very heart of the tension between the narrators and the central narrated 
characters in the American political novel. The central moral problem that arises in this 
situation presents itself as one primarily of character 
-what is it about the 'character' of the 
10 Whalen-Bridge, Political Fiction and the American Sey, 172. 
" Everdell, Me End of Kings, 297. 
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figures under description that makes them a threat to the republic? However, as Everdell 
astutely recogruses, this is merely symptomatic of a political culture that has degetwrated to the 
point that questions of character tend to arise in a very limited context: 
American history itself has resolved, at the elementary level, into a 
chronicle of presidential character, conveniently divided into thirty- 
nine presidential administrations 
... 
The most trivial events of a 
presidential election get more attention than the passage and pub- 
lication of laws. Children are taught virtue through the contemplation 
of Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Roosevelt (first names 
unnecessary except for the Roosevelts) and are not even taught the 
last names of John Milton, Roger Sherman, Thaddeus Stevens, or 
George Norris. Ben Franklin hangs on grimly, despite the fact that no- 
one celebrates his birthday, and despite being dropped off the half- 
dollar in favor of a president whose most lasting accomplishment 
was to fall before an assassin's bullet in the age of television. 12 
'Republican' political fiction serves to counter this impulse by bringing to bear on the 
'monological' outlook of the dictator the consciousness of a conflicted, ambivalent narrator. 
This narrator is generally both critical of yet conditioned by a 'presiding' authority in the text 
or, alternatively, the 'presidential' qualities of the character whose story he narrates. In this 
respect, in republican political terms, the narrator most resembles the figure of the senator 
whose "rank' depends on the characteristics Everdell denotes as "intelligence, judgement and 
preparation. '13 It is through our own assessments of these particular 'senatorial' qualities of 
the 
-narrator that we, in turn, pass judgement on his or her 'reliability'. Such novels 
furthermore, insofar as they seek to 'balance' narrative power, deploy their narrators in a way 
that recalls the upper chamber's most important responsibility in a republic 
-to provide the 
final barrier against dictatorship. This might go some way to explaining why, though the 
narrated character usually dies by the close of the narrative, the narrator almost always 
'survives', invariably as a chastened isolato and/or Ishmaefite exile. 
The closure of such fictions, nonetheless, invariably involve articulations of pastoral, 
sometimes even 'Adamic' renewal. We might here recall Ishmael, adrift 'on a soft and dirge- 
12 Ibid., 313. 
13 Ibid., 270. 
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like main' amidst 'unharming sharks 
... 
and 'savage sea-hawks 
... 
with sheathed beaks'14; 
Owen Brown making his way westward under a 'sky [that] had cleared' over 'fields covered 
with a skin of powdery snow(CS, 758); Charles Schuyler in Bitrr representing the United 
States government in Europe at a Feast of the Immaculate Conception, the final image here 
being that of the 'crowned figure of the Virgin' (Burr, 574). We should consider, finally, 
Zuckerman's description of the stars above the New England countryside at the end of I 
Married A Communist as a 'colossal spectacle of no antagonism' (IMA C, 323) or his 'pure and 
peaceful' vision at the close of The Human Stain of a 'solitary man on a bucket, fishing through 
eighteen inches of ice in a lake that's constantly turning over its water atop an arcadian 
mountain in America' (THS, 361). The central point is that whilst subordination to the 
'monological' will of the 'dictator' invariably generates tragedy, nevertheless an American 
sense of freedom that reasserts the importance of judgement and intelligence always allows 
for the possibility of a republican return to first principles. Such novels are Janus-faced in so 
far as they reflect a society that, at once, reveres a political act of founding yet produces a 
literature, as Philip Fisher has written, premised on 'creative destruction'. 15 
The republic is couched in literal terms in the novels I have examined but it can also 
be presented through metaphor or allegory- an attribute John Whalen-Bridge construes in 
terms of 'submerged' politics in relation to Moby Dick. For Whalen-Bridge, Moby Dick 
represents a loss of political nerve on Melville's part, a recognition that art in mid-nineteenth 
century America was obliged to conform to the bourgeois imperatives of a relatively narrow 
reading public. Notwithstanding this though, he believes, the novel's excursion into a tale 
that foregrounds the 'politics of storytelling' confronts readers with the residue of a 'censored 
chapter' that provides some intimation of an 'honorific treatment of class revolt' that was, 
finally, aborted. 16 'The novel as it is written, mainly as Ahab's story, it is claimed in this way, 
I only comes into being by displaiqing a different story. Any novel is the displacement of 
14 Melville, U60 Dick, 470. 
13 See Fisher, Still the New, World: American Literature in a Culture of Creative Destruction. 
16 Whalen-Bridge, Political Fiction and the American Se#' 
, 
47. 
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innumerable possible novels, but Moby Dick is different since it suggests so strongly what that 
other novel would have been: the story of a democratic hero's repudiation of tyranny. "-, 
V%Thalen-Bridge offers a close reading of the "The Tozvn-Hds Story" chapter in which 
Ishmael recalls the occasion he relayed the tale of a ship rebellion to a group of aristocratic 
Peruvian Dons in Lima. This metafictional frame, it is argued, aHows MelviHe to present the 
chapter as a political parable that foregrounds the politics of storytelling. Ishmael's self- 
censorship and carefully choreographed evasions in this narrative are the result of a 
sensitivity to his audience whom 
- 
despite being fascinated by the spectre of mutiny 
- 
are 
equally constrained by aristocratic values that reject any questioning of the existing social 
order. This neo-Marxist reading of Moby Dick is supported by various 'two book' theories 
Whalen-Bridge recruits from earlier Melville scholarship. These theories, based on 
interpretation of Melviffe's correspondence and other documentary evidence, account for the 
novel's discontinuities and structural puzzles in a number of ways; but more than one 
proposes that both "The Towii-Ho's Story" and Steelkilt (the 'democratic hero' character who 
features in Ishmael's tale) once provided the basis for the novel as originally conceived by 
Melville. 
Whalen-Bridge offers some persuasive close readings of "The Town-Ho's Story" 
chapter as well as of other episodes in Moby Dick but leans too heavily, as many earlier 
political readings of the novel perhaps have, on interpretation that must reduce the level of 
ambiguity in the text (and its sub-texts). By reading the novel primarily through the prism of 
"The Town-Ho's Story" he appears to be consumed by a desire to unearth and celebrate a 
"democratic hero' without exploring-as Melville does-the political (as well as aesthetic) 
merits of such an unambiguous enterprise. For Whalen-Bridge, furthermore, the political novel 
must, by definition, not only be activist in this sense but, judging by both the works he 
chooses to celebrate and his readings of them, it must be activism of a left-leaning, feminist 
and pro-choice stripe. q At one point the need to avoid 'preaching to the choir' is asserted but it 
remains difficult to see in his study of works by Jack London, Norman Mailer, Toni Morrison 
17 [bid., 57. 
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and Margaret Atwood how any space is made available in these texts for the possibility of 
persuasion rather than mere affirmation. 
Twentieth century 'republican' notions of the public sphere as formulated by thinkers 
such as Hannah Arendt, by contrast, conceive the concept of persuasion as absolutely crucial 
to a healthy democratic polity. This can be viewed in Nietzschean terms, as an 'agonistic' 
process, or as a more benign instantiation of what Jfirgen Habermas has described as 
'communicative action' but, either way, it posits an open-ended relation between speaker and 
listener. 18 This is a relation, ultimately, that allows for a much greater degree of cognitive 
dissonance than that evident between the author of Political Fictim mid Me Americati Self and 
the novelists under consideration in that work. One of the central ideas too, of modern 
Rawlsian liberalism, it might be added, is that a self "unencumbered' by those pre-existing 
structural or ideological constraints that distort judgement must be the first condition of 
social justice. 
When Whalen-Bridge disavows then, the 'either/or formulation in which a book 
either sends us to the barricades or enlarges our experience', the disvowal involves more than 
the suggestion that it can do both; the inference is that it must. The "barricades' here, of course, 
are no more than a metaphor for the more general notion of activism championed elsewhere 
in the study. We might, however, respond by asking whether an effective political novel 
should not only be capable of 'send[ing] us to the barricades' but, alternatively, why might it 
not also be possible for it to prompt us to question some of the assumptions that helped 
assemble those barricades in the first place. In other words, why does there appear to be an 
implicit prohibition against the idea of an effective conservative political novel? Why is it hard 
to imagine Whalen-Bridge grappling with the relative complexity of the political vision in, to 
take just one example considered earlier, Philip Roth's Anierican Pastoral? This is not to say 
that the studies of novels such as London's The Irott Heel or Mailer's Harlot's Ghost presented 
in Political Fiction and the American Self are reductive in any critical sense (or the novels 
'g This division, in fact, is represented in contemporary scholarship on Arendt. For an example of the 'agonistic' approach to the 
concept of a public sphere in Arendt see Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: 7he Fate of the Political (19%). for an expression of the 
'Habermasian' interpretation of Arendt see Benhabib, 7he Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (19%). 
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themselves flawed in any aesthetic sense), merely that it seems curious that the only 
identifiable politics in either the criticism or the fiction itself continually falls within certain 
recognisably left-hberal parameters. 
Such a limited political ambit perhaps explains why Whalen-Bridge views the fact 
that Moby Dick cannot be read as a 'democratic hero's repudiation of tyranny' represents 
failure of a sort. Despite his own earlier acknowledgement that 'aesthetic language and 
political language are not mutually exclusive'19, he then goes on to state the following: 
Melville's novel, then, was certainly connected with politics, and its 
political representations are not merely background scenery. It alluded 
to explosive controversies that would, in a few years, sunder the nation, 
yet these allusions are buried beneath teeming references to the Bible, 
literature of the more secular sort, general history, American and world 
geography, as well as subjects cetological. My claim is that the political 
portion is not merely outweighed by these other matters; it is masked by 
them. The political content dives beneath an ocean of literariness. 20 
For a critical study that leans to the left in the way Whalen-Bridge's does, the 
slippage between thought and action in his conception of the political novel is strange. 
"Action", in the form of 'activism' is privileged over the 'act' of judging or, in Melville's case, 
dramatising those conditions marked by the absence of requisite judgement. My point in 
relation to Moby Dick would be that, though Ishmael may not have 'repudiated' the 
dictatorship of Ahab, he has survived it and, it would seem, imparted an invaluable amount of 
political wisdom in his account of the travails of the Pequod. It might be seen, in any case, as a 
I very shallow 'submersioW of politics that-a century and a half after its original 
appearance 
- 
allows a number of cultural critics to plunge into Moby Dick as a way of 
understanding the foreign policy of George W. Bush since September 11th 2001.21 
The political point of Melville"s novel, nevertheless, is undoubtedly more ambiguous 
than such appropriations ultimately permit. As with Hannah Arendt' s famous account of the 
trial of the Nazi functionary Adolf Eichmann, the meanings of Moby Dick may not be 
'9 [bid., 4. 
20 [bid., 46. 
21 See Epstein, 'Leviathan' and Patrick McGrath, 'Deep Waters' for readings of Melville's novel as 'prophetic' in the wake of the 
subsequent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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apparent so much in its dramatisation of a "failure. to repudiate' but, rather, in its depiction of 
the repercussions of a certain kind of 'thoughtlessness' or 'inability to think'. 2-1 In the context 
of the American political novel, this often takes the form of an examination of the bieyz petisaw 
or 'thoughtless' fiberal. 231t is a similar 'thoughtlessness' to that exhibited by Owen Brown in 
Cloudsplitter; Gifford Maxim (and Arthur and Nancy Croom) in The Middle of t1te lotimey; Ira 
Ringold in I Married A Communist and Seymour Levov in American Pastoral. 
Nonetheless the motivation behind American fictional explorations of such 
phenomena has its roots in more than just the residual or attenuated 'republican' persuasion 
referred to above. It is also a deeply entrenched component of a more recognisably modern 
liberal tradition within the intellectual and artistic culture of the United States 
-a tradition of 
immanent liberal critique. Indeed, as intellectual historians have been increasingly keen to 
stress in recent years, it makes little sense to speak of a politics informed by republicanism, 
liberalism, Protestant Christianity or, returning to Howe's more fluid designation, 
'anarchism', in terms of autonomous spheres. Americans, as James Kloppenberg has 
remarked, were uniquely positioned to ensure that they yielded to no single vision: 
In the absence of rigid traditions requiring differentiation by bloodlines, 
classes, or creeds, it was possible in nineteenth century America 
... 
for 
diverse interpretations of these ideas to coexist and for loose and fluid co- 
alitions to form and dissolve as different issues appeared and vanished. 24 
The contrapuntal structure of the American political novel I have outlined represents 
an attempt to negotiate some of the difficulties in maintaining the forms of "co-existence' and 
I coalition' Kloppenberg cites. The counterpoint drawn in these works between the 'presiding' 
authority of the central 'narrated character and a countervailing 'senatorial' authority, of 
course, is not the only source of political tension in these works. As with MoInj Dick, the 
template for this form, there are usually a good deal of voices 'in between' which give these 
works much of the dialogical and 'democratic' flavour Bakhtin uncovered in Dostoevsky. 
22 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 49. 
2" The term translates as 'right thinking' ftom the French but is invariably invoked with a derogatory implication that signals a 
mindless compliance with fiLshionable intellectual and moral positions. 
24 Kloppenberg, Me Virtues of Liberalism, 62. 
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Nevertheless, what makes the American political novel primarily 'republican' rather than 
democratic in character is their foregrounding of this central tension between the two 
narrating and narrated personages: the man of action and the man of thought, the novel's 
'executive" power and its (unacknowledged) legislator. 
The difficulty in disentangling the republican and democratic facets of political 
fiction in the United States is testimony to the complexity of the American political tradition 
more generally. Whilst the identification of this tradition with "liberalism' remains the 
unavoidable starting point in the study of US intellectual history, literary critics concerned 
with understanding the dynamics of the American political novel must begin to share the 
more complex understanding of that liberal tradition advanced by post-consensus intellectual 
historians. In short, they must, to some extent, excavate the understanding of the 'liberal 
imagination' articulated by Lionel Trilling in the years immediately following World War II. 
For Trilling, liberalism itself is uniquely imbued with the resources to interrogate its own 
premises. Confronted by the coercive rationialisations of an institutionalised liberalism at 
mid-century, Trilling called for an intellectual culture once again energized by a liberalism of 
self-reflexivity. This would constitute a liberalism, he added, once more embedded in 'its first 
essential imagination of variousness and possibility, which implies the awareness of 
complexity and difficulty. 2-1 
In his famous preface to The Liberal Imagination Trifling goes on to assert the 'unique 
relevance' of literature to such a project. As well as the fact that so much modern literature 
has taken politics for its subject, he notes, 'more importantly 
... 
literature is the human activity 
that takes the fullest and most precise account of variousness, possibility, complexity, and 
difficulty. '26This'emphasis on critical attributes such as 'variousness' and 'complexity' has 
been taken up by cultural critic Stefan Collini who appreciatively invokes Trilling's supple 
methodology in order to re-affirm. the importance *of 'persuasion' in political and cultural 
debate. Cultural criticism of this ", CoUini claims, distances itself from the 'tidier 
intellectual worlds' typical of post-1960s theory and ideology-critique along with the zero- 
2-'Tiilling, Me Liberal Imagination, 14. 
2" [bid. 
208 
sum closure of debate they impficitly engender. Although Whalen-Bridge's Political FICtioti 
and the American Self is keen to undermine the quest for purity and the re-inscribed 
Adamicism of the New Americanists, the over-riding finpression is still of a related quest to 
preserve intellectual and political purity on the author's own part. There is no sense, for 
instance, of any of the novels Whalen-Bridge examines having persuaded him of an alternative 
political view, only perhaps of giving a more sophisticated expression to those he already 
held. For all its stress on 'activism' and 'conflict, the result, ultimately, is a relatively benign 
encounter between writer and critic in which both emerge politicaHy unscathed. 
By contrast, the process of persuasion, Collini states, is 'more like coming to enjoy 
someone's company than like losing at chess. '27This, it seems to me, can be adapted to the 
context 6f the republican 'persuasion' identified here in the genre of American political * 
fiction. The authors of such novels, of course, do not demonstrate anything so intellectually 
I tidy / as a coherent republican ethos committed to civic virtue, an autonomous public sphere 
of politically active citizens, a suspicion of centralized power and so on. Nonetheless such 
commitments are implicitly and, on occasions, explicitly evident in the works in the form of a 
republican persuasion that serves to distinguish them from less political forms of American 
fiction. 
Moreover, in taking account of the importance of "variousness', 'complexity' and 
'persuasion', these works reflect the ways in which such values have historically coalesced 
and clashed with those others forged by Lockean liberalism, non-conformist Protestant 
Christianity, Marxism and neo-conservatism. The result is that these values generally appear 
in complex, hybridized forms that, since Melvilles MoInj Dick, have underwritten a clearly 
discernible novelistic structure. This structure has enabled American novelists to convey 
complex crystallizations of ideas at a number of historical junctures. American ideals, 
whether republican, liberal, Protestant, radical or neo-conservative are filtered through this 
novelistic form as a means of digesting the meaning of social and cultural change for the 
health of the polity. It is this essential concern for the republic, that is, with the political 
27 Collini, 'On Vafiousness; and on Pemuasion', 
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foundations that sustain and support the idea of the American polity, that gives these novels 
their political vitality and often encourages critics to classify them with reference to that 
chimerical but seemingly irrepressible beast- the great American novel. 
In Blood of the Liberals (2000), George Packer presents a genealogy of American 
liberalism since the Civil War in the form of a family memoir. He sees no contradiction in 
recording the beliefs, careers and fates of three generations of liberals using the vehicle of a 
literary form traditionally marked by 'sentiment. 'Goethe said that there are no liberal ideas, 
only liberal sentiments, Packer writes, 
But sentiments and ideas are more closely related than we 
usually think. Few people reach a political opinion by deduction 
from some abstract system of philosophy; most feel their way 
into the opinions they hold, often contradictory ones, and are 
hardly aware of the forces within and without that drive them. 28 
Packer's exquisite fusion of memoir and inteflectual history, of 'sentiment' and ideas, 
has a corollary in the American political novels considered in this study. Each is concerned 
with the meaning of intellectual 'inheritance' in the context of a liberal tradition; each exhibits 
grave political tensions between fathers and sons (literal or metaphorical); each is aware that 
to write the republic is always to write a tale of generational conflict, to write the story of, in 
Packer's words, 'an inherited idea crashing up against the hard rock of new circumstance. '29 
This, of course, underlies the idea of republican 'declension' or what J. G. A. Pocock described 
as the 'Machiavellian moment' when the republic's finitude or its perceived detachment from 
a pristine moment of political origin, serves to generate a sense of political crisis. American 
republicanism, like earlier incarnations, has a celebrated historical birth, its own rich gallery 
of personalities, myths, motifs and revelatory moments. The novelists here give voice to the 
solicitude with which the republican persuasion inevitably confronts historical change. 
'A republic, if you can keep W', announced Benjamin Franklin to the throng outside 
the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention in 1787. In order to keep it, however, as Franklin 
28 Packer, Blood of the Liberals, 7. 
29 Ibid., 8. 
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no doubt meant to imply, one must first be aware of how precious it is: how it was acquired 
via conflict and sacrifice; how it was 'consummated' (to use Lincoln's term) only after a four 
year orgy of fratricidal slaughter; and how, finally, it negotiated the internal and external 
pressures brought on by neo-imperial imperatives in a nuclear age. It is the tradition that has 
unfolded in response to developments such as these that has here been subject to several 
novel understandings. In this way the American political novelist's task is to make sense of 
the republic in time, to shed light on the evolution of its political tradition, to chart the 
process of punctuated equilibrium evident in those moments where idea can no longer be 
reconciled with circumstance. As such, the American political novelist, like the republican, 
has less interest in wielding power via, say, 'activism", than he has in examining its (always) 
theoretically informed basis. 'Given the choice', William Everdell has remarke. d, 'a republican 
would prefer to tinker not with nuclear command but with symbolism and mythology. He 
believes, as someone once wrote, if one can but tell the stories of a people, one cares not who 
makes its laws'. 30 
Everdell, Ae End ofKings, 313. 
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